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INTRODUCTION
On March 14, 2000, Utah Governor Mike Leavitt signed into law House
Bill 103, a measure that prevents unmarried couples from adopting children.'
The law places children with two married heterosexual adults and expressly
denies others from becoming adoptive parents. The exclusion applies to
same-sex couples, unmarried heterosexual couples, and single parents who
live with a partner or significant other.'
Utah's law is not an anomaly. In 1977, Florida was the first state to pro-
hibit gay individuals and unmarried couples from adopting.3 In 1999, Arkan-
1. Katherine Kapos & Heather May, Adoption Law Faces Legal Tests, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Mar. 17, 2000, at C6.
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3) (2003) ("(a) A child may be adopted by: (i) adults who
are legally married to each other in accordance with the law of this state, including adoption
by a stepparent; or (ii) any single adult, except as provided in Subsection (3)(b).; (b) A child
may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid
and binding marriage under the laws of this state. For purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), 'co-
habiting' means residing with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with
that person."). A gay man, lesbian woman, and single mother who are celibate may adopt
children in Utah. However, if any such person enters into a serious relationship outside of
marriage, she loses her ability to parent children. See Kapos & May, supra note 1, at C6
("The state law ... more clearly targets gay and lesbian partners and requires DCFS [Division
of Child and Family Services] case workers to determine if applicants have a sexual relation-
ship outside of marriage.").
3. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (2003); see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and
Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
207, 222-23 (1995) (observing that in the height of Anita Bryant's anti-gay campaign, which
was entitled Save Our Children, "the first state-wide statutory ban on adoptions by lesbians
and gay men was passed with almost no analysis or debate") (citing Tom Mathews et al.,
Battle Over Gay Rights, NEwswEEK, June 6, 1977, at 16). 2
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sas promulgated a similar administrative regulation, and in 2000, Mississippi
enacted a statutory ban reaching the same end.' Between 1996 and 2000,
legislators in seven more states-Alabama, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas-have introduced similar measures
with the purpose of restricting gay individuals, same-sex couples, or unmar-
ried heterosexual couples from becoming adoptive or foster care parents.' In
seven short years, just over 20% of the states have revised or are attempting
to revise their child welfare policies in this manner.
The basis of state authority to regulate selection of adoptive and foster
parents derives from a general power of the state that is known as parens
patriae, which empowers the state to confer "protection for those unable to
care for themselves. 6 A state has the power to ensure that children are
placed with good-indeed ideal-parents.7
4. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2002) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender
is prohibited."); Minimum Licensing Standards for Child Welfare Agencies, Ark. Reg. §
200.3.2 (2002) ("No person may serve as a foster parent if any adult member of that person's
household is a homosexual.").
5. See H.J.R. Res. 35, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) ("we hereby express our intent to prohibit
child adoption by homosexual couples"); H.B. 1055, 11 1th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.
1999) ("The division may not grant a license to operate a foster family home to a homosex-
ual."; "A person who is a homosexual is not entitled to adopt an individual .... "); H.R. 6236,
89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998) ("A child shall not be placed with a prospective adoptive
parent and the court shall not issue an adoption order if a person authorized to place the child
or the court authorized to issue the order has reliable information that the prospective adop-
tive parent is homosexual."); H.B. 29, 89th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (provid-
ing that a petition for adoption and foster care shall be denied "if the [statutorily required]
investigation.., contains credible evidence that the petitioner has been involved in a homo-
sexual relationship at any time within the three years preceding the filing of the petition.");
H.B. 1455, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996) (same); H.R. 1280, 47th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Okla. 1999) (providing that a child welfare committee draft legislation "prohibiting
homosexuals from adoption children"); S.B. 387, 2003 Gen. Assem., 115th Sess. (S.C. 2003)
(as relating to foster care, prohibiting a child to be placed "with a person who is engaged in a
sexual relationship with another person residing in the proposed foster home other than their
lawful spouse"); S.B. 904, 2001 Gen. Assem., 114th Sess. (S.C. 2002) (as to foster care and
adoption, prohibiting placement "with a person who has been convicted of buggery or who is
a homosexual or bisexual"); H.R. 3179, 1997 Gen. Assem., 112th Sess. (S.C. 1997); H.R.
382, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (prohibiting placement of children in foster care or
adoptive homes where homosexual activity occurs or is likely to occur). In addition, in 1997
and in 1998, Congressman Steve Largent (R-OK) introduced his bill entitled the "Largent
Amendment" that would have prohibited same-sex couples from adopting children in the
District of Columbia. Log Cabin Republicans of Washington, Log Cabin News, available at
www.logcabinwa.com/archive/199907291800.shtml (last updated July 29, 1999) (reporting
that the Largent Amendment was defeated by a vote of 213-215 after it had passed in 1997 on
a vote of 227 to 192).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see also Sarah Abramowicz, Note,
English Child Custody Law, 1660-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal
Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1344, 1346-47 (1999) (explaining that parens patriae is "the
ancient English doctrine that the King, as the father of the nation, has the power to act in pro-
tection of the nation's weak and powerless, namely infants, idiots, and lunatics. Today, in
both the United States and England, parens patriae is used in a variety of contexts, from pro-
tection of the mentally ill to the law of juvenile courts, in order to justify the state's power to
intervene."); JOAN HEE'Z HOLLINGER, I ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE 1 1.01, at 1-4 (1st ed. 3
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Since the first adoption bill was enacted in the mid-1800s, states have
used a variety of selection criteria to ascertain who will be an ideal parent.
The notion of "ideal" has been defined differently at various times in Ameri-
can history. In the past fifty years alone, the preferred adoptive parent
changed from one who matched society's standards of the suburban family,
defined by siblings and a home with specific square footage, to one who is
able to respond to the demands of each child's individual characteristics-
whether it be care for a particular medical condition, education with respect
to his or her ethnic heritage, or even contact with his or her birth parent.8
Thus, over time, adoption law has shown a greater understanding and flexi-
bility regarding what properly is counted as a desirable parental trait. Adop-
2000) ("For the most part, adoption is the product of and subject to state laws and regulations,
not federal ones. Pursuant to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, state
governments are considered the proper domain for the enactment of family, property, and
succession laws. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of federal statutory and constitutional
law pertaining to adoptions.").
7. Curiously, all fifty states exercise their power to select adoptive parents but none make
any attempt to determine who may become a biological parent. Any biological parent can
have as many children as he desires and may maintain custody as long as he does not neglect
or abuse his child, a low legal threshold. An adoptive parent, by contrast, must demonstrate a
number of criteria purportedly showing her fitness as an ideal parent before a child is placed
in her care. As explained in detail in part I of this Article, the contemporary standards that
determine who may raise an adopted or biological child have not been constant throughout
history. For example, until the 1930s, child welfare agencies freely and easily removed, and
most often permanently, children from their biological families if the parents were considered
unfit, which included the now considered capricious reasons that the parent possessed wine in
the home during the Temperance Movement or practiced the Catholic religion. See LINDA
GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 11-12 (1999) [hereinafter GORDON,
ORPHAN]. In addition, until the 1950s, children in many states were placed in the homes of
adoptive and foster parents with minimal, and often, no screening of the adoptive parents'
capacities, follow-up of the child's well-being, or regulation of the process. See E. WAYNE
CARP, FAMILY MATrERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 13 (1998).
I mention these differences not in an effort to return to the abuses of the past, but rather, to
understand that the contemporary bifurcated treatment of prospective parents, which subject
adoptive parents to heavy scrutiny and practically never interfere with the biological relation-
ship, are quite unique to the modern era.
8. See Elizabeth S. Cole & Kathryn S. Donley, History, Values, and Placement Policy
Issues in Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 289 ("In former times the preparation
[of adoptive parents] tended to be investigative in nature, concentrating more exclusively on
the qualifications of the candidates. Preparation now tends to be more educative in nature,
familiarizing adopters with common behaviors among children needing adoption, the intrica-
cies of the child welfare system, the techniques used by experienced parents, and the re-
sources they will need to make adoption work This focus is largely due to the emergence of
special needs adoption, the reality that adoptive candidates are in short supply for older and
handicapped children, and the experience that veteran parents are the best sources of informa-
tion and help.") (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter, eds., 1990) (emphasis in
original); id. at 277 (critiquing the "restrictive eligibility requirements" formerly used to
screen out adoptive parents for being "strictly applied and [of] dubious psychological and
social criteria"). See, e.g., ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN
THE COLD WAR ERA 143-63 (1999) (describing the conditions and ideologies that combined
to create the ideal of the "typical" suburban home in 1950s America).
[Vol. 40
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tive parents no longer need be sterile, religious, non-working, or have one
bedroom per child.9
9. State laws and private agencies have screened out prospective parents on a number of
factors that are now considered arbitrary, irrelevant, needlessly rigid, and of "dubious psycho-
logical and social criteria." Cole & Donley, supra note 8, at 277. Despite its questioned rele-
vance to parenting, even today, "infertility is a prerequisite to apply to most adoption agencies
placing babies [who are white infants], and the applicant may be required to provide medical
proof of infertility." CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L. PIERCE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ADOPTION 24 (Facts on File 1991); Eligibility Guidelines for Adoption, Family Service Cen-
ters of Holston United Methodist Home for Children (licensed by the Tennessee Department
of Children Services), available at http://www.holstonhome.org/adoptionseligible.html (re-
quiring from prospective adoptive parents a "statement of infertility or a medical statement
not recommending pregnancy by an appropriate specialty physician"). Such a requirement,
however, is waived for parents who are adopting a child from another country or one who is
classified as a "special needs" child. Id. at 25. A "special needs" child is one whose
"[c]bnditions or characteristics make a child difficult to place." Id. at 266. Such characteris-
tics include "black or biracial" children, handicaps, those with siblings who must be adopted
together, teenagers, and those with behavorial problems. Id. at 266-69.
With respect to religion, as reported in a child welfare manual written in 1919, "some [child
placement] organizations formerly demanded that foster parents should be church members."
W.H. SLINGERLAND, CHID-PLACING IN FAMILIES: A MANUAL FOR STUDENTS AND SOCIAL
WORKERS 121 (Russell Sage Foundation 1919). Although the requirement providing that
adoptive and foster parents must demonstrate actual church membership began to relax in
some states by the 1920's, (the fact that an adoptive or foster parent would participate in non-
Christian religion apparently had not been anticipated), states required a child to be placed in
an adoptive home that matched the religion of its biological parents, where such information
was known. This rule in turn barred through the 1950's parents who had different religious
faiths from adopting a child. See RUTH CARSON, So You WANT To ADOPT A BABY, PUBLIC
AFFAIRS PAMPHLET No. 173, at 17 (May 1951) ("Many fine couples of mixed religion feel
that this requirement works an unfair hardship on them, and some of them even resort to the
amateur, or so-called grey market, because of it. What they don't realize is that the agency
ruling has to be consistent with the state laws as interpreted by the courts, since court action is
needed to make an adoption legal-whether it is arranged by an agency or an amateur.").
Despite the fact that the requirement of church attendance was relaxed, some agencies and
states continued to rely upon church membership as a marker of good parenting and thus
screened out non-church goers. See, e.g., EDITH M.H. BAYLOR & Euo D. MONACHESI, THE
REHABILITATION OF CHILDREN: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CHILD PLACEMENT 334 (Harper
& Bros. 1939) (the authors, an instructor and assistant professor of sociology, state: "The
manner in which people observe and practice the mandates of their professed religion may to
some extent be indicative of their stability and dependability. It may... serve as a means of
ascertaining the consistency or inconsistency in a person's profession and action.").
With respect to complexion and personality, a 1919 manual directed at social workers, how-
ever, stated that "[iut is also desirable in fitting children to applications, to select such as re-
semble one or both of the foster parents, or at least are not specially different from them in
appearance. A strong contrast between parents and children causes endless remarks and calls
for continued explanations, which are often irritating and sometimes embarrassing to the fos-
ter parents ... The laws of most states properly require that so far as is practicable placements
of children be made in families of the same religious faith.... It is also worth while to avoid
mixing too diverse types or nationalities, as, for instance, the very swarthy with the decidedly
blond." SLINGERLAND, supra, at 125. By 1941, the Child Welfare League of America, in its
recommendations to child placement agencies, provided that: "It should be required that a bed
of his own be provided for each child. It is preferable that infants should not sleep in the same
room as foster parents, and never after the age of two or three." CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING FOSTER FAMILY CARE 40
(1941) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS]. As late as 1978, many
5
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What then explains the apparent trend toward excluding a subset of oth-
erwise qualified parents on the grounds of their sexual orientation and mari-
tal status? Certainly this question becomes more intriguing in light of the
following social facts: There are more parentless children than available
homes;0 542,000 children are in foster homes and of these, 119,000 are eli-
gible for adoption;" there are many prospective parents who are not in het-
erosexual marriages; 2 and every mainstream child advocacy organization is
against this type of policy."3
child-placement agencies continued to recommend that a child not be placed with any family
in which the mother worked outside of the home, a recommendation that was later revised to
require that there is one stay-at-home parent (of either gender) for a particular set of time. See,
e.g., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 71 (Rev.
1978) ("A woman who works should not for that reason alone be excluded from consideration
as an adoptive parent, if she is able to remain at home with the child for as long as necessary
after placement.").
10. See Number of Foster Parents Drops, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2002, at
A17 (according to the Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General there is a
shortage of families willing to provide foster care).
11. In addition, of the estimated children in foster care, 38% are black/Non-Hispanic,
37% are white/Non-Hispanic, 17% are Hispanic, and 8% are identified as being another
race/ethnicity. These statistics are the most current federal estimates, which were released in
June 2003 by the American Public Human Services Association (APHSA)-formerly known
as the American Public Welfare Association (APWA). Although the federal government
stopped collecting national data on adoptions in 1975, APHSA is a federally-mandated data
collection program, which collects data based on information voluntarily submitted semi-
annually by the participating States. Not all of the States submitted information used in the
2001 estimate. See National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Services, available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheetsl
foster.cfm. (last updated Oct. 8, 2003).
12. For instance, when a county commissioner proposed introducing a prohibition
against gay individuals and single parents from serving as foster parents in El Paso County,
Colorado, the local Department of Human Services estimated that of the 700 children in foster
families, approximately 10% to 15% were patented by single parents. The DHS did not keep
statistics on how many of its foster parents were gay or lesbian because "it's not something
that's a function of the decision about the placement of a kid." Pam Zubeck, Beedy Takes on
Foster Care, TIE GAzETTE (Colorado Springs), Dec 4., 1999, at Metro I (quoting DHS
spokesperson Lloyd Malone).
13. Before the Utah State Board promulgated Administrative Rule R512-41, which re-
serves adoption for married individuals, it invited comments from professional child welfare
organizations including the Child Welfare League of America, the American Family Therapy
Academy, the Utah Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, and the Chil-
dren's Service Society of Utah; official advisory bodies including the Family Violence Advi-
sory Committee, Youth Services Advisory Committee, and the Out-of-Home Care Advisory
Council; and child welfare and family law scholars including Professor Thorana Nelson of
Utah State University, Professor Pepper Schwartz of the University of Washington, Ann
Hartman, Dean of the Smith College School for Social Work, Professor Judith Stacey of Uni-
versity of Southern California, Professor Joan Hollinger, Reporter for the Uniform Adoption
Act, and Michael Wald of Stanford Law School and former Report for the American Bar
Association's Model Standards for Child Abuse and Neglect. Utah Plaintiffs' Brief at 18-20,
Utah Children v. Utah State Bd. of Child & Family Servs., Civ. No. 990910881 (3d Dist. Ct.,
Salt Lake County, Utah 1999) [hereinafter Utah Plaintiffs' Brief]. All of these organizations,
boards, and experts recommended against the rule. Id. See also David Crary, Gays Gaining
Ground in Adoptions, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 29, 2003, at A5 (reporting that a recent survey
[Vol. 40
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A starting point to find an answer is with David Blankenhorn who wrote
the 1995 book, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social
Problem"' Advocates of the contemporary adoption bans justify their poli-
cies by relying heavily on the theories and concerns set forth by Blanken-
horn, describing what he dubs the problem of "Fatherlessness."' ' Blanken-
horn presents a contemporary justification for the belief that two parents of
the opposite sex is the proper familial arrangement in which to raise children
and that any other familial combination harms children. 6 When introducing
a similar exclusionary regulation in El Paso County, Colorado, County
Commissioner Betty Beedy relied upon this concept, explaining to a reporter
that single parents and same-sex couples are unable to provide an "ideal"
family environment: 7 "It's a role model [issue]. A normal biological unit of
a family is a mother and father. The father and mother bring different paren-
tal skills to a family."'" Commissioner Beedy supported her views by claim-
ing that national statistics show "most kids that commit crimes come from
one-parent families."' 9
Within a six-month period after the foster care regulations were pro-
posed, Beedy made a string of telling remarks. In March 1998, she publicly
opposed renaming a highway in honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. be-
concludes that "[a]bout 60 percent of the nation's adoption agencies now accept applications
from gays and lesbians" who are seeking to adopt children).
14. DAvID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995).
15. See Zubeck, supra note 12. The problem of a child being raised outside of a tradi-
tional one mother, one father family is not about "motherlessness" because Blankenhorn's
concern is over traditional masculinity either disappearing by becoming emasculated by femi-
nists and modern marriages or exploding into violent rages in the form of violence towards
women and children. BLANKENHORN, supra note 14, at 102-03 (Blankenhom critiques the
"New Father" defined as the "diaper changing men" who have a "more nurturing, hands-on
paternal role," id. at 98, because "[tihe New Father is the missing father. For a cultural
model-a set for cultural cues for paternal behavior-the New Father reflects the puerile
desire for human omnipotentially [sic] in the form of genderless parenthood, a direct repudia-
tion of fatherhood as a gendered social role for men"); id. at 37 ("For many men, suddenly
losing their identity as married fathers, especially when the loss is involuntary, shatters their
world and triggers violence.").
16. BLANKENHORN, supra note 14, passim. Blankenhorn explains that whereas women
are naturally able to be mothers, men are inherently aggressive and violent and that only when
these impulses are channeled toward caring for a child or wife can the violent nature be
tamed. See id. at 107 ("Maternal tenderness is assumed, not recommended"); id. at 35
("[M]arried fatherhood emerges as the primary inhibitor of male domestic violence. By reduc-
ing the likelihood of sexual jealousy and paternal uncertainty, and by directing the male's
aggression toward the support of his child and the mother of his child, married fatherhood
dramatically reduces the tendency among men toward violent behavior.").
17. Zubeck, supra note 12. Commissioner Beedy publicly advocated for such legislation
and introduced it to the commission. The commission, however, declined to adopt the policy.
E-mail from Pam Zubeck, THE GAZETTE (Colorado Springs) to Kari Hong (Aug. 20, 2003,
04:56:46 CST) (on file with author).
18. Zubeck, supra note 12.
19. Id. In the same article, Colorado Springs Police Lieutenant Skip Arms "said he knew
of no data showing one-parent families produce more criminals." Id. 7
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cause "he had extramarital affairs.""0 In June 1998, she called single mothers
who date men, "sluts," a remark she later clarified to extend only to promis-
cuous women. 1 In July 1998, when appearing on the "The View," a nation-
ally syndicated talk show, Beedy asserted that the struggle for gay rights is
not comparable to the civil rights movement. Attempting to demonstrate
her point, she explained that the African-American co-host was clearly a
minority because "she's different than the white, normal American."23
Commissioner Beedy's remarks serve as an important backdrop to the
rest of this article. In her words, an "ideal" family is a "normal biological
unit" of a mother and a father, and any variation from this norm is inferior.
According to Beedy, single mothers are "sluts" and gays are not like "nor-
mal" Americans. Indeed, her televised comments conflate bad character with
cultural inferiority by claiming that (undeserving) gays are not like the (de-
serving) civil right fighters, while still clarifying that despite any gains, peo-
ple of color are still in Beedy's worldview, not like "white, normal Ameri-
cans."
The legislative history of Utah's statute mirrors Beedy's moral oppro-
brium against unmarried couples and gay people. Utah's adoption statute
began as an administrative rule that categorically denied a foster care or
adoption application if the prospective parent is shown to have (1) a violent
criminal history; (2) had molested a child; or (3) lived in a home with an-
other adult to whom he or she was not married.2' Although the administrative
rule's constitutionality was immediately challenged, the lawsuit became
moot when the state legislature enacted the statute at issue.5 In an astonish-
ing turn of events, the state law dropped the categorical presumption against
placing children with individuals with histories of criminal violence or child
molestation, but codified the principle that Utah children shall never be
raised in foster or adoptive homes by couples who are not married. The
sponsors of Utah's statute adamantly defend their policies as protecting chil-




24. In June 1999, the Utah Board of Child and Family Services, which is the agency
responsible for administering foster care, issued Rule R512-41, mandating that before a child
will be placed with adoptive parents, a home study must be done to verify the specific infor-
mation about each adult, including non-adoptive parents, who is living in the prospective
home. The information sought included inter alia (1) criminal background check; (2) child
abuse screening; and (3) "verification that adults present in the home are legally related to
parent(s) by blood or adoption or legal marriage." Utah Admin. Code R512-41-4 (3), (7), &
(8) (1999) reprinted in 99 Utah State Bulletin, No. 11, at 39-42 (June 1, 1999) [hereinafter
Utah Rule R512-41].
25. See Utah Children v. Utah State Bd. of Child & Family Servs., Civ. No. 990910881
(3d Dist. Ct., Salt Lake County, Utah 1999); Kapos & May, supra note 1. The plaintiffs in the
administrative action did not renew their complaint as applied against the statute. As of Au-
gust 2003, no advocacy organization has brought a challenge against the statute.
[Vol. 40
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dren from the harm that arises when they are raised outside of a nuclear fam-
ily with parents who exhibit traditional gender roles.26
What is notable about Utah's statute is that it revives a form of family
policy that denied parenthood based on a prospective parent's moral stand-
ing in the community. The Utah statute is a radical break from contemporary
adoption placement practices by eschewing reliance on individualized find-
ings with respect to whether a person can provide emotionally and finan-
cially for a child and instead deems a parent presumptively unfit based on
with whom he or she does--or does not-reside. Despite attempts to cushion
contemporary adoption bans27 by claiming--often sincerely-that the pre-
ferred family formation is in the best interest of children, these latter-day
statutes and regulations are a revival of family policies that seek to regulate
undesirable individuals. The contemporary adoption bans reveal connections
between the contemporary "Fatherlessness" movement, which is increas-
ingly influential in national politics, and its prior incarnations. As poignantly
illustrated by the 1999 Lofton v. Kearny case," the purpose of these new
adoption bans is not to place children in good homes, but rather, to remove
children from the care of families who are deemed morally inferior. The ex-
ercise of parens patriae again is infused with an intolerance intent on regu-
26. See Lucinda Dillon, Critics Jab Leavitt on Adoption Bill, DESERT NEWS, Feb. 16,
2000, at B 1 ("'A child in crisis is best served in a traditional family setting,' [Utah Governor
Mike] Leavitt repeated. 'Why?' the reporter followed. 'Because the traditional family setting
serves the child best."'); Lynn Wardle, Utah Legislation Barring Nonmarital Cohabitants
from Adopting (July 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter
Wardle Manuscript], at accompanying text & nn.29-30 ("There is abundant evidence that
nonmarital cohabitation is an environment of elevated risk to children of child abuse, child
sexual abuse, relational instability, exposure to adult domestic violence, economic depriva-
tion, and immoral and dangerous behavior modeling. Most of the studies focus on heterosex-
ual nonmarital cohabitation, but the advocates and defenders of adoption by same-sex couples
failed to provide any credible evidence that gay/lesbian cohabitation is less-risky nonmarital
cohabitation.").
27. My selection of the term "adoption bans" is shorthand to refer to the laws and admin-
istrative regulations passed by Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah, the statute repealed
by New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. § 170-B:4 (repealed 1999), and the bills recently con-
sidered by Alabama, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. The
various statutes and administrative regulations vary on whether their prohibition extends to
applications for adoption, foster care, or both. In addition, the states deploy various means by
which they define an undesirable parent. Some states expressly limit or prohibit a "gay man"
or lesbian" or "homosexual" from being a prospective parent. Some states prohibit only same-
sex couples. Some states limit or prohibit unmarried couples from being prospective par-
ents-either through statutory language or accompanying regulations. Some states limit or
prohibit unmarried individuals who live with another adult in the home, which extends to
individuals who are straight and gay. And most states elect to mix and match the various
categories. See supra note 5 for citations and description of the states' statutes and regula-
tions.
28. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (upholding federal challenge against Florida's
prohibition against gay men or lesbians from becoming adoptive parents); see infra notes 302-
317 and accompanying text. Lofton appealed the district court opinion to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. At the time this article was sent to the printer, no decision had been issued.
See Lofton v. Kearney, No. 01-16723-DD. 9
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lating or destroying differing conceptions of morality, gender identity, and
personhood.29 These contemporary adoption bans, once stripped from their
feel-good rhetoric, are nothing more than revived attempts at improper social
engineering, and as such, they should not continue.
Part I of this article presents a historical overview of child placement
practices in the United States. In the past 150 years since its inception, two
separate trends have shaped adoption policy. As social science has acquired
more knowledge regarding what influences child development, such findings
have been incorporated into adoption policy, shaping it into a respected insti-
tution. Such progress has not been seamless, however. At different times in
history, social reformers, government officials, and private vigilantes have
misused the institution of adoption, removing children from their biological
families if the parents were imputed to be inferior morally. The contempo-
rary adoption laws thus trace their lineage to such failed social experiments
as the Orphan Trains, the Tennessee Baby Snatching Scandal, and the condi-
tions that resulted in the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Part II examines why the contemporary adoption bans have been en-
acted and the reasons behind the declared state interest in reserving parent-
hood for married heterosexual couples. In court filings, Arkansas, Florida,
and Utah contend that married couples are the optimal families in which to
raise children because single mothers produce violent boys and promiscuous
girls and gay and lesbian parents produce gay children. What is remarkable
is that the states' contentions regarding the nature of alternative families (1)
are contrary to mainstream science and child welfare expertise; and (2) sup-
ported only by Fatherlessness ideology. Set against the possibility of same-
sex marriage, the contemporary Fatherlessness movement is gaining influ-
ence and using the adoption bans as part of an ideological campaign that is
reviving eugenic undertones of saving children from their parents' moral
pollution.
Part III begins by analyzing Lofton v. Kearny," the recent case challeng-
ing Florida's adoption ban. In that case, the State of Florida removed a ten-
year-old boy from his two fathers and four siblings on the basis that the par-
ents are presumptively unfit because they are gay and unmarried. (Curiously,
the state previously had recognized the men's superlative parenting by pre-
senting them with an Outstanding Foster Parent Award, which it subse-
quently renamed in their honor.) The district court upheld the statute facially
29. First exercised by the King of England to take children away from their biological
parents who were poor, the action was justified not because the children were in harm's way,
but because the removed children were placed in apprenticeships and thus were believed be
less likely to burden tax-payers. See CARPt, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that "[i]t was not un-
usual for English Overseers of the Poor to remove children from impoverished families and
place them with those more fortunate"); Lucy McGough & Annette Peltier-Falahahwazi,
Secrets and Lies: A Model Statute for Cooperative Adoption, 60 LA. L. Rav. 13, 20 & n.25
(1999) (observing that the English involuntary apprenticeships did not require the consent of
the biological parent).
30. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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and as applied to Lofton, relying on its finding that there is no fundamental
right to adoption.' In 1987, the New Hampshire state supreme court simi-
larly issued an advisory opinion upholding New Hampshire's adoption ban.32
Both of these courts erred by failing to recognize the substantive due process
to family formation that Carey v. International Population Services" affords
an unmarried person and that Lawrence v. Texas3" recently conferred to gay
and lesbian individuals. Just as a state's regulation of contraception, limiting
the choice of whether to create a child, impermissibly interfered with an in-
dividual's right to bear and raise a child, so the adoption bans impermissibly
control a person's ability to form a family. Furthermore, the adoption bans as
applied to foster parents operate similarly to the ways that illegitimacy stat-
utes once removed a child from her unmarried biological father. Both types
of statutes create irrebuttable presumptions of parental unfitness, and both
fail to comport with procedural due process by denying a gay or unmarried
individual the individualized determination of fitness that is provided to
every other prospective parent. The contemporary adoption bans, like the
prohibition on family planning in Griswold v. Connecticut,' and the illegiti-
macy statute in Stanley v. Illinois,3" are impermissible exercises of state
power and therefore must fall.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ADOPTION PLACEMENT PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES
In modem times, adoption is understood as the respectable, legal proc-
ess by which a child is placed into a loving, stable home. Social workers
scrutinize the prospective family through extensive interviews and home
studies; state legislatures protect the biological mother by providing her a
grace period to reconsider her decision, which allows from anywhere be-
tween seventy-two hours and three months from the time she surrenders her
child until an adoption is finalized; and judges supervise the situation, ensur-
ing that the final arrangement is in keeping with the best interests of the
child.38 A recent and growing trend in the area is "open adoption," an ar-
rangement in which the biological mother surrenders her legal rights to the
31. Id. at 1380.
32. Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
33. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
34. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
37. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990) (defining adoption as process by
which a parent takes "into one's family the child of another and give him or her the rights,
privileges, and duties of a child and heir."); HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-6.1 ("Considerable
evidence exists that in at least the past fifty years, adoption has attained the status of a fully
socially acceptable practice.").
38. See HOLLJNGER, supra note 6, at 1-12 (child welfare professionals); id. at 1-9 (birth
mother rights); id. at 1-12 (best interest of the child). 11
Hong: Parens Patri[archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
adoptive parent(s), but retains contact with her child and the adoptive fam-
ily. 3
9
The history of adoption, however, uncovers an institution plagued with
undercurrents of eugenic purposes and racist ends. In particular, the removal
of children from their biological homes exemplifies state power at its worst.
The drastic, and at times, sudden changes in the desirability of adoption mir-
rors shifting societal meanings of the nature of family, child welfare, citizen-
ship, and morality.
A. Early History of Adoption in the United States: From Private Bills
to Orphan Trains
The modem conception of adoption, defined as an adult adopting a child
(as opposed to another adult), is "doubtless as old as humanity itself."' For
centuries, the Christian Church had helped coordinate placing orphaned
children with relatives and church parishioners. If homes could not be found,
the "Church began boarding children with worthy widows, paying for the
service by collections taken in the various congregations.""' However, by the
sixteenth century, adoption in Europe was not common, but when it did oc-
cur, was made through informal arrangements that were primarily motivated
out of humanitarian or charitable impulses. 2 The Christian Church opposed
these arrangements, however, citing concerns that men were abusing adop-
tion as a means to fold their illegitimate children into a legitimate family
structure.43 The Christian Church initiated a campaign to stigmatize adoption
by advocating that sex and procreation should be reserved for marriage. By
the 1600s, the campaign had achieved its goal, and most Europeans stopped
39. See CARP, supra note 7, at 196. "Open adoption" is the result of advocacy efforts by
adopted children and birth mothers who were frustrated, and claimed to be harmed emotion-
ally, by the lifelong forced separation that a closed, secretive adoption created. Id. One of the
primary reasons that adoptive parents are willing to enter into these arrangements is that there
are fewer desired children than ever before due to the legalization of abortion, availability of
contraception, and the increase in numbers of unmarried mothers raising their children. Id.
For instance, over forty years, the percentage of babies unmarried white women gave up for
adoption decreased from approximately 80% to less than 4%, and the percentage of children
black and Latino mothers gave up for adoption remained at its constant rate respectively of
2% and 1% of out-of-wedlock children. See id. at 200-01; HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-58
(citing these statistics from a study performed by the Alan Guttmacher Institute); RICKIE
SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE 33 (2d ed. 2000). For a humorous and moving account of
one couple's experience with open adoption, see DAN SAVAGE, THE KID (1999).
40. CARP, supra note 7, at 3 (observing that adoption "appears in the Code of Hammu-
rabi, drafted... around 2285 B.C." and "was practiced in ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, the
Middle East, Asia, and the tribal societies of Africa and Oceania.").
41. SLINGERLAND, supra note 9, at 29.
42. CARP, supra note 7, at 4.
43. Id. Historians speculate that the Church also discouraged adoption to protect its in-
terest in land and money that would otherwise be inherited by the adopted children.
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adopting children out of belief that it was "unchristian" or an "unnatural" act
to do."
At the founding of the United States, adoption was not a widespread
practice among white, "native-born" families.4" When they occurred, adop-
tions were arranged informally and usually involved shifting the care of a
child to an extended family member.' In response to the arising logistical
complications, people turned to the state legislatures for assistance. Between
1781 and 1851, state legislatures passed hundreds of private bills requesting
name changes, and in some states, even conferring partial inheritance rights
upon the child.'7 Among poor and immigrant families, however, orphaned or
abandoned children were placed in orphan asylums or almshouses, which
were usually run by private, religious organizations."'
In 1851, Massachusetts became the first state to pass a general statute
establishing a system by which legal adoption could occur. The Massachu-
setts statute was unique because it established adoption as a means to serve
the best interests of the child. The law conferred full inheritance rights to the
child, imposed duties on the adoptive parent, required biological parents (or
legal guardians) to provide written consent, terminated the rights of biologi-
cal parents, established an evaluation of the prospective adoptive homes, and
provided judicial supervision over the child's placement. '9
44. Id. ("Fears of adoption were spread by stories of accidental incestuous unions be-
tween unsuspecting blood relatives. As a result, people hesitated to adopt: childless couples
who adopted invited public scrutiny of their infertility; other presumptive adoptive families
worried that neighbors might perceive them as challenging the natural order.").
45. It appears that absent interference by a slave owner, informal "adoption" of orphans
among slaves operated in a similar, informal manner. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested
Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1348, 1364-65 & nn.107-
09 (1994). The fate of the children who were born to slave women and "fathered" by slave
masters also varied widely. Some slave owners made arrangements for these children to be
educated, freed and receive inheritance (usually upon the master's death), or be owned for-
ever by the "family." With respect to the last arrangement, one slave owner considered it
"cruelty" for the children of his slave "mistresses" to be owned by strangers. Specifically, he
said that "any but my own blood should own as slaves my own blood." RANDALL KENNEDY,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 45-48 (2003).
46. See CARP, supra note 7, at 6-7. With respect to orphaned, neglected, or children who
were born out of wedlock, the institution of adoption differed. The American Colonialists
replicated the English poor law system of removing poor children from their biological fami-
lies and placing the child with wealthier families or in involuntary apprenticeships.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 6-7.
49. Id. at 11-12. Known as "An Act to Prove for the Adoption of Children," Massachu-
setts enacted the first modern adoption law, which was characterized by granting rights to the
child and by evaluating the parents. In 1846, Mississippi and in 1850, Texas enacted general
adoption statutes that recorded private adoption agreements in the same manner that land
deeds were recorded. The laws of Mississippi and Texas, which had been under the control of
France and Spain, reflected the legal principles of the Napoleonic Code. The modern concep-
tion of adoption, which marshaled its resources to focus on the best interest of the child, was a
radical break from the traditional legal scheme of adoption that "was intended to benefit the
adopting male parent by providing the necessary heirs to mourn, inherit, or carry on the fam-
ily line." Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 441 (1996). 13
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The legalization of adoption was controversial but spread widely in a
short period of time. One of the ripples from adoption was a sudden interest
in children's issues by the elite, Protestant social reformers. In urban centers,
particularly New York City and Boston, social reform movements boomed
during the mid- to late-1800s, and private charities and organizations rallied
around the cause to save the children from urban degeneracy." For instance,
as "an offshoot" of the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
("SPCA"), Eldridge Gerry founded the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to
Children ("SPCC") in the 1870s, which for the first time identified the prob-
lems of "child abuse" and "neglect."' The reformers were protestant, white,
and wealthy; the objects of their reforms were newly-arrived immigrants
who were mostly poor, Catholic, and considered to be not "white."5 2 In the
Progressive Era, a person's "race," as used in the Northeastern cities, was
not based on her skin color; rather race was used to demarcate a perceived
culturally inferior individual from the white, native born elite. By 1911, the
U.S. Immigration Commission's Dictionary of Races of Peoples identified
forty-five different races, including "Hebrew," "Irish," "Italians," "Poles,"
"Great Russians," "White Russians," and "Little Russians."5 3
In 1853, the Reverend Charles Loring Brace, a prominent social re-
former, established the Children Affairs Society ("CAS"), which was an or-
phanage for poor (and mainly Catholic and immigrant) children.' Reverend
50. SLINGERLAND, supra note 9, at 36-37 (listing the "most noteworthy" organizations,
as understood in 1919, to be: the Henry Watson Children Aid Society of Baltimore, founded
in 1860; the Boston Children's Aid Society, founded in 1864; the New York Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in 1874; the Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in 1878; the Children's Aid Society of Pennsyl-
vania, founded in 1882; and the association known by 1919 as the Illinois Children's Home
and Aid Society, which began in 1883 as the American Educational Aid Association. By
1917, 34 states had active societies dedicated to child-placement concerns.) See LINDA
GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LivES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 32-
37, 82-83 (1988) [hereinafter GORDON, HEROES] (listing various organizations and social
influences that led to their founding); GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEw YORK: GENDER, URBAN
CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890-1940, at 138-41 (1994) (listing
various private anti-vice and social purity societies formed in this era).
51. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 50, at 138.
52. See GORDON, HEROES, supra note 50, at 32-37 (discussing class interests in reform-
ing the poor and depraved immigrants); GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 11-12 (noting that
most of the orphans were Irish, Italian, Polish who were considered to be racially inferior to
the protestant white elite).
53. See GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 12 (observing that race was used to connote
status. "These were not physical or cultural descriptions of innocuous 'difference,' but social
and economic markings of rank. For example, elites typically labeled upscale German Jews as
Germans and Russian Jews as Hebrews.").
54. See CARP, supra note 7, at 9. When African-American children were truly orphans-
abandoned or homeless on the streets-they were not placed on the orphan trains because of
the mores concerning interracial adoptions. (Known technically as "transracial adoption," the
first documented adoption of a black child by white parents occurred in Minnesota in 1948.
See HAWLEY FOGG-DAviS, TH ETHics OF TRANSRACiAL ADOPTION 3 (2002)). "Even when
the orphan train movement was at its height, most wound up in poorhouses or segregated
'colored orphanages."' See ANNETrE R. FRY, THE ORPHAN TRAINS 50-51 (1994). Indeed,
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Brace also is credited with devising the concept of the orphan trains, which
he used for the purpose of dispersing the children to rural areas of the United
States.55 Reverend Brace reasoned that now with the advent of legalized
adoption, children would benefit by being adopted into homes away from
urban vices. 6 The rural farmers were eager for more help, children would
thrive once away from the "peculiar temptations" found in a city, and the
end result would be fewer children who remained in the urban environment,
rife with corrupt influences.' Reverend Brace, and soon other child welfare
organizations, loaded children onto west-bound trains. When an orphan train
arrived in a station, eager farmers met the trains and picked out the hardiest
looking children to work on the farms. The remaining children re-boarded
and continued west until all were claimed. By 1910, over 110,000 children
had been shipped out of New York City to the West on such trains."
Reverend Brace's romantic vision of children romping in bucolic para-
dise was shattered by the harsh and exploitative reality. The orphan trains
drew sharp criticism for three main reasons. First, the orphans were placed in
random families without any supervision or follow-up. Although there were
families who welcomed the orphans into their home, critics pointed to the
farmers who treated the children as a source of cheap labor, subjecting them
to exploitative working conditions, physical abuse, at times sexual abuse,
and even death. 9 For example, in 1919, child welfare expert W.H. Slinger-
Reverend Brace observed that: "It is a noticeable thing that during this age of poverty, not a
single colored boy has come under the operations of this Society, and only two during the two
years of our labors." Id. at 50-51. Jewish children also were rarely placed on the orphan
trains. (Although they would be if they were baptized as Catholic first). The Federation of
Jewish Charities formed during this time and looked after the welfare of Jewish children.
Most of the homeless Jewish children were placed in segregated asylums for Jewish orphans.
Id. at 51. See also SLINGERLAND, supra note 9, at 51 (listing that as of 1919, 1,200 Jewish
children were "in residence" at the Hebrew Orphan Asylum in New York City and 600 Jew-
ish children were in residence at the Hebrew Sheltering Guardian Society in Pleasantville,
New York. In addition, the organizations had "boarded-out" approximately 800 orphans to
"selected Jewish families.").
55. CARP, supra note 7, at 9; GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 8.
56. GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 9.
57. Id. (listing Brace's description of the advantages of his program and commenting
"[t]hen as now some of the wealthy preferred to deal with poor and homeless by expelling
them"); see also CARP, supra note 7, at 9-10. The Reverend Brace believed that he was "res-
cuing" children by removing them from their biological families who lived amidst urban vices
and by placing them in the homes of the rural Christian families. Reverend Brace believed
that this process would transform the children, whom he referred to as "street Arabs," "little
vagabonds" and "homeless creatures," into "decent, orderly industrious children." Id.
58. GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 10.
59. CARP, supra note 7, at 13. In 1882, contemporary criticism of the orphan trains in-
cluded charges that the CAS "distribut[ed] large number of children to farmers 'without ask-
ing any questions or obtaining any information regarding them or any security for their proper
care or protection."' Critics said that the farmers treated the children "like slaves." In 1884,
Hastings H. Hart, a "respected child reformer" conducted an independent study documenting
"many abused and exploited children." Significantly, one-fourth of the 340 children placed in
Minnesota never were located. In addition, farmers took the children with the understanding
that they could return them if unsatisfied for any reason. According to the Home for Destitute15
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land criticized the previous child-placement practices because "supposedly
rescued boys and girls have frequently been cast into an environment that
injured body and spirit, and sometimes destroyed even life itself."' Other
critics in the western states also fought the Orphan Trains because they per-
ceived the children to be miscreants, and they accused the CAS of dumping
the "offspring of New York's criminal population" into their pristine lands.6
Both sets of reformers combined their efforts, and individuals in various
western states stepped in as early as 1874 to begin attempts either to block
the trains from arriving in their state or to establish judicial supervision over
the adoptive families.62
Second, in New York City and Boston, Catholic Church leaders were
outraged at what they called the kidnapping of children from Catholic, im-
migrant homes and their subsequent placement into Protestant families.63 In a
well-publicized case, a Catholic father became temporarily debilitated from
illness and placed his children in the care of a private agency until he be-
came well. ' When he recovered, he requested the return of his children only
to discover that the agency instructed the foster family to hide the children
away as long as possible because "we dread Catholic influence more than
the bite of the rattle-snake."' By the 1860s, the Catholic church leaders re-
Catholic Children, "foster children were fairly often sent back to them." FRY, supra note 54,
at 50.
60. SLINGERLAND, supra note 9, at 43.
61. FRY, supra note 54, at 57; id. at 55 (quoting a Catholic leader who said: "The system
which is flooding our western country with undisciplined, vicious children is much to be dep-
recated"); CARP, supra 7, at 12 (reporting that residents in the Midwestern and western states
also criticized the orphan trains for dumping "car loads of criminal juveniles, .... vagabonds,
and guttersnipes," which had the claimed effect of increasing the population of the homeless
and prisoners).
62. See CARP, supra 7, at 12. For instance, the Reverend Martin Van Buren Van Arsdale
represented a movement of reformers who responded to practices of the CAS by establishing
a more humane method of removing and placing children. Reverend Van Arsdale, for in-
stance, founded the National Children's Home Society ("NCHS") in 1883, which was an
agency that required a thorough investigation of the child's background to ensure that she was
not being separated from her biological parents. A child was not accepted into the custody of
the NCHS until either a legal guardian provided written consent or a court ordered a legal
commitment. In addition, the NCHS screened prospective families, kept records where chil-
dren were placed, and followed up with inspection visits to ensure the child was cared for
properly. CARP, supra note 7, at 14.
63. The majority of children "stolen or rescued, depending on one's point of view" were
Catholic whereas most of the child-saving organizations and foster homes were Protestant.
GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 11. In New York, 40 to 50% of the population was Catho-
lic, a percentage that increased among the poor. Id. Jewish leaders also responded by starting
their own welfare organizations to take care of Jewish children. See supra note 54.
64. CARP, supra note 7, at 103.
65. Id. The father had placed his children with the American Female Guardian Society
and Home for the Friendless. The entire quote from the agency official to the foster parents
was: "As we dread Catholic influence more than the bite of the rattle-snake, for that only
destroys the body while the other destroys the immortal soul ... ; if you have become attached
to the dear boy, save him from the power of the fell-destroyer, and the conscious approving
smile of your Heavenly father will be your award." The agency official forwarded the letter to
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sponded to the perceived religious annihilation by starting their own orphan-
ages and placement services for the purpose of placing the "orphaned" chil-
dren into Catholic families." These organizations worked more closely with
adoptive families to oversee adoptions, albeit mainly motivated by the desire
to ensure that the children were not being raised outside the faith.67
Third, and most chilling, Reverend Brace's plan ultimately failed be-
cause most of the children sent west were not really orphans. By his own
estimate, 47% of the "orphans" had one or both parents who were still alive68
and historians estimate the figure to be closer to 75 or 80%.' Reverend
Brace defended his practices by explaining that "the great majority [of the
children sent west] were the children of poor and degraded people, who were
leaving them to grow up neglected in the streets."7
Reverend Brace and agents from other private agencies swept the
streets, picking up immigrant children and taking them to orphanages or pri-
vate agencies.7' The private agencies also would make sua sponte house calls
and remove children from immigrant parents on the grounds of poverty, im-
morality, or cultural inferiority.72 A diagnosis of "immorality" often was
made if the mother did not have a husband, if the family was poor, or if the
parents were Catholic." "Cultural inferiority" was charged whenever fami-
lies failed- to resemble the "American" values of temperance, wealth, and
a CAS officer who "tacitly approved hiding the child to prevent him from falling into the
hands of the Catholic father."
66. See FRY, supra note 54, at 50 (observing that in 1865, 48 children from Catholic
birth mothers were sent on the first orphan train directed toward Catholic families in the
west); CARP, supra note 7, at 13-15.
67. See CARP, supra note 7, at 13-15.
68. Id. at 10.
69. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-27 (observing that the estimates were based on
data provided by the U.S. Census data and many state and private agencies).
70. CARP, supra note 7, at 10. Historians estimate that approximately half of all children
taken from their homes during this period were "removed from parents only because of pov-
erty." GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 11.
71. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-28 ("The Children Aid Society agents thought that
proper children should stay clean, remain in school, speak modestly, and never-at least not
in the cities-play outside unattended."); GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 11. See also
GORDON, HEROES, supra note 50, at 37-38 (remarking that 45.2% of new cases of child abuse
and neglect that the Massachusetts SPCC investigated in a three month span were initiated by
the SPCC agents. In addition, complaints also were received by elite individuals who called to
allege that their servants were "mistreating" their own children. In 1880, 56% of the com-
plaints made in Boston were dismissed for lack of evidence.).
72. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-28.
73. Although approximately 10 to 15% of households in New York City were headed by
single mothers, approximately 55% of child neglect cases arose from single mother families.
"The child neglect of which [single mothers] were accused was often difficult to distinguish
from, simply, poverty: the children were malnourished, poorly clad, without medical care, or
living in unheated flats; they were left unsupervised or with slightly older siblings while
mothers worked." GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 8; see also CARP, supra note 7, at 103-
04 (anti-Catholic bias); GORDON, HEROES, supra note 50, at 34 (observing that the New York
chapter of SPCC was noted for its prosecution of parents). 17
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whiteness." Relying exclusively on the representations made by the private
anti-vice agencies, courts typically committed these children to the custody
of a private or public institution.7 Indeed, under state law, a court could en-
ter an order severing the biological ties of the child to her parents without
providing the biological parents notice or an opportunity to contest the
charges."' In the few circumstances in which parental consent was required,
some states allowed a judicial finding of the parents' "moral depravation"
sufficient to waive it.
77
Once a private agency took custody of an "orphan," a biological parent
had limited, if any, legal recourse to secure the return of his child.8 Many of
the biological families targeted by the anti-vice societies were ignorant of
any rights they may have had, often because they were illiterate and non-
citizens.79 When legal remedies in fact existed, the courts usually did not side
with the biological parents who sued for the return of their child.8"
The "social reformers" who removed children from their homes relied
upon the Fatherlessness ideology of the day to identify a bad mother as one
who was unmarried or poor and a bad parent as one who is morally depraved
(defined as not Protestant) and poor. A number of factors lead to the demise
of the Orphan Trains during the 1910s, including a heightened criticism of
child labor and abuse, continued discontent by the western states who re-
ceived the children, burgeoning consciousness that poverty was not a basis
74. See GORDON, HEROES, supra note 50, at 46-48. In addition, the protestant elite
"traced child mistreatment to vices inherent among inferior nationalities and cultures" of the
newly arrived immigrant families. Id. at 47. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text for
discussion of "whiteness" during this time period.
75. HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-28 ("SPCC agents would round up children from city
streets ... and on the basis of little more than the agent's allegation of parental immorality or
unfitness, obtain a court order committing the children to a state or private institution."); id. at
1-26 (noting that when prospective adoptive parents went to court to legalize custody of their
child, the courts "accepted the adopters' statement that the biological parents had abandoned
the child or [had] died" without taking any efforts to locate the biological parents to determine
whether those representations were true). In addition, the New York SPCC agents were depu-
tized, providing them with legal authority to remove children. GORDON, HEROES, supra note
50, at 52.
76. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-26; GORDON, HEROES, supra note 50, at 43.
77. HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-26 (observing that "[j]udges had broad discretion to
determine whether these grounds existed"). In addition, in 1882, the Massachusetts legislature
enacted a law providing that a probate judge could appoint the SPCC guardian for any "ne-
glected, ill-treated, or abandoned child under fourteen" and that any judge could give the
SPCC immediate 30 day custody of an "abandoned or deserted child[]" who was under age
five. GORDON, HEROEs, supra note 50, at 50-51.
78. Poor immigrant families feared the CAS and SPCC, criticizing the agencies for being
"child stealers." GORDON, HEROES, supra note 50, at 33.
79. Id. at 47-48.
80. CARP, supra note 7, at 10. In one case, a man lost his case against the CAS for send-
ing his son west without his permission or knowledge. In another, a father left his daughter in
the care of the Salvation Army Brooklyn Nursery and Infants Hospital. When he returned to
bring her home, the hospital informed him that she had been "'put out on a farm in Kansas'
by the CAS." Neither the Salvation Army nor the CAS provided the father with any more
information and the father and daughter never saw each other again.
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to remove a child from a home, and the railroads' discontinuing its practice
of offering eastern charities reduced or free fares.8 ' The trains, however, did
not stop running until the Fatherlessness ideology of the day, which declared
a parent unfit based exclusively on his or her marital status, income, or relig-
ion, permanently severed at least 110,000 children from their biological
families.'
B. The Fall and Rise of Adoption: Eugenics to the Cold War
During the Progressive Era, a woman who gave birth out-of-wedlock
engaged in highly immoral behavior. Like the prostitute, the bachelor who
frequented bars, and immigrant children who spent much time on the urban
streets, the vice of a single mother was that she was not a part of a traditional
family. 3 Progressive Era Social Reformers in New York founded organiza-
tions to repress such social corruption and "[t]he societies' efforts to control
the streets and tenements and eliminate the saloon and brothel were predi-
cated on a vision of an ideal social order centered in the family."" In the
1880s, the social reformers, particularly the white middle-class evangelical
Protestant women, ran rescue homes for the purpose of saving prostitutes
through proper moral instruction." By 1909, approximately seventy-eight
rescue homes existed around the country, and the social reformers aban-
doned their efforts directed towards the prostitutes and focused on saving
81. President Teddy Roosevelt took many efforts to encourage poor families to keep
their children. For instance, he said, "Parents of good character, suffering from temporary
misfortune, and above all deserving mothers... deprived of the support of the normal bread-
winner, should be given such aid as may be necessary to enable them to maintain suitable
homes for the rearing of their children." FRY, supra note 54, at 73; see also id. at 72 (observ-
ing that the Orphan Trains stopped running when anti-monopolization contributed to the rail-
roads' decision to stop giving reduced or free fares to eastern charities).
82. See FRY, supra note 54, at 72; CARP, supra note 7, at 12-13.
83. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 50, at 139.
84. Id. The self-appointed anti-vice societies hired agents to attend the social functions in
question to report back on the activities. Over time, some societies attempted to regulate the
corrupt individuals either through assuming quasi-police powers from the state or using their
connections with the business community to use economic pressure against the tenement
landlords and small business owners of the particular neighborhoods. The social reformers
apparently targeted groups of individuals who posed a "threat to the social order" and "con-
ventional gender and sexual arrangements." Id. at 140. The anti-vice squads' conflation of
gender transgression with foreignness culminated in the Prohibition movement, designed to
stop the "un-American culture of German brewers and immigrant saloons." id. at 143.
85. See REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS
AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK 1890-1945, at 10-11 (1993). Many of the
evangelical women believed that they uniquely were equipped to provide moral instruction.
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, society attributed "piety, virtue, and morality" as
feminine traits and characteristics. Id Despite such rhetoric, it was a man, Charles Nelson
Crittenton, who built a larger number of maternity homes in response to hearing a divine call
after his youngest daughter Florence died. Id. at 14. Crittenton inspired women across the
nation to open up Florence Crittenton homes by "criss-crossing" the country in his personal
railroad car to hold religious services for "outcast girls." Id
19
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unwed mothers." The immigrant unwed mothers were believed to suffer
from a moral vulnerability, which resulted from their poor training in reli-
gious and domestic affairs, and from a heightened risk of degeneracy, which
derived from their status as lower-class immigrants. 7 The renamed maternity
homes attempted to educate them by imparting employment skills that would
market the women as domestic servants for the upper classes."
During this time, however, the belief that every single mother was pre-
sumptively unfit was not universal. By 1910, widespread social pressure,
including the outspoken support by President Teddy Roosevelt, led Congress
to enact legislation that created pensions for widows." Considered deserving
single mothers, the pensions allowed widows the means to raise their own
children in their own home.* Notably, as the widow pensions provided that
not all single mothers were treated the same, racism ensured that not all wid-
ows were treated the same. The pensions were given only to white women
and, in a shift in defining whiteness, the Progressive Era's delineation of
multiple races was replaced ultimately with an understanding that immigrant
women from Europe were white, and thus worthy of raising their own chil-
dren.9' Indeed, the maternity homes that served (white) immigrant woman
86. See KUNzEL, supra note 85, at 14, 16-17. In 1896, Kate Wailer Barrett was hired as
the superintendent of the Florence Crittenton Mission. Id. at 17. Crittenton remained the
president of the Mission but left Barrett to supervise the various maternity homes. Id. When
Crittenton died in 1909, Barrett was the sole person in charge and over the next fifteen years,
"shifted the emphasis of the homes from the rescue and redemption of prostitutes to residen-
tial and maternity care for single mothers." Id Barrett also told audiences that her first en-
counter with an unwed mother was a religious experience for her. Id. at 9-10.
87. See KUNZEL, supra note 85, at 13, 30-31. In addition, "[t]raining in the womanly arts
supplemented training in religion and industrial habits to complete the evangelical strategy of
redemption, and lessons in cooking, sewing, laundering, ironing, and child care were offered
in every home." Id at 28. The maternity homes attempted to alter the dress, language, and
habits of the unmarried women because "a working-class style... [was] associated with
moral and sexual laxity." Id. at 30-31. For this reason, maternity homes only accepted "first
offenders." Kate Barrett explained that a woman with a second illegitimate child may exert a
"bad influence" over "girls who are in the institution for the first time." Id.
88. KuNzEL, supra note 85, at 34 ("Evangelicals valued domestic work for precisely the
reasons that working women disliked it; it effectively removed women from the temptations
of city life and limited their independence in ways that young women found constraining and
reformers found reassuring." Kunzel observes that despite the fact that Evangelical women
believed that proper training in female domesticity could cure a morally depraved girl or
woman, "many studies indicated that domestic servants were disproportionately represented
among populations of unmarried mothers, prostitutes, and delinquent girls.").
89. See CARP, supra note 7, at 16. In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt urged states to
assist a widowed mother "keep her own home and keep the child in it." In 1911, Illinois be-
came the first state to enact a pension for widowed mothers, and by 1920, 40 states had en-
acted similar statues. Id.
90. For an excellent historical overview of the social and political factors that resulted in
the creation of pensions for widows, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND
MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 434-75 (1992).
91. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY
OF WELFARE, 1890-1935 at 24-35 (1994) [hereinafter GORDON, PITIED]; see also KUNZEL,
supra note 85, at 29 (observing that by early 1900s, social reformers considered immigrant
women to be "white").
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excluded black women from their care.92 With the allowance that some sin-
gle mothers were capable of raising children, the private agencies became
less aggressive in taking away children who would have otherwise been the
targets of removal a decade earlier.93
With the dawning of the Eugenics movement, which was most influen-
tial from approximately 1910 to 1930, the popularity of adoption declined.
Eugenics was a widely-accepted belief that humanity could combine the
theories of Darwinism and animal husbandry to produce a superior race, or
at least prevent an inferior one from forming.9' As explained in a 1914 high
school textbook, "the demand has become more urgent that we do something
to prevent the race from handing down diseases and other defects, and that
we apply to man some of the methods we employ in breeding plants and
animals.... A tendency to cancer, or tuberculosis, or chorea, or feeblemind-
edness is a handicap which it is not merely unfair, but criminal, to hand
down to posterity."' Accordingly, in an effort to purify the race by reserving
parenthood for the most fit, "tens of thousands of American citizens were
locked up or sterilized as a precaution against crime, disease and other social
ills."'
92. See KUNZEL, supra note 85, at 29-30. In response, African-American women
"founded benevolent institutions for 'unprotected women' in their own communities." Id. at
13.
93. Id. at 33 (observing that "evangelicals insisted that every effort be made to keep
mother and child together." As explained in 1913 by Lilian Clarke, a social reformer of the
day, "It is a dangerous thing to take an infant away from a mother of this type.... If deprived
of [the baby, which was a] powerful motive and influence toward an upright life, ... [the
unmarried mother will be] ready for evil spirits to come in and take possession." (citing
LILIAN FREEMAN CLARKE, THE STORY OF AN INVISIBLE INSTITUTION: FORTY YEARS WORK
FOR MOTHERS AND INFANTS 12 (1913)).
94. Christopher Reardon, American Gothic: A New Curriculum Explores a Disturbing
Side of the Progressive Era, TEACHING TOLERANCE, Spring 2003, at 20. Francis Galton, an
English mathematician who was also Charles Darwin's cousin, is attributed to have developed
the theory of Eugenics in 1883, a term whose etiology is the Greek word for "good in birth."
Galton intended to promote the good of humanity by using the principles of Social Darwinism
to encourage "breeding the best with the best." In his words, "Eugenics cooperates with the
workings of nature by ensuring that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races. What
nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly." Id.
95. Id. at 21 (quoting GEORGE WILLAM HUNTER, THE NEW CIVIC BIOLOGY (1914)).
96. Id. at 19. States regularly passed laws to sterilize individuals who were diagnosed as
insane, feebleminded, or had a propensity for criminal behavior. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927), the Supreme Court infamously upheld such a regulation (in an 8-1 decision)
with the chilling explanation: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.... Three generations of imbeciles
are enough." The Supreme Court did not strike down forced sterilizations until 1942 when it
decided Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute
that provided for the sterilization of felons). Historians estimate that 65,000 individuals were
sterilized during this time period. See Reardon, supra note 94, at 22. In addition, the immigra-
tion policies of this era reflected eugenic principles. In 1923, Congress limited citizenship to
"white persons." See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (upholding ban). From the
1870s until the 1940s, Congress had categorical bans against nationals of various Asian coun-
tries, preventing them from receiving immigration benefits including even entry into the21
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With respect to child-placement practices, the "science" of Eugenics
dominated the entire process. In 1919, as described by W.H. Slingerland, a
"Special Agent of the Department of Child-Helping," "[o]ne of the greatest
social problems in America is the large and constant increase in feeble-
mindedness. Less than a decade ago the world woke up to this fact-for the
problem is not confined to America but is world-wide-and realized some-
thing of its portent. We now know that almost every orphanage contains
some feeble-minded children;... [and] that from 15 to 50 percent of the
delinquents in the reform and industrial schools are of subnormal mental-
ity."'9 "Feeble-mindedness," (a now-discredited medical condition) was de-
fined in 1911 by Dr. Walter S. Cornell of the Department of Public Health
and Charities as the "original lack of normal mental capacity. By 'original'
is meant before the end of the child period or about the twelfth year, al-
though actually 95 per cent of the feeble-minded are bom so because of he-
reditary influences, or injury to the head during labor.... Probably over
one-half of all the feeble-minded, and certainly three-fourths of all of those
found as state charges in our public institutions, are degenerates. They repre-
sent the running down of the human stock."'
The child welfare experts in the Eugenic Era did not presume that a
child would benefit from being raised by his or her biological parent. As ex-
plained in 1919, "it is not right to leave children with parents regardless of
the parents' character and fitness to raise them. Those who are immoral,
positively criminal, afflicted with contagious or infectious diseases, or de-
cidedly deficient mentally, are unfit to bear or raise children. The state and
philanthropic organizations must sometimes step in to save the progeny al-
ready in existence, and take measures to prevent further reproduction by
these classes."9
In response to the fear of the "running down of the human stock," the
child welfare experts in the Eugenic Era classified the feeble-minded chil-
dren into categories such as "Idiots," "Idio-imbeciles," "Imbeciles," "Mo-
rons," and "Dullards" to identify which children could be treated or rehabili-
tated.'" The child welfare experts relied upon these categories to identify
country. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding Chinese
Exclusion Act).
97. SLINGERLAND, supra note 9, at 69. Accordingly, Special Agent Slingerland recom-
mended an education for all "teachers, social workers, and others interested in community
problems" to include instruction on how to administer the Binet-Simon exam and course
preparation in "vital statistics, the family, marriage and divorce, eugenics, educational stan-
dards for normal children, and other subjects... [in] clinical psychology." Id. at 70.
98. Id. at 74 (quoting Walter S. Cornell, M.D., Department of Health and Charities,
Philadelphia, BuLLETIN, at 1-2 (1911)).
99. Id. at 83.
100. Id. at 74-75 (listing comprehensive definitions of each category and identifying the
five-tiered classification scheme as devised from the "systems of Martin W. Barr, of Elwyn,
Pennsylvania, and Henry H. Goddard, of Vineland, New Jersey" and previously published in
a book entitled, "Child Welfare Work in Pennsylvania."); See also id. at 67 (explaining that
there were four categories of "Defective Children," which include the "(1) feeble-minded or
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which children needed to be removed from their biological homes, the at-
tributed source of the feeble-mindedness problem. For instance, as admon-
ished by Special Agent Slingerland in his "Manual for Students and Social
Workers," "[c]hildren of very incompetent, really feeble-minded, viciously
cruel, or positively criminal parents, [] should be wholly separated from
them and provided for permanently in selected private homes or appropriate
institutions.'"
Social agencies and child-welfare workers removed children from their
biological families if one of the five situations existed: (1) serious neglect;'12
(2) physical or moral endangerment "by their surroundings;" (3) desertion or
abandonment; (4) "badly diseased or distressed by deep poverty;" and (5)
"poor and unprotected orphans and half-orphans." ' 3 (The term "half-orphan"
was a term of art that was defined in 1919 as "[wihen only one parent is de-
ceased, the children are called half-orphans."'" In continuing with the abuses
of the Orphan Train era, the vast majority of children deemed orphans had in
fact one living parent. Special Agent Slingerland, for instance, states that
"[iut is estimated that only a little more than 10 percent of the children in
orphan asylums are full orphans." 5). Equally important, the same agencies
insane; (2) epileptic; (3) physically crippled or deformed; (4) seriously diseased").
101. Id. at 65.
102. What is particularly notable about the Eugenic Era's grounds for removal is that the
term "neglect" was defined differently in each state. The State of Indiana, for example, de-
fined neglect as "A child who has not proper parental care or guardianship, who begs or re-
ceives alms, is employed in a saloon, or lives in [an] unfit environment." Id. at 61 (quoting
Indiana statute). The State of Tennessee provided that "neglected children" include those
whose parents "allow them to have vicious associates, or visit vicious places." Id. at 234 (re-
printing Public Act of 1917 (Tennessee)). The reformers targeted neglect because it was be-
lieved that neglect caused a child to become "wayward, truant, lawless, and ultimately incor-
rigible." Id. at 61-62. In demonstrating the logic of Eugenics, Special Agent Slingerland con-
tinued to explain that "By reason of neglect, prenatal and postnatal, many children are af-
flicted with blood diseases, or are deformed, crippled, anemic, neurotic, or tuberculous....,
[which] generally causes its victims to become dependent, delinquent, or defective." Id. at 62.
States also relied on the perceived basis of neglect as a ground to waive the requirement that a
biological parent consent to having his or her child removed from its home and adopted to
another family. For instance, the state of Idaho provided in its Abused Child Law that a bio-
logical parent's consent to have his or her child removed and adopted "is not necessary from a
father or mother deprived of civil rights, or adjudged guilty of adultery or cruelty and for
either cause divorced, or adjudged to be a habitual drunkard, or who has been judicially de-
prived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect." Id. at 136 (quoting from
Idaho statute, § 2703).
103. SL1NGERLAND, supra note 9, at 65. In addition, a child would be deemed deserted if
only the father left the family. Id. at 63 ("In probably nine-tenths of all desertion cases the
father alone deserts his family."). Thus, under the reasoning of the day, a child could be re-
moved from the care of an otherwise competent and devoted single mother on the basis that
her husband deserted the family. Indeed, Slingerland explains that "[miany half-orphans,
because of the poverty, illness, bad character, or other incapacity of the surviving parent, also
need the temporary or permanent care which can be given in boarding or free homes." Id. at
65.
104. Id at 74-75.
105. Id. at 65. 23
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took great care to place a child with the family perceived to be best situated
for its care, which was understood to mean that the least defective child was
placed with the family with the highest social standing."°
Not surprisingly, the popularity of adoption declined in part due to the
rhetoric deployed by the child welfare agencies and experts who justified the
mass removals of children from morally and mentally unfit parents. As ex-
plained in 1955 by Justice Wise Polier, a justice in the New York City's
Children Court, during this era, "Adoption was a rare and unusual thing,
risked only with a brand new, beautiful and perfect baby known to have an
excellent family history."'' " Indeed, popular wisdom no longer attributed the
moral failings of a single mother to her voluntary participation in vice or
inherent vulnerability arising from her lower caste; rather immorality was
the result of the given individual's biological inferiority." Under this logic,
unwed single mothers were considered "feeble-minded" and "near-morons,"
and had a biological flaw such as mental deficiency, which, in turn, created a
propensity to moral weakness."° In this era, children of immoral parents
could no longer be saved from the influences of urban degeneracy, and
adopted children were believed more likely to grow up to be "poor, criminal,
and feebleminded[].""' Following the advice of popular magazines that
warned prospective parents of the "bad heredity" embedded in single moth-
106. As explained by Slingerland, a failure for the social worker to appreciate from
which defect a child suffered was an unforgivable mishap. "To put a low grade mental defec-
tive in a family home where a normal child was expected is a social crime, once to be con-
doned because of ignorance, but now inexcusable in a well-ordered and progressive child-
placing agency." Id. at 69. In addition, Slingerland admonishes the reader of his manual that
"You must bear in mind that there are first-class, second-class, and third-class children, and
there are first-class, second-class, and third-class homes. If a child is dull, stupid, untrained,
or a bed-wetter, you cannot expect to secure as good a home as you could secure for a bright,
attractive, well-trained child, and it is true many humble homes of uncultivated people are
permeated by a loving and faithful spirit, and will give conscientious care even to an undesir-
able child." Id. at 118-19.
107. SOUNGER, supra note 39, at 149; see also LINDA TOLLETr AUsTIN, BABIES FOR
SALE: THE TENNESSEE CHILDREN'S HOME ADOPTION SCANDAL 1 (1993) ("Around the turn of
the century, few adoptions were initiated because people felt ambivalent about adoption.
Those persons felt that poor, immigrant, and unwed mothers were likely to give birth to chil-
dren of low intelligence."). Cole & Donley, supra note 8, at 276 (reporting that "In one re-
quest to the Chicago Child Care Society, adoptive parents requested that the agency assure
them that the child did not have 'one drop of Irish Blood."').
108. See SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 149-52.
109. KUNZEL, supra note 85, at 52-56 (describing how "criminologists, social workers,
and psychiatrists" used the now discredited Binet-Simon test, which could measure mental
capacity, to correlated feeblemindedness in men with criminal activity and poverty and fee-
blemindedness in women with sexual deviance that was understood as prostitution and out-of-
wed lock pregnancy. In addition, social workers diagnosed women too intelligent to be fee-
bleminded as "sexual delinquents" if they were lesbian, victims of rape, or pregnant outside
of marriage).
110. CARP, supra note 7, at 18. ("Studies like Henry H. Goddard's The Kallikak Family
(1912) claimed to demonstrate the tendency of generations of children to inherit the social
pathology of their parents, particularly criminality and feeblemindedness.").
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ers' offspring, white families became less inclined to adopt such a child into
their family."'
In a marked shift from the Orphan Train era, social reformers strongly
encouraged white women to keep their children. Single women were admon-
ished that they would be bad mothers if they abandoned their biological
child, and the maternity homes took great efforts to discourage adoption
through literature, counseling tactics, and even signed contracts in which a
woman's admission into the home was predicated on her keeping the child."'
In addition, a "handful of states" passed legislation mandating that a woman
breast feed her infant for the first six months in an attempt to ensure that il-
legitimate children remained with their birth mothers."3
By the 1950s, however, adoption returned to a desirable means by
which to create or expand a family. The rise in the popularity for white fami-
lies to adopt white babies boomed overnight, alongside the post-World War
baby boom, and can be attributed primarily to three factors."4 First, by the
1940s, the eugenic theory of biological inferiority faded from its prominence
111. Id.
112. See KUNZEL, supra note 85, at 33; Sanger, supra note 49, at 445-46 (observing that
the counseling tactics included "regularly requir[ing] pregnant women to touch, nurse, and
room with their infants as a condition of admission. Such intimacies were intended to create a
bond too wrenching for the mother to break. Tactics were blunt. Throughout the 1930s and
1940s, the Florence Crittenton Homes gave their residents a letter signed by 'The Baby You
Didn't Want' which asked, 'Whose arms will pick me up from my coop tomorrow? Into what
home shall I be consigned...?').
113. SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 21; MAY, supra note 8, at 120-42 (describing the myr-
iad forces that led to the baby boom, a belief in a large family, and an emphasis on confor-
mity).
114. See JEAN CHARNLEY, THE ART OF CHILD PLACEMENT 149 (Univ. of Minnesota
Press 1955) (reporting that "the shortage of foster homes was most acute" during World War
II). According to estimates made by the Children's Bureau, in 1937, approximately 16,000
adoptions occurred each year. id. By 1945, this rate tripled to approximately 50,000 adoptions
annually. In the 1950s, the adoption rate doubled to approximately 93,000 adoptions per year.
By 1965, the adoptions per year grew to 142,000. Id. As a historical note, white families dis-
regarded the stigma of childlessness and mores of white supremacy and began to adopt chil-
dren of color relatively late in time-first Japanese children after World War II and then or-
phaned children from the Korean and Vietnam wars. See CARP, supra note 7, at 33. In modem
times, international adoptions are skyrocking in popularity. In 2001, international adoptions
accounted for 20,000 placements in the United States. Jane E. Brody, Adoptions from Afar:
Rewards and Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2003, at F7. The international adoptions are
criticized for promotion or reliance on baby selling. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, A Challenge
in India Snarls Foreign Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, at A3. See also FRANCES M.
KOH, ORIENTAL CHILDREN IN AMERIcAN HOMES iv-xv, 102-07 (1981) (discussing challenges
and suggesting resolutions to difficulties occurring in adoptions of Asian children by white
American parents). In modem times, there also is a controversy over interracial adoptions
arising between white parents adopting non-white children, focusing on the adoptions of Afri-
can-American children. For an overview of this controversy, see KENNEDY, supra note 45, at
447-79; FOGG-DAvIS, supra note 54, at 3-4, 34-51 (critiquing the concept of "colorblindness"
as used in the adoption context); see also Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values,
Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEw. ENG. L. REV. 913, 916-18 (1994) (commenting on assump-
tions behind the placement of children with parents of same race and of different races than
the child).
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as psychology and child-rearing theories scientifically proved that children
were influenced by their environment. Once again adoption offered the op-
portunity to save the children of depraved single mothers as long as the chil-
dren were raised by the good (and usually Christian) parents of the day."'
For the first time, adoptive parents preferred adopting infants to older chil-
dren because an infant hid the child's illegitimacy, the mark of its own moral
failing, and it was believed that the earlier in time a good couple could raise
the child, the earlier a child would be free from the influence of her biologi-
cal mother's corrupted environment."6
Second, the demand for white babies was enforced by changing psycho-
logical explanations for single motherhood. By the 1940s, the discipline of
psychiatry proffered that white women and girls who became pregnant
merely suffered from a mental illness, which caused them to act out by en-
gaging in illicit behavior such as pre-marital sex and out-of-wedlock child-
birth."7 During the baby boom, the penance for a single mother's moral fail-
115. See CARP, supra note 7, at 18.
116. See HOLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-50. According to a 1951 survey of 25 states,
approximately 70% of the children who were adopted were under the age of one. Id. See also
Cole & Donley, supra note 8, at 276 (listing the reasons why infants were not adopted in ear-
lier periods including the fact that until the 1920s, there was an infant mortality rate as high as
95% when an infant was separated from her birth mother). By contrast, in contemporary
times, approximately 81% of children who are adopted are under age one. See ADAMEC &
PIERCE, supra note 9, at 24.
117. SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 90. Whereas the "scientific" explanation for single
motherhood previously had been the result of a woman's moral weakness (Progressive Era) or
biological inferiority (Eugenics), in the 1940s, the etiology of out-of-wedlock pregnancy
among white women became understood as the result of mental illness. The psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers discovered that these women suffered from "masochism,
sadomasochism, severe immaturity, psychopathic tendencies, homosexual tendencies, schizo-
phrenia, delinquency, and chaotic personality structure." Id. Despite the more seemingly for-
giving explanation, the psychological genesis of single motherhood in fact was predicated on
the assumption that women who chose pregnancy were doing so to defy society's order. For a
white woman to chose out-of-wedlock pregnancy despite the societal opprobrium against it
indicated that she was "a truly sick person [who] den[ied] reality so radically." Id. at 88.
Although contraception and abortion were legally unavailable (or if legal, extremely limited)
the researchers focused on how a white teenager willed herself pregnant, including one 1957
report by a respected researcher, that showed pregnant teenagers were able to consciously
control their ovulation process to ensure pregnancy. Id. at 90. Notably absent were studies on
the male fathers who impregnated the girls. One reason for this omission was that the
underlying anxiety about an unwed mother's pregnancy was that she was having sex, an
activity reserved for men. Researchers identified an unwed pregnancy as pathological because
the young woman was acting "aggressively like [her] father," she had "a lot of latent
homosexuality.., coupled with contempt for men," and she was conflicted about her
"masculine and feminine drives." Id. at 90-91. The discourse about gender role transgression
entered greater society. In 1951, a social worker described a particular unwed pregnant
teenager as "boyish," "aggressive," and attributed her interest in "work, recreation, and
sports" to the possibility that "she denied her femininity by redirecting her sexual energy .... "
Id. at 91. By contrast, the larger white society continued to attribute unwed black women's
pregnancies to their biological inferiority that was exhibited by their "hypersexuality." Id. at
43. Because unmarried black women's pregnancy remained a "fact" of biological inferiority,
black single motherhood was associated with an inferior morality leading to the breakdown in
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ing, having sex outside of marriage, was to surrender her child to a loving
home inhabited by a upwardly mobile, infertile married couple. During this
era, the single mother still was considered unfit to parent her child. Indeed,
courts could, and did, terminate her parental ties based on her out-of-
wedlock status."' More commonly though, the private maternity homes that
had once counseled women to keep their children during the Eugenic Era,
almost overnight, again changed tactics to convince women to give up their
children at birth."9
society. id. at 43-44. In the 1950s and 1960s, segregationists and de-segregationists alike
defended their cause based on the effect the end of segregation would have on out-of-wedlock
pregnancies among black women and girls. In the state legislature, laws were passed and
proposed to penalize, and at times, criminalize black women who had out-of-wedlock births.
. at 46-51. For example, in 1960 Louisiana made it a crime for a woman to have more than
one child out of wedlock. Id. at 47. And in 1958, the following bill was introduced to the
Mississippi legislature: "An Act to Discourage Immorality of Unmarried Females by Provid-
ing for Sterilization of the Unwed Mother Under Conditions of the Act; and for Related Pur-
poses." Id. at 41. Although the bill did not pass, the sentiment captures the enormous amount
of animus unwed black mothers faced. For instance, states across the country considered simi-
lar sterilization bills, conditioned public benefits on limiting family size to one child, and
required hospitals and doctors to involuntarily sterilize unmarried and even married black
women during these decades. Id. at 48-58. (Notably absent were the states' regulation of
men's involvement in out-of-wedlock pregnancies. In North Carolina, when the legislature
was debating the merits of an unwed mother sterilization bill, a member proposed sterilizing
the unwed fathers. Although the amendment was added to the bill, the bill was tabled, never
to be discussed again. Id. at 56-57).
118. See SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 165 (recording comments of Judge Harry D.
Fisher, Circuit Court, Cook County, Illinois, who "believed it was [his] right and duty to in-
tercede and terminate the parental rights of mothers whose wrongdoing consisted of bearing a
child while unwed."). In extreme examples, upon the birth of their child, unwed mothers in
Augusta, Georgia were brought into juvenile court, charged with neglect, the children were
taken away permanently, and usually placed with adoptive couples who lived in California or
New York. Id. at 175.
119. See Sanger, supra note 49, at 446-47 & n.334 (observing that maternity homes ad-
monished unwed pregnant women who desired to keep their children for being selfish and
immature. For instance, the unwed mother who decided to keep her child did so "not out of an
ability to care for the child, but out of the wish for pleasure for herself"). Unlike earlier eras,
maternity homes conditioned care on a signed agreement that the unwed mother would sur-
render her child upon its birth. See SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 161-64 (describing the "relin-
quishment culture" in maternity homes that led to birth mothers surrendering their children at
birth). When a white pregnant teenager learned she was pregnant, she was aggressively coun-
seled by family, friends, and maternity homes to surrender her child and admonished not to
tell anyone of her secret. The larger white community was complicit in this lie. When a young
white girl became pregnant, her parents, shamed and tremendously embarrassed by her ac-
tions, usually pressured their daughter to give up her child by sending her away to a maternity
home before she showed. If the young woman had wanted to keep the baby before entering
the maternity home, she rarely did afterwards due to the social workers' aggressive and con-
stant guilt campaign. While she was away, the family explained to others she was visiting
relatives, and upon her return, she continued her schooling and social life as if nothing had
happened. Id. at 108-13.
The sin for which unwed pregnant white women were punished was not that they were preg-
nant per se, but that the pregnancy was proof that they were violating their gender role. A
proper woman only had interests in domestic hobbies, was uninterested in sex, and stayed at
home until she married. Id. at 90-93, 100-02. A pregnant unmarried woman carried around27
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Social pressures to have large families, combined with restrictive crite-
ria for adoptive parents, resulted in a sizable number of couples who desired
to adopt children at any cost. A black market (for white babies) responded to
this demand, which thrived in the 1940s and 1950s.2 ' During that time, it
was commonly believed among lawyers, doctors, judges, and social workers
that the "ideal" family consisted of two parents and at least two children, and
that an unmarried mother should not raise children under any circum-
stances.' Accordingly, motivated by moral conviction (and at times the
generous compensation for their services), these professionals participated in
or facilitated baby selling on the black market. For instance, some lawyers
recruited pregnant women on the streets to sell their baby; some hospitals
refused to return the newborn baby to the mother if she did not have suffi-
cient funds to pay for her hospital bills; and some judges worked with agen-
cies to terminate the rights of birth parents and approve adoptions without
requiring any investigation of the situation beyond whether the adoptive par-
ents had sufficient funds to cash the check for the services rendered." Other
agencies aggressively manipulated and coerced a young poor pregnant teen-
ager to surrender her child for sale on the black market.' The most flagrant
the proof that she had been outside the home, and even worse, participating in the male be-
havior of sex. Pregnancy in a married woman ironically made her chaste; pregnancy in an
unwed woman made her manly. Motherhood was an icon reserved for the pure women who
could live up to proper ideals of femininity. Id. at 90.
Black families responded differently to a teenage pregnancy. Although they never encouraged
teenage pregnancies as claimed by white policy makers, black parents usually saw abandon-
ing one's own child to strangers as the greater harm than extramarital sex posed. Families
usually accommodated the pregnancies by having other relatives or the grandmother help the
unwed mother raise her child. Id. at 82. White society treated black pregnant teenagers sub-
stantially different than it treated white pregnant teenagers. Although there were some mater-
nity homes opened by the black community, most maternity homes were segregated and
closed to black girls. Schools would expel a black pregnant teenager, ending her educational
career; and the welfare agency scolded, admonished, and made it extremely difficult for
young girls to receive the benefits to which they were entitled under law. Id. at 50-51, 57-59,
61-63, 78-85. In the late 1950s, the maternity homes became integrated and accepted a num-
ber of black women. Id. at 66-76.
Whereas a white unwed mother threatened the gender hierarchy, she was controlled by famil-
ial pressures, maternity homes, and social workers who pressured her to abandon her child to
restore her femininity. An unwed black mother was perceived to burden society by draining
the tax rolls or infecting others with her immorality. Id. at 42-45, 56. A black unwed mother's
desire to raise her own child, however, had the subsequent perceived effect to threaten to
bring down the entire social order, which is a sentiment that contributed to the ending of the
Aid to Families With Dependent Children program in 1996.
120. SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 168, 177-86; AusTIN, supra note 107, at 102-05 (re-
counting reasons why one couple turned to the black market).
121. See SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 165-66 (listing comments by various judges); id. at
175-76 (listing practices by courts and social workers to secure adoptions of children born to
unwed mothers without consent).
122. Id. at 168-86 (listing abuses by various lawyers, judges, doctors, maternity homes,
and social workers).
123. Id. at 168-77 (describing the exploitative practices, moral condemnation, and ma-
nipulation used to secure the "consent" of birth mothers).
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examples of coercion included informing the birth mother that her child was
still-born while in fact, the agency flew the child to a waiting couple, usually
in New York or California, who was thrilled to receive an addition to their
family.1
24
The "Tennessee Baby Snatching Scandal" is the most widely known ex-
ample of these abuses. In addition to employing the various coercive tactics
already mentioned, the Tennessee Children's Home Society, run by Georgia
Tann, colluded with a local judge, Camille Kelley, for the immediate termi-
nation of the parental rights of poor white women and families." For in-
stance, when Tann learned that a father with underage children was about to
lose his job, Judge Kelley declared the children neglected and, without a
hearing or even notice, removed the children and ordered them adopted by a
waiting family (who paid Tann and allegedly Kelley handsomely for their
time). 26
The private individuals who ran the black market were motivated in part
by the sincere belief that babies would be corrupted if they were raised by
the poor, immoral women who birthed them. 27 The ideology of Fatherless-
ness thus justified the removal of babies from their mothers and placing
them in the homes of desired, good, normal families: well-off, white hetero-
sexual couples or on occasion, single mothers if they happened to be movie
stars. "'28 Once the black market practices were exposed, the homes were shut
down, and the various states responded with measures to curtail private
abuses through more state involvement in the adoption process."
124. Id. at 176. One single mother told the Congressional Committee that Elizabeth B.
Hamilton, the chief probation officer in the Richmond County Juvenile Court, informed her
that her baby was born dead. Hamilton assured the mother that if she signed a paper authoriz-
ing the burial of the child, "no one . . would know of the situation [unwed pregnancy], and
that everything would be cleared up easily." Id. The mother signed the paper "without really
looking at it" and "[t]wo years later [I was shocked to receive in the mail adoption papers
from the Welfare Department in California." Id.
125. AusTIN, supra note 107, at 122-23; see also SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 176-77
(reporting a similar arrangement between Elizabeth Hamilton and Judge Harry A. Woodward
in Augusta, Georgia).
126. AusTrN, supra note 107, at 122-23; id. at 65-71 (listing details of 4 cases between
1940 and 1943 in which the court denied a habeas corpus petition by a single mother or poor
family seeking the return of their children from the custody of the Tennessee Children's
Home Society). In addition, in one instance, Judge Kelley took custody away from foster
parents and informed the couple that the child would be placed for adoption. Without investi-
gating the merits of the allegations against the foster parents, Judge Kelley stated in open
court that "she was the law, the whole and sole law and that President Truman could not tell
her to do otherwise with this child." Id. at 70. Judge Kelley threatened to charge and jail the
parents for contempt if they appealed her decision. Id.
127. See SOLNGER, supra note 39, at 177-86.
128. AusTIN, supra note 107, at 80. Joan Crawford adopted children from the Tennessee
Children's Home Society. Id.
129. Id. at 124-25. Senator Estes Kefauver brought the abuses to light by holding well-
publicized committee hearings on the baby selling practices. Although Senator Kefauver in-
troduced a bill to prompt federal reform of the abuses, the legislation was killed repeatedly in
the 1950s and 1960s by various interests that opposed the increased regulation. Nonetheless,
29
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The third factor leading to the increase in adoption, one of the notable
social influences of the Cold War, is that the post-World War II notion of
citizenship included raising better and more children than the Communists."3
In a sharp turnabout from the Eugenic Era, childlessness became stigma-
tized, because it reflected a couple's selfish shunting of an obligation that
they were expected to contribute in the efforts to overcome the Soviet
threat.' Infants were favored because they could be brought into the home
and successfully hide a couple's infertility, which was perceived to be a
badge of shame and a failure of good citizenship."
In keeping with efforts to hide the fact of adoption, during the post
World War II era, the government and private agencies maintained records
that restricted, if not prevented, a birth mother or her child from identifying
or locating one another in the future.' 3 Adoptive families took great efforts
to hide the fact that they adopted a child. After receiving a child, they often
would move to new neighborhoods to appear like a "normal" family, would
rarely inform others of their secret, and at times, did not disclose the adop-
tive status to their child until adulthood, if at all.3
Placement agencies reinforced the shame of childlessness by undertak-
ing various efforts to make the addition of a child in a home appear the result
of a biological birth rather than an adoption placement. The criteria for pro-
spective parents developed, and the specifications of desirability in a parent
were modeled after, and thus molded them into, the ideal nuclear family:
The mothers needed to be within child-bearing age, the couple had to be in-
fertile, the parents had to be of the same religion and race, the marriage had
to be at least two years in duration, the homes required minimum square
states responded by introducing reforms such as keeping adoptions within various states,
stricter birth parent consent laws, and follow up investigations of the adoptive parents. Id.
130. See MAY, supra note 8, at 137 (reporting J. Edgar Hoover's remarks to "homemak-
ers and mothers" in which he lauded them for their ability to fight "the twin enemies of free-
dom-crime and communism"); CARP, supra note 7, at 28 ("Parenthood during the Cold War
became a patriotic necessity.").
131. See MAY, supra note 8, at 137 ("A major study conducted in 1957 found that most
Americans believed that parenthood was the route to happiness. Childlessness was considered
deviant, selfish, and pitiable.").
132. See supra notes 114 and 116 (recording statistics showing that in 1945, adoption
rates tripled to approximately 50,000 adoptions annually and in the 1950s, the adoption rate
doubled to approximately 93,000 adoptions per year. According to a 1951 survey of 25 states,
approximately 70% of the children who were adopted were under the age of one).
133. CARP, supra note 7, at 35. Indeed, at the time that an adoption becomes final in the
United States, an amended birth certificate is issued listing the adoptive parents as the parents
of the child. See Sanger, supra note 49, at 444. By the 1960s, a hallmark of modem adoption
included the sealing of adoption records. Access was denied to everyone (including the birth
mother, adopted child, and adoptive family) unless a court ordered them opened upon a find-
ing of "good cause." CARP, supra note 7, at 34-35.
134. For an excellent history of the adoption rights movement's response to the secrecy
and success in unsealing records, see CARP, supra note 7, at 36-70 (origin of adoption re-
cords); id. at 103-37 (history of keeping biological parents away from children, 1900-1970s);
id. at 167-95 (beginnings of adoption rights movement); id. at 196-222 (documenting trends
of open records and open adoption).
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footage, and great efforts were made to match children with their adoptive
parents' complexion, personality, and needless to say, the same race.'"
C. Historical Examination of Contemporary Justifications for Adoption Bans
In the contemporary defense of the adoption bans, Arkansas, Florida,
and Utah have provided a number of reasons why their adoption bans should
survive rational review. Although Part II and III will examine the legal vi-
ability of these arguments, this section examines the primary justifications
through a historical lens of prior adoption policies.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act: Superiority of Nuclear Family and Proper
Gender Role Socialization
In briefs filed with the courts, state attorneys from Arkansas, Florida,
and Utah each defended the rationality of their adoption bans by claiming a
state interest in heterosexual modeling and proper gender socialization. For
instance, Florida asserts that it is in the best interest of children to be raised
by married mothers and fathers, because "[i]n such homes, children have the
best chance to develop optimally, due to the vital role dual-gender parenting
plays in shaping sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual
role modeling."'36 Florida also provides that "[tlhe adoption law is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest in expressing community disap-
proval of homosexuality in the context of child rearing... The fact of the
matter is that it is not unconstitutional-and it is in fact not uncommon-to
discourage promoting homosexuality to children."'37
The one father, one mother nuclear family ideal is set forth as an un-
questioned talisman of good parenting and happy families. However, the
state interests in preventing improper gender socialization and discouraging
a child from learning about, and later embracing, a different cultural lifestyle
have been asserted once before?3 The most tragic example of a family pol-
icy designed to achieve cultural assimilation took the form of removing Na-
tive American children from the homes of their biological families and plac-
ing them into permanent foster care or adoptive homes of non-Indian fami-
135. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-64; CARP, supra note 7, at 30 (age limitations,
religious uniformity, marriage length, personality, complexion). Most agencies were segre-
gated until the 1950s and 1960s, and the ones that placed black children applied the same
standards to prospective black couples. See SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 72-75.
136. Brief of Appellee at 16, Lofton v. Kearney, (No. 01-16723-DD) (11th Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter State of Florida Brief].
137. Id. at 44.
138. Gay men and lesbian women constitute a culture, defined as one with separate his-
tory and heroes and shared commonalities such as the "coming out" experience, humor
(marked by drag and camp), and political commitments. Opponents of rights for gay men and
lesbian women appear to agree with this demarcation, denigrating them for leading an im-
moral "lifestyle."
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lies.'39 At its height in the 1970s, approximately 25 to 35% of all Native
American children were removed from their families, and 85% of those chil-
dren were placed in homes with white parents."4
Like the earlier Progressive Era social reformers, the state agencies re-
moved children after diagnosing the parents as neglectful and abusive." Ac-
cording to a 1978 House of Representatives Report, 1% of the removals
were in response to child abuse and the remaining 99% of the removals were
on the grounds of "neglect" or "social deprivation," which were the charges
social workers made in response to the perceived emotional damage that a
child was receiving by being "subjected to [I living with their parents.' 4 2
The vague grounds were confirmed to be a pretext in light of the fact that
after reviewing evidence of these removals, "the conditions which led to the
separation are not demonstrably harmful or are remediable or transitory in
character.' 41 3 Moreover, the vast majority of the children were removed by
non-Indian social workers and government agents who were "unfamiliar
with and often disdainful of Indian culture and society."'"
Ironically, the children usually were removed from their homes because
"neglect" was in fact the result of too many adults taking care of them. In
many Native American homes, extended -family members actively were in-
volved in the care of children. "[T]he whole concept of family in Indian life
is different from that in non-Indian life. There are not just one mother and
father, but mothers and fathers. When you deal with a situation like that,....
[the] child is just as closely related to his or her mother's sister as he or she
is to the mother."'4 5 The white policy makers were blinded by their prefer-
ence for a family consisting of one man and one woman such that they failed
139. See THEY ARE YOUNG ONCE BUT INDIAN FOREVER: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF
INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS ON INDIAN CILD WELFARE 15, 79, 87 (Joseph A. Myers ed., 1981)
[hereinafter YOUNG ONCE]. This family policy was not an isolated effort to prevent Native
American individuals from perpetuating their culture. Since the founding of the United States,
social workers, state governments, and the federal government's Bureau of Indian Affairs
have been trying to separate Native American children from their parents, families, and cul-
ture. Instead of investing in adequate schools on reservations, the government created board-
ing schools for Indian children. Id. at 96. Located far away from the reservation, the schools
served the purpose of stripping away the children's tribal, and at times, ethnic identity. Id. at
35. The children were separated from their families for nine months of the year and the
schools' purpose was to "persuade Indian children to abandon the customs, traditions and
values of their tribes in order to achieve a place in American society." Id.; see also Associated
Press, Lawsuit Alleges Abuse at Indian Boarding Schools, BILLINGS GAZETTE, July 12, 2003
(reporting $25 billion class action filed on behalf of Indian students who allegedly were
abused at Indian boarding schools across the country. The lawsuit alleges specific instances of
physical and sexual abuse but also alleges "that the government set up the boarding school
system in the late 1800s to try to wipe out Indian culture, tradition, and language.").
140. See KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 485-86; YOUNG ONCE, supra note 139, at 87.
141. See YOUNG ONCE, supra note 139, at 91.
142. KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 489 (quoting findings from House report).
143. See YOUNG ONCE, supra note 139, at 88.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 91.
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to see how the extended familial bonds were providing an enormous amount
of love, care, and attention for the child. As explained in Congressional tes-
timony by Evelyn Blanchard, the removals were the result of "recognized
ignorance or a conscious decision to provide different and discriminatory
services where Indian families are concerned. The strengths of Indian fami-
lies are not explored and presented, only the weaknesses."'"
The absence of a nuclear two-parent family-even when replaced by a
larger familial support system-functioned as per se neglect in the eyes of
the white policymakers. The policymakers' anxiety over having children
raised outside the nuclear family was so great that an alternative familial
structure constituted harm to the child, which was cured only by perma-
nently resettling the child in the homes of white, two parent families. Fi-
nally, after much publicity, charges of racist regulation, and a failure to
demonstrate countervailing benefits that such removals had on the children
involved, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 ("ICWA"),
which sought to rectify the situation by granting tribal courts exclusive juris-
diction over child custody and adoption placements of Native American
children.'4
The similarities to the contemporary adoption statutes are uncanny.
First, in both situations, the ideal family is comprised of one mother and one
father. Alternative familial relationships are presumed to be per se neglect
and the strengths of alternative familial relationships are left unexamined.
Second, neglect of and harm to a child are defined by the parents' presumed
inability to pass on proper gender role socialization. The white policy mak-
ers believed that the presence of the aunts, uncles, and grandparents in the
home would cause Indian children to be confused about their own gender
roles and create unhealthy role-modeling that would prevent the children
from entering into nuclear families as adults. Third, although the white pol-
icy makers must genuinely have believed that they were reordering families
in ways that were in the best interest of the children, history has shown that
the policies in question were in fact driven by the desire to ensure that Na-
tive Americans were unable to continue their values and way of life. Simi-
larly, in court filings, the states justify the contemporary adoption bans as
preventing children from being exposed or influenced by gay men and lesbi-
ans in the belief that exposure to gay parents will result in the production of
gay children. The policies against Native Americans, though couched as
child welfare concerns, were in fact nothing short of an attempt at cultural
annihilation. Likewise, the contemporary adoption statutes' stated goal of
preventing gay children from growing into gay adults suffers from the same
ignominious purpose.
146. Id. at 88.
147. See id. at 57-58 (discussing operation of the ICWA); KENNEDY, supra note 45, at
486-89 (same); see also i at 499-518 (offering criticisms and proposing reforms to contem-
porary operation of the ICWA). 33
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2. Great Arizona Orphan Abduction: Reserving Adoption for
Morally Fit Parents
Arkansas, Florida, and Utah justify their bans in part on the moral infe-
riority of gay men, lesbian women, and single mothers. A historical exami-
nation of adoption practices supports the idea that implicit mores influence
notions of who can be an acceptable parent. As much as white families are
no longer influenced by the ideology of white supremacy that prevented
many from adopting children from other ethnic groups,'4 8 the institution is
still filled with racist overtones controlling who may adopt whom. For in-
stance, the interracial adoption debate is always about whether a white cou-
ple should adopt a black, Latino, Asian, or Native American child; never
whether a black, Asian, Latino, or Native American family should adopt a
white child. 9
In unearthing an incident where this taboo was transgressed, historian
Linda Gordon has recently documented the Great Arizona Orphan Abduc-
tion.50 In 1904, a group of 40 Irish orphans de-boarded a train in the West
and were adopted by Catholic homes in Clifton, Arizona. Arranged by New
York nuns and the local Catholic priest, the Irish children were placed in the
homes of Mexican-American families who attended the local parish.'"
Within days of the placement, the white townspeople organized an
armed vigilante that raided each home and took the white children away
from their adoptive families. The white townspeople were so insulted by the
idea that their dark skinned neighbors and co-workers could raise "white"
children, the townspeople started a race riot that nearly killed the local
Catholic priest and the New York nuns who had traveled with the children.'
In New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti,"'3 the Mexican-American par-
ents and New York nuns filed a habeas petition for the return of the chil-
dren. ' The Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona denied the habeas
petition, concluding that the best interest of the child is the dispositive ques-
tion in the matter.' 5 Chief Justice Kent, who was sitting on the territory
court, issued the decision, which noted that: "The evidence establishes,
without contradiction, that the persons to whom the children were given, as
assigned, both in Clifton and Morenci, were wholly unfit to be [e]ntrusted
with them; that they were, with possibly one or two exceptions, of the lowest
148. See supra note 114 for a discussion of international and interracial adoptions.
149. GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 309 (observing that "adoptions of white children
by parents of color are so rare they are not even debated.").
150. For an excellent review and analysis of this historical event, see GORDON, ORPHAN,
supra note 7, passim.
151. Id. at 16-18.
152. Id. at 109-17.
153. 79 P. 231 (Ariz. 1905).
154. Id. at 234.
155. Id. at 235.
[Vol. 40
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss1/2
2003] PARENS PATRI[ARCHY]: ADOPTION, EUGENICS, AND SAME-SEX COUPLES 35
class of half-breed Mexican Indians."" The court described the armed vigi-
lantes taking the children by force and intimidation as "a committee of 25
persons.., named to collect the children from the people to whom they had
been consigned,"'57 and the Catholic nuns and priest's deliberate placement
of children into their homes was "a great blunder [that] was committed in the
consignment and delivery of the children to these degraded half-breed Indi-
ans."'58 In light of the fact that the "orphans" had lived with the white fami-
lies since the beginning of the court case, the court further held that the best
interest of the children not to be returned to the "degraded half-breed Indi-
ans"'59 but to the "good women of the place""lw who had rescued the children
from the "evil they had fallen."'' Although the appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,62 the Supreme Court
gratuitously announced its approval of the result below, observing that "the
children were distributed among persons wholly unfit to be intrusted with
them, being, with one or two exceptions, half-breed Mexican Indians of bad
character."'63
As the Progressive Era practices demonstrate how children were saved
from the corrupt influences of an inferior culture, the Orphan Abduction
confirms the flip-side: That racism also determines in which homes prized or
undamaged, in this case white, children may be placed. A tragic footnote to
this case is the allegation that one of the white parents was later charged with
raping his foster daughter.'" The ultimate irony of the situation, however,
was that the New York social reformers originally removed Irish children
from their families because the reformers regarded the poor Irish immigrants
as being racially inferior to the white elite society. A train-ride away, how-
156. Id. at 233. The entire quote is as follows: "The evidence establishes, without con-
tradiction, that the persons to whom the children were given, as assigned, both in Clifton and
Morenci, were wholly unfit to be intrusted with them; that they were, with possibly one or
two exceptions, of the lowest class of half-breed Mexican Indians; that they were impecuni-
ous, illiterate, unacquainted with the English language, vicious, and, in several instances,
prostitutes and persons of notoriously bad character; that their homes were of the crudest sort,
being for the most part built of adobe, with dirt floors and roofs; that many of them had chil-
dren of their own, whom they were unable properly to support." Id.
157. Id. at 234.
158. Id. at 237.
159. id.
160. Id. at 234.
161. Id. at 238.
162. 203 U.S. 429, 439 (1906) (holding that "[i]t was in the exercise of this jurisdiction
as parens patriae that the present case was heard and determined. It is the settled doctrine that
in such cases the court exercises a discretion in the interest of the child to determine what care
and custody are best for it in view of its age and requirements.").
163. Id. at 436.
164. GORDON, ORPHAN, supra note 7, at 306. Gordon emphasizes that the records are
ambiguous and cautions that historical documents do not establish whether the victim was in
fact one of the orphan train children. Gordon also observes that several contemporary Clifto-
nians believe that the vigilantes failed in removing all of the orphans in light of the fact that
there are "some light-skinned and even red-haired members of their families." Id. at 304. 35
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ever, the Supreme Court and townspeople recast the same children as
"white." Away from the New York's hegemonic ordering, the children were
innocent and young enough to overcome their formerly imputed culturally
inferior status. Race was not determined by skin color, but by imputed innate
behaviors. The process of marking both the townspeople and children as
white additionally served the purpose of undermining the legitimacy of the
claims made by the Mexican-families, the "degraded half-breed Indians," to
care for the children. On the frontier, the racial ordering was bifurcated into
white and savage, and where a white child would be placed was clear. As is
often observed by social commentators, here is a situation illustrating that
race is not about difference, but hierarchy."
At different times in history, imputed moral deficiency has separated
out the Irish and Catholic immigrants, dark skinned Mexican-Americans,
and Native Americans from the morally pure white-acting and self-
appointed elite-a motley grouping whose ethnic and racial differences were
elided by their imputed whiteness, which reified the belief that difference
was found outside of one's racial group. Because behavior and marriage
marked citizenship, people in alternative familial arrangements were identi-
fied as racially inferior beings. Whereas whiteness, and literally citizenship
through 1865, once was defined through behaviors such as marriage, income
above poverty, and associating with acceptable white people, the contempo-
rary adoption statutes define parental ability through markers of morality:
heterosexuality, gendered parenting skills, and a state-issued marriage li-
cense)
165. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEz, WrrT BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE, at xiii (1996).
166. After Reconstruction, most states defined a person as African-American by the
infamous "one drop of blood" rule, a legacy of which was the propagation of the ideology of
racial purity that gained momentum in segregationists' attempts to keep the white race free
from the "tainted" black race in public and private settings. Notably, such a rigid definition of
race was the product of a specific historical moment. For many years, American society, and
in turn the law, had a much more fluid understanding of race. Although states were heavily
invested in defining who was black and Native American, and implicitly who remained white,
there was no consensus between the states over such definitions. Legal definitions substan-
tially varied, but in the early 1800s, most states determined that a person was white or Native
American as long as she could prove that less that one-fourth of her ancestry was black. In a
fascinating phenomenon arising during this period, no doubt influenced by the tensions be-
tween free and slave states and the reality that, be it by the choice or coercion of their parents,
interracial individuals existed, a person could be placed on trial to determine his or her racial
status. Typically, the racial ambiguity of a person arose when a slave catcher captured a dark-
skinned individual in a free state and the person alleged she was wrongfully enslaved. If she
proved before a jury that she was white or Indian, she was declared a free person. If he was
proven to be black, he was kept or returned to slavery. See Ariela Gross, Litigating White-
ness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109,
120-23 (1998).
As much as judges, juries, and testifying experts prided themselves in being able to "spot"
black blood in the physical features of an individual, a review of the trial transcripts reveal
that the means of proving racial identity in the courtroom typically was made through evi-
dence of character. For a man, his whiteness was demonstrated through evidence of good
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The contemporary adoption bans revive the creation of social castes
based on perceptions of a parent's moral behavior. As part and parcel with
the creation of social castes, implicit mores that once governed child place-
ment practices are back in vogue. As illustrated by the Great Arizona Or-
phan Abduction, a parent can adopt a child within or below her caste, but
never above it. As adoption was once the selected vehicle by which children
were removed from immoral immigrant and Native American homes--the
families who were considered deviant because they failed to conform to the
social reformers' ideal nuclear family--the contemporary adoption bans are
used to prevent today's "morally deficient" families from ever receiving
children, reserving the young, and the right to form families, as a privilege
for the morally righteous. The adoption bans thus are not providing for child
welfare; rather, they are engaged in a much larger, and questionable, project.
II. ORIGINS OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY ADOPTION AND
FOSTER CARE BANS
Despite the history of misguided and racist policies, adoption has be-
come a respected institution over the past fifty years.67 The modern respect-
ability has resulted from the introduction of legal measures that ensure that
children are not taken away from biological families without their consent
and that determine parental fitness based on an individualized assessment.'
The contemporary adoption bans eschew both principles by forcibly remov-
ing children from existing homes with gay or unmarried parents and by de-
termining fitness based on gross generalizations rather than specific findings
relating to a prospective parent. This next section explains why the contem-
porary adoption bans" have been enacted and reveals the proffered justifica-
citizenship activities such as voting, helping one's neighbor, marriage to a white woman, and
associating with white people. Id. at 158-66. For a woman, her citizenship was proven by
evidence of her sexual chastity, beauty, or examples of her moral purity. Id. at 166-76. Char-
acter and compliance with moral codes thus defined a person's race and subsequent social
ordering. Id.
167. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-6.1 ("Considerable evidence exists that in at least
the past fifty years, adoption has attained the status of a fully socially acceptable practice.").
16& See Sanger, supra note 49, at 443 & nn.317-19 (discussing some provisions of
modem consent laws); STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 9, at 28, 35.
By 1941, the Child Welfare League of America ("CWLA") recognized the importance of
individualized determinations. In its policy paper, the CWLA recognized that "[sipecial needs
in regard to health care, education, and vocational training should determine the selection of
homes where resources are available." STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 9, at 28. In addition, by 1941, the CWLA was advocating that the relevance of a parent's
personality no longer required a "match" between the child and parent; rather, "[t]he person-
alities and relationship of the adoptive parents, and their family life, should be such that they
are capable of giving love, care, education, and support to the child. Financial security but not
necessarily wealth is desirable." Id. at 35. See also supra note 9.
169. As a reminder, I use the term "adoption ban" as shorthand to describe the various
legal challenges in each of the states. Arkansas has a regulation that prohibits same-sex cou-
ples from being foster parents, but it neither prohibits gay or lesbian individuals from being37
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tions, which claim to be concerned about child welfare, to be nothing more
than pretextual forms of discrimination against a class of parents.
A. Origin in State Legislatures: Preemptive Strike Against Gay Marriage
and Moral Opprobrium
In 1977, Florida became the first state to reserve parenthood for hetero-
sexual individuals. 17' For the next twenty-two years, only two other states
enacted and then subsequently repealed similar provisions. In 1987, New
Hampshire enacted a statute prohibiting gay men and lesbian women from
serving as adoptive and foster parents, which it repealed in 1999.'71 In 1986,
the Massachusetts Department of Social Services promulgated regulations
banning gay men and lesbian women from being foster parents, which it
eliminated during a lawsuit settlement.'
What is significant is that no other state followed Florida or New
Hampshire's lead until 1996. Suddenly, a flurry of bills were introduced in
seven state legislatures between 1996 and 1999, and the contemporary adop-
tion bans passed in Arkansas in 1999 and in Utah and Mississippi in 2000.171
These dates are significant because in 1996, the Hawaii state appellate court
issued Baehr v. Miike,'74 a comprehensive order determining that there was
no compelling state interest in denying marriage to same-sex couples, 175 and
in 1999, the Vermont state court decided Baker v. Vermont,77 which held
that the State of Vermont "is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex
foster parents nor extends the prohibition in the adoption context. Florida's statute prohibits
gay men and lesbians from adopting children, but places no limitations on foster parents.
Florida also has a presumption against placing an adoptive child with a single parent. Utah
has a facial prohibition against unmarried individuals who cohabitate together. As explained
in their filing with the court, the application of the statute is defended when it denies same-sex
couples and single mothers from adopting children. See supra notes 3-5 for the citations and
descriptions of the state laws, regulations, and bills.
170. See FLA. STAT. ch. 77-140, § 1, Fla. Laws, 466 (1977).
171. N.H. REv. STAT. § 170-B:4 (repealed 1999).
172. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110 § 7.100 et seq. (1986); HOWARD J. ALPERIN &
LAWRENCE D. SHUBow, MASS. PRAC. SERIES, SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 5.13, at n.6 (3d ed.
1996) (observing that the challenge brought against the policy, Babets v. Sec'y of Human
Servs., 526 N.E.2d 1261 (1988), "eventually settled when the department revised its policy.").
173. See supra notes 3-4 (state law and regulations); supra note 5 (state bills).
174. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234
(Haw. 1997).
175. Id. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that the marriage laws imper-
missibly discriminated on the basis of sex and remanded the matter for the state to overcome
the presumption that the ban against same-sex couples from marrying furthered compelling
state interests. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-69 (Haw. 1993). On remand, the appellate
court considered extensive testimony regarding the well-being of children who are raised by
gay individuals or same-sex couples. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *4-16.
176. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under
Vermont law."' 7
In reaching these legal conclusions, the Hawaii court made an express
finding that children who are raised by gay parents do not suffer any disad-
vantage,7 and the Vermont court observed that providing same-sex couples
with the benefits of marriage was logical in light of the fact that the legisla-
ture already had provided legal protections for same-sex couples to "legally
adopt and rear the[ir] children.' 79
The state legislatures that considered and enacted the contemporary
adoption bans did so in response to these decisions. Utah Senator Howard
Nielson explained to a reporter that he supported Utah's statute because "he
found convincing a legal argument that homosexuals would use the provi-
sions to argue for the right to marry, as happened in Vermont. 'We want to
make it clear that we do not approve of homosexual marriage in this
state." '' '  The supporters of Mississippi's ban "said the move was fueled by
the recognition of gay unions in Vermont.... Indeed, on June 8, 1977, Flor-
ida followed the same logic by enacting a law that expressly restricted mar-
riage to opposite sex couples on the exact same day it enacted its statute pro-
hibiting gay people from adopting children.' The state legislatures thus en-
acted the adoption bans, not in response to any child welfare concerns, but as
legal mechanisms designed to be preemptive strikes against same-sex mar-
riage. The legislators believed that if they denied same-sex couples the right
to adopt and raise children, they could prevent their state courts from finding
a basis under which marriage benefits would be conferred to such families.
177. Id. at 867.
178. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (finding that "the single most important
factor in the development of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing rela-
tionship between parent and child;" "[tihe sexual orientation of parents is not in and of itself
an indicator of parental fitness," "[g]ay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples have the
potential to raise children that are happy, healthy and well-adjusted").
179. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882 ("The Vermont Legislature has not only recognized this
reality [that gay couples are raising children], but has acted affirmatively to remove legal
barriers so that same-sex couples may legally adopt and rear the[ir] children.").
180. Hillary Groutage, Amendments to Adoption Bills Axed; Without Them, Unmarried
Couples Not Allowed to Adopt, SALT LAKE TRm., Feb. 19, 2000, at A1; see also Utah Fanii-
lies Coalition, History and Facts About Utah's Anti-Children Adoption Ban, at
http://www.utahfamilies.org/history.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (listing remarks made by
Senator Nielson, the bill's co-sponsor, Representative Nora Stephens, and BYU Law Profes-
sor Lynn Wardle in support of the bill. Wardle "testified to the legislature that gay couples
were secretly taking advantage of Utah's adoption law with the ultimate goal being legalizing
same-sex marriage.").
181. Girla Holland, Mississippi Legislature Passes Ban on Adoptions by Gay Couples,
BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Apr. 21, 2000, at 7B; Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The For-
gotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. Rev.
883, 896 & nn.125-27 (2000).
182. FLA. STAT. ch. 77-139, § 1, Fla. Laws, 465 (1977) (restricting marriage to hetero-
sexual couples); FLA. STAT. ch. 77-140, § 1, Fla. Laws, 466 (1977) (restricting adoption to
heterosexual parents). 39
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When Florida and New Hampshire first enacted their adoption bans,
they failed to rely on any evidence of harm that children raised by gay peo-
ple experienced. Rather, the legislatures employed rhetorical devices once
used in the Eugenic era to guard against a class of perceived morally inferior
individuals from infecting their children. For instance, when Florida's bill
was being debated, a state senator accused the proponents of advancing dis-
crimination in light of the fact that there was "no demonstrable evidence that
any problem existed in Florida with regard to adoptions by homosexuals." ' 3
The proponents of the bill countered by defending the prohibition as a meas-
ure that would prevent children from being placed with families that are not
"wholesome.""' Likewise, state legislators in New Hampshire enacted their
statute by relying on the hate-driven stereotypes that all gay people have
AIDS and gay parents will molest their children. 85
Various state legislators have publicly recognized the error of the
eugenic impulses behind these statutes. When New Hampshire repealed its
statute, one state senator claimed that "[b]ecause of the ignorance, discrimi-
nation, and prejudice of that Legislature [that passed the initial statute], the
foster children of New Hampshire have suffered." '186 In addition, a group of
former legislators who voted for Florida's statute have mobilized in an at-
tempt to repeal the measure. Citing a desire to "express[] our shame at hav-
ing been part of the people who voted in 1977," the group is advocating for
gay parents to receive the same individualized assessment that all other pro-
spective adoptive parents receive in Florida.'87 Representative Randy Ball,
who is a current Florida state legislator, nonetheless defends the statute by
explaining that "homosexuals lead unstable lives, as a rule," and that they
"are 'an abomination' in God's eyes."'88 Representative Ball's comments are
significant as they capture the fact that moral opprobrium is the driving force
behind the contemporary adoption bans.
Some legislators in New Hampshire and Florida express regret for en-
acting the measures out of moral condemnation. Nonetheless their contem-
porary state officials are enacting their bans for the same reason. The Missis-
sippi legislature passed its statute "without debate and without opposition."'89
183. Elovitz, supra note 3, at 222-23 (observing that in the height of Anita Bryant's anti-
gay campaign "the first state-wide statutory ban on adoptions by lesbians and gay men was
passed with almost no analysis or debate") (citing Tom Mathews et al., Battle Over Gay
Rights, NEwswEEK, June 6, 1977, at 16).
184. Id. at 223.
185. See Jodi L. Bell, Prohibiting Adoption by Same-Sex Couples: Is It In the "Best In-
terest of the Child?," 49 DRAKE L. REv 345, 351 & n.46 (2001) (citing N.H. Set to Repeal
Ban on Gay Adoptions, RECORD (Concord), Apr. 23, 1999, at 8 [hereinafter Set to Repeal]).
186. Id. (quoting Set to Repeal, supra note 185, at 8).
187. ABC News, Update: Rosie, the Loftons and the Law: Legislators: 'We Were
Wrong,' (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/primetime
/DailyNews/primetime_02418_adoptonupdatejfeature.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
188. Id.
189. HOLLAND, supra note 181, at 7B.
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Senator David Jordan explained that "Morally, we did the right thing.'
Senator Ron Farris explained that the statute was proper in light of the
state's sodomy law: "A homosexual relationship implies the exercise of ille-
gal activities, and no child should be permitted to enter that type of set-
ting."'9  Likewise, the Arkansas policy was introduced by Robin Woodruff,
member of the Child Welfare Agency Review Board, by stating:
"[P]ersonally, as far as I am concerned, I don't think in any way should we
ever promote homosexuality in any form or fashion, ever. I just don't think
it's morally right and I don't think it's something I, as a person on the board,
would ever condone or agree with."'" Before the Arkansas Board promul-
gated its gay exclusion policy, legal counsel twice warned the Arkansas
Board that no Board member had presented evidence or provided a state-
ment establishing a nexus between the prohibitions against gay foster parents
and the best interest of the child. 93 In its court papers, Florida asserts that its
adoption ban permissibly "reflect[s] the State's moral disapproval of homo-
sexuality,"' " and Utah justifies its measure to be consistent with "community
values that view extramarital relations to be detrimental to children and the
community."'95
A state may punish offensive or harmful conduct with criminal or regu-
latory sanction pursuant to its general police powers, which involve matters
of "[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and or-
der."'" Accordingly, laws expressing community morals, such as those pro-
hibiting nudity, prostitution, polygamy and murder, are permissible and con-
stitutional. However, the federal constitution prohibits any government en-
tity from punishing a person based on her status as a member in a particular
social group.'" This distinction is highly significant in this context. When
190. Id.
191. id.
192. Brief for Plaintiffs at 7, Howard et al. v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No.
CV 99-988 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski County, Ark. 1999) [hereinafter Arkansas Plaintiffs' Brief] (cit-
ing stipulated facts 13 and Minutes of Board's June 23, 1998 meeting).
193. Id. at 7-8 (quoting DHS attorneys Joel Landrenau and Karen Wallace who advised
that the statute presented constitutional defects).
194. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (summarizing ar-
gument asserted by State of Florida).
195. Brief for Defendants at 28, Utah Children v. Utah State Bd. of Child & Family
Servs., Civ. No. 990910881 (3d Dist. Ct., Salt Lake County, Utah 1999) [hereinafter State of
Utah Brief].
196. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
197. Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994).
"Equating status or propensity with conduct or acts that are prohibited is problematic as well.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the constitutional infirmity of penalizing status
alone." Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (holding that
ethnicity is insufficient basis to believe persons are illegal aliens); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 665-67 (1962) (holding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize narcotics addiction
in absence of proof of use); cf Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-34 (1968) (recognizing
Robinson rule that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if accused has committed act by
contrast with status)).
41
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Bowers v. Hardwick' was the law of the land, government entities could
claim that their laws singling-out gay men and lesbian women for disadvan-
tage targeted the criminal conduct of sodomy and not their status as gay
people.'" Lawrence v. Texas2 ' has rejected this distinction, declaring that the
sodomy laws in question are unconstitutional because "the State cannot de-
mean the[] existence of [gay individuals] or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime."'
The legislative records establish that the state officials justified the
adoption bans exclusively on moral opprobrium towards gay men, lesbian
women, and unmarried couples based on their status alone. The states at is-
sue thus confused the purpose of the "morality" clause by passing legislation
based on "[m]oral disapproval of... [a] group, like a bare desire to harm the
group'2  Passing legislation of the latter purpose is impermissible. The Su-
preme Court has "never held that moral disapproval, without any other as-
serted state interest, is a sufficient rationale.. . to justify a law that discrimi-
nates among groups of persons."2 3
It is clear that child welfare concerns were not the basis of the passage
of these laws. The legislatures passed the measures either as a means to ex-
press moral disapproval against gay men and lesbian women or out of the
belief that adoption bans would immunize themselves against "Vermont-like
actions" by the judiciary that pave the way for same-sex couples to marry.
(The judiciary's actions at issue are those that ensure a state comports with
the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.)"' Indeed,
immediately after Lawrence, conservative organizations responded by an-
nouncing their intent to introduce state legislation in a revived campaign to
deny gay people the rights of the hearth.2'5
198. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
199. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dismissing claim of
employment discrimination of FBI agent based on her sexual orientation because "[ilf the
[Supreme] Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that de-
fines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimina-
tion against the class is invidious"); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(dismissing equal protection challenge to military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy based on
Bowers); see also Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 & n.17 (11th Cir. 1997) (reject-
ing claim made by prospective employee that the state attorney general discriminated against
her based on her sexual orientation because "some reasonable persons may suspect that hav-
ing a Staff Attorney who is part of a same-sex 'marriage' is the same thing as having a Staff
Attorney who violates the State's law against homosexual sodomy.").
200. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
201. Id. at 2484.
202. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)); Lofton v. Kearney, 157
F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting the states proffered interest in regulating
morality because "[miorality is not a legitimate state interest").
203. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Baker v. Vermont, 774 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
205. Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N.Y. TBMES,
July 6, 2003, § 1, at 8.
[Vol. 40
42
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss1/2
2003] PARENS PATRI[ARCHY]: ADOPTION, EUGENICS, AND SAME-SEX COUPLES 43
B. State Interest in Preventing Gay and Single Parents from Parenting
Arkansas, Florida, and Utah each argued in court filings that under
parens patriae, their discretion to select such criteria for the ideal parents for
a foster or adoptive child essentially is unassailable.' ° They claim that be-
cause states restrict adoptive or foster placements based on a parent's age,
education, intelligence, minimum income, and duration of their marriage,
they also have complete discretion to reserve adoption for the "ideal" family,
which they set forth as being a nuclear family with one man, one woman,
and one marriage license between them.'° History, however, challenges
these assertions. Criteria that define the optimal parent are not above exami-
nation, and indeed many of the criteria that once were used to identify an
ideal family have been abandoned as misguided or irrelevant over the past
fifty years."S
Florida nonetheless contends that it is better for a child to have no par-
ent than a gay or lesbian parent, because it is perfectly reasonable and ra-
tional for the state to prevent a child from being placed with a sub-optimal
parent, which is understood as not heterosexual.2" In other child placement
206. See, e.g., State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 28-29 ("The state in its role as
parens patriae of children owes a high duty to them in approving whoever shall adopt them.
'That duty would not be met in granting the privilege to adopt to the petitioners, who live on a
daily basis outside of the law."') (quoting Matter of Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083,
1089 (Utah 1991) (denying adoption petition filed by polygamists)); State of Florida Brief,
supra note 136, at 28 (defending its adoption ban against charges of eliminating eligible pro-
spective parents on the basis that "[t]here are any number of restrictions-statutory, regula-
tory, practical, categorical, and non-categorical---on who may adopt.... Each of these restric-
tions restricts the pool of prospective adoptive parents available to adopt children out of foster
care; that is what restrictions do."); Brief for Defendants at 11, Howard et al. v. Child Welfare
Agency Review Bd., No. CV 99-988 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski County, Ark. 1999) [hereinafter State
of Arkansas Brief] ("Defendants have a duty to pass rules that they rationally believe protect
and promote the safety and welfare of foster children.").
207. See State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 9 ("the 'best practice' for adoptive
placements is reflected in a traditional family consisting of a man and a woman who are le-
gally married"); State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 19 ("As the district court found,
Plaintiffs did not dispute that it is in the best interest of children to be raised by mothers and
fathers who are married."); State of Arkansas Brief, supra note 206, at 3 ("Due to the stigma-
tization that gays may face, it may not be as easy to get the [biological] parents, the foster
parents and the child together.").
208. For instance, adoptive parents are no longer required to be sterile or the same race
or religion as each other, and children no longer must reflect the same race, complexion, or
personality traits as their adoptive parents. Furthermore, the criteria of an ideal home has
evolved from now considered arbitrary requirements such as a mandated square footage of a
prospective house, to a concrete finding of a parent's ability to provide a nurturing and loving
home as substantiated by an individualized home study by a professional who is trained in
assessing the parenting capability of the prospective parent. See supra notes 7-9.
209. See State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 29 ("The flaw in Plaintiffs' first com-
plaint is in its assumption that the best interest of a child always requires that she be adopted
by any person or placed in a permanent home at any cost. The reality, however, is that just as
the best interest of a child sometimes requires removing her even from her natural parents, it
also requires that ineligible adoptive parents be screened such that the pool of adoptive par-
ents is reduced."). The issue for the children in foster care is not what are the optimal circum-
43
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contexts, however, Florida-and every other state in the Union-recognizes
that parents are not perfect; and following the wisdom of contemporary so-
cial science, all fifty states endorse the principle that absent proven, concrete
abuse, a child is better off with one, and even two imperfect parents than
none at all."' Why then is heterosexuality and a marriage license the talis-
man of ideal parenting? In the following section, the asserted state interests
are examined and are revealed to be without scientific support. The states
make assertions of parental fitness based on stereotypes and junk science,
and their claims are pretextual means to assert moral judgments against sin-
gle parents and gay individuals.
1. Stability and Assertions of Illness and Premature Death
Arkansas, Florida, and Utah each defends its presumption for married
couples as rationally related to the legitimate end of providing "permanent,
stable and safe homes for adopted and foster children," but none provide
statistical support for this claim."' In Department of Agriculture v. Mo-
reno,"' the State of Texas passed a statute providing income assistance only
to individuals who lived in a home in which all of the adults were related to
one another. Texas, like the states today, asserted that these homes were
more stable than other households."' The Supreme Court, however, soundly
rejected Texas's assertion as an "unsubstantiated assumption" and held that
the "household" provision was a form of pretextual discrimination.2t ' In light
of the fact that approximately fifty percent of all contemporary heterosexual
stances in which a child will thrive. Taken to its logical end, states could provide that only
millionaires could adopt because it is beyond dispute that children with trust funds will not
suffer from material wants. Indeed, it was this impulse that led England and the United States
to remove children from the homes of poor families. After such atrocious abuses of these
practices, see infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Tennessee Baby
Snatching Scandal), the states no longer consider incorporating such restrictions in their adop-
tion policies. The issue facing the child in foster care is whether she will have a permanent
home with loving, qualified parents or a life of instability between short term placements.
210. See, e.g., SANDRA MORGAN LrrrLE, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 1 1.03, at 1-96 (2002) ("Natural parents are the preferred custodians of their chil-
dren 'absent grievous cause or necessity."' (quoting Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75,
77 (1987))); see also Matter of Marriage of Hruby, 748 P.2d 58 (Or. 1987) (holding that un-
der principles of common law and equity, biological parents have the right to maintain cus-
tody over their children absent compelling reasons to place children in custody of nonpar-
ents); Chancey v. Dep't of Human Res., 274 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. 1980) (holding improper a ter-
mination of parental rights proceeding based solely on the "welfare" of the child).
211. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 7; State of Arkansas Brief, supra note 206, at
6 ("The state felt that it would... provide children with stability, nurturing, and adequate
medical care; and provide protection against violence and sexual abuse, disease, neglect or
stigmatization."); State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 23 ("it is in the best interest of the
child to enjoy the stability.., which is best provided by mothers and fathers").
212. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
213. Id. at 535-37. Texas apparently was attempting to bar "hippies" from receiving
income assistance.
214. Id. at 535.
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marriages end in divorce, the states' present day assertion of the stability of
marriage appears at best a false irrebuttable assumption, and at worst, a crite-
ria devoid of factual support, which, like Moreno, raises the inference of an
impermissible pretext."'
Why then, in light of America's divorce culture, are states asserting that
heterosexual marriages are presumptively stable, yet alone even more stable,
than alternative familial relations? The State of Utah answers this question
by asserting that same-sex couples are unable to provide permanent homes
because gay men and lesbian women have a "[d]ecreased life expectancy.""2 6
The State of Arkansas concurs, contending that "the Board believed that
there was a higher degree of disease... among homosexuals." '17 In support
of its argument, Utah quotes the findings of two studies in its 1999 brief
filed with the court. One report claims that "[glay sex can be deadly behav-
ior," ' that 40% of gay men "still never use condoms during anal inter-
course,"219 and that "30% of all twenty-year-old homosexuals will be HIV
positive or dead by the time they reach thirty.""22 Relying on a second study,
the State of Utah contends that "[e]ven without HIV infection, homosexual
behavior shortens life expectancy. In a 1993 study, a group of researchers
examined 7,000 obituaries ... [and] found the following: On average, mar-
ried women died at 79; married men died at 75; homosexual women died at
45; homosexual men without AIDS and no long-term partner died at 41;
homosexual men with AIDS (with and without a long-term partner) died at
39.""21 The State of Utah uses this data to argue that it has a state interest in
preventing adopted children from being placed with a gay or lesbian parent
because that parent would die young and the loss of yet another parent
would prove traumatic to the child.222
The latter study was conducted by Paul Cameron, a researcher who "re-
signed from the American Psychological Association to avoid an investiga-
tion into charges of his unethical conduct as psychologist. 22 3 In 1985, a
215. Id. at 536-37 ("The existence of these provisions [that are directed at fraud] neces-
sarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally
have been intended to prevent those very same abuses.").
216. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 26.
217. Surreply of Defendants at 1, Howard et al. v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd.,
No. CV 99-988 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski County, Ark. 1999) [hereinafter State of Arkansas Surreply].
218. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 25.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 25-26.
221. Id. at26.
222. Id.
223. Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526, 537 n.31 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (the court states that the
"charges of unethical conduct against Dr. Cameron included his continuing misrepresentation
of Kinsey data and other research sources on homosexuality; inflammatory and inaccurate
public statements about homosexuals; and his fabrications to a Nebraska newspaper about the
supposed sexual mutilation of a four year old boy by a homosexual" (citing Dr. James K.
Cole; Psychology, Homosexuality, and Human Rights in Lincoln, Nebraska, at
http://www.qrd.org/qrd/religion/anti/cameron/memorandum (last visited Oct. 4, 2003))).
45
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Texas federal court found in Baker v. Wade,"2 that Mr. Cameron's testimony
with respect to the behavior of gay men "distorted data" sufficient to support
a finding of misrepresentation to the court.'2 In 1984, the United States
Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M
Univ.,226 dismissed evidence by the then-Dr. Cameron as "speculative evi-
dence.. . for which no historical or empirical basis is disclosed."2"7 In 1984,
the American Psychological Association terminated Cameron's membership,
the Nebraska Psychological Association adopted a resolution "formally dis-
sociat[ing] itself from the representations and interpretations of scientific
literature offered by Dr. Paul Cameron in his writings and public statements
on sexuality," and in 1985, the American Sociological Association adopted a
similar resolution.228
The other study cited by the State of Utah was performed by Dr. Sati-
nover who is on the scientific advisory board of the National Association for
Research and Therapy of Homosexuality ("NARTH"), an organization
whose "members consider homosexuality to represent a developmental dis-
order" and whose self-defined "function is to provide psychological under-
standing of the cause, treatment and behavior patterns associated with homo-
sexuality." ' This medical position is one that the rest of the medical profes-
sion abandoned in 1973 when the American Psychological Association de-
classified "homosexuality" as a mental illness.30 In the same report from
224. 106 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
225. Id. at 536.
226. 737 F.2d 1317 (50Cir. 1984).
227. Id. at 1330. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit explained that reliance on Dr. Cameron's
assertions regarding gay individuals and the HIV virus "is precisely the kind of 'undifferenti-
ated fear or apprehension' that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held 'is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression."' Id.
228. See Mark E. Pietrzyk, Queer Science, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 3, 1994, at 10 (reporting
Cameron's expulsion from the APA for misrepresenting the findings of others and engaging
in dubious research techniques); see also Utah Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 13, at 14-15 (cit-
ing sources for assertions that were submitted in administrative record). In addition, the study
cited by the State of Utah "has never been published or cited in a peer-reviewed scientific or
medical journal and does not conform to any reliable statistical methodology." Pietrzyk, su-
pra at 9; see also id. at 14 n.3 (citing Andrew Sullivan, False Bennett: Gay Bashing by the
Numbers, Nw REPUBLIC, Jan. 5, 1998, at 15 (describing flaws in Cameron's obituary study
that is cited to in Utah's brief); William Bennett, Letter to Editor, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 23,
1998, at 4 (retracting prior endorsement of Cameron's statistics)).
229. NARTH, Our Purpose, at http://www.narth.com/menus/statement.html (last up-
dated Nov. 24, 2002).
230. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLInCS
OF DIAGNOSIS (1981) (discussing political battles involved surrounding the APA's decision).
As acknowledged by NARTH, "Professionals who belong to NARTH comprise a wide vari-
ety of men and women who defend the right to pursue change of sexual orientation. This
right-to-change is currently under threat by all of the leading mental-health professional or-
ganizations. Students writing doctoral dissertations on sexual reorientation are being discour-
aged from pursuing their projects; researchers are silenced and cannot find funding; and clini-
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which the Utah attorney general office submitted evidence to the court, Dr.
Satinover also claimed that "Gays are prone to 'Gay Bowel Syndrome,' a
cluster of diseases typically associated with contaminated water in Third
World nations." '231 There is no other documentation of Gay Bowel Syndrome
in the mainstream medical community.232
The state interest in stability thus relies upon conclusory assertions and
research that was performed by psychiatrists who have been disbarred or
denounced by the American Psychology Association. What is most notable
is that the "studies" and "facts" advanced by the states employ rhetorical
devises that claim disease is a marker of moral deviancy, differentiating
"normal" Americans from gay men and lesbian women who mysteriously
die in their 40s, purportedly from "gay sex." The medical studies indisputa-
bly lack scientific rigor, but they serve to "prove" the abnormality of inti-
macy between same-sex couples. For instance, the fabricated "Gay Bowel
Syndrome" associates undeveloped, uncivilized disease with gay men, which
clearly plays on racism and xenophobia to mark gay men and lesbian women
as strangers to America and dangers to children. Such claims of immorality
and disease recall the Eugenic Era in which American society attributed dis-
ease with moral deficiencies, most notably the mistreatment of Chinese im-
migrants and citizens of Chinese descent who were quarantined in neighbor-
hoods based on the imputed, and unscientifically shown, belief that Chinese
immigrants carry syphilis.233 Although similar claims of immorality were
rejected by state courts at the turn of the century,23 the states assert these
arguments in the contemporary defense of their adoption bans. The Utah
Department of Human Services and legislature relied upon Dr. Satinover's
and Paul Cameron's findings when enacting its statewide regulation and
statute prohibiting gay parents from adopting children. 3 5 Florida, Missis-
sippi, and Arkansas infuse moral opprobrium in their proffered state inter-
ests, which they demand to be left unquestioned.
231. See Ex. R00064, Submission of Scientific Evidence by Joseph Nicolosi, Adminis-
trative Record, Ex. R00061-68, Utah Children v. Utah State Bd. of Child & Family Servs.,
Civ. No. 990910881 (3d Dist. Ct., Salt Lake County, Utah 1999).
232. There is no mention of "gay bowel disease" in the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsoRDERs ("DSM-IV") (4th ed. 1994), which is the authoritative man-
ual prepared by the American Psychiatric Association that enumerates all known and treatable
psychological conditions and details recommended treatment. In addition, gay bowel disease
is absent from STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1995), a comprehensive listing of
all known medical conditions and related terminology.
233. See supra notes 95-96; see also Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The
Americans with Disabilities Act as Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1451, 1461-67 (1994)
(detailing history of the times in which American society has pathologized perceived socially
inferior groups of people as outcasts).
234. See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1900). See Hiegel, supra note 233,
at 1464 for an excellent analysis of this issue.
235. Dr. Satinover's and Paul Cameron's "reports" were in the administrative record
upon which the DHS relied upon in promulgating the rule. See State of Utah Brief, sapra note
195, at iii (submitting administrative record "as part of the pleadings" pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-46a-12.1(3)(b)(iii)). 47
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2. Poverty
In their briefs defending the preference for marriage, Florida, Arkansas,
and Utah assert that "it is in the best interest of children to be raised by
mothers and fathers who are married." '236 Utah explains that one reason for
this preference is that children "do better on every measure of adjustment
when compared to other family constellations," '237 which include "less pov-
erty."238 The State of Utah later emphasizes that "[m]arital status is [the] fac-
tor most closely related to whether a child grows up in poverty."239 Despite
its use of inclusive language, Utah acknowledges that in 1998, all adoptions
to Utah single parents were to single mothers.'
The term "single mother" is loaded with ideological meaning, which, as
illustrated in the historical overview of adoption placement practices, has
changed over time.2"1 In contemporary understandings, the term "single
mother" is used to describe a widow, divorcee, pregnant teenager, adult
woman who chooses to raise a child without a husband or partner, or welfare
recipient. However, the defenders of the adoption bans rely on studies
documenting the poverty rates among divorcing mothers and black, poor,
urban teenagers to claim that all single mothers will experience poverty.242
The states' reliance on the first type of studies lacks logic. Arguably, the di-
vorce statistics would apply only to married couples who have an actual risk
of divorce. Single mothers, by definition, are immune from experiencing
family dissolution. The second type of studies cited by the states are even
236. State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 19; State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at
14 ("For a child to obtain optimal emotional and physical well-being, a home with a married
mother and father is best suited."); State of Arkansas Brief, supra note 206, at 5 (defending
exclusion of gay individuals as rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
237. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 14-15.
238. Id. at 17.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 15.
241. For the past 150 years, the meaning of a black single mother in particular has un-
dergone enormous changes in American society. Today, despite the possible socio-economic
status of a given single mother, the black single mother often is presented as a lazy, shiftless,
welfare recipient who had children to burden the tax system and fill the jails. The etiology of
this racist and sexist caricature is revealing, especially as the anxieties around the black
mother have been pronounced through repeated efforts to punish and control her through
family and social policies. White society's concern over black unwed mothers has not always
been this vehement. William Harper, chancellor of the University of South Carolina during
the 1800s, described an unmarried slave who gave birth out-of-wedlock in a drastically dif-
ferent way: "The unmarried slave mother was not a less useful member of society than be-
fore.., she has not impaired her means of support, not materially lowered her character, or
lowered her station in society; she has done no great injury to herself, or any other human
being." In a telling remark, Chancellor Harper's assertion ends with: "Her offspring is not a
burden, but an acquisition to her owner." SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 44 (citing Herman
Gutman, Marital and Sexual Norms Among Slave Women, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN:
TowARD A SOCIETY OF ANERICAN WoMEN 305 (Nancy Cott & Elizabeth Pleck eds. 1979)).
242. See, e.g., State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 17-19 (citing "culture of poverty"
studies that assert children of poor mothers grow up criminal and sexually promiscuous).
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more troubling because they employ the "culture of poverty" ideology,
which traces its contemporary origin to the 1965 Moynihan Report."3 Propo-
nents of the "culture of poverty" theory assert that poverty is caused by the
immorality of single mothers rather than socioeconomic factors such as em-
ployment opportunities, educational attainment, effect of segregation, and
illegal hiring practices of employers.'" There are three flaws with the states'
contemporary reliance on the culture of poverty ideology in justifying their
adoption bans."' First, the states claim that single mothers cause poverty and
243. The Moynihan Report, completed by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a professed
liberal, had the ill effects of solidifying the Progressive Era's myth of the "culture of poverty"
to explain economic inequality in the 1960s. Instead of focusing on macro-economic and
social forces that cause income inequality and prevent people from rising out of poverty, the
culture of poverty discourse sets up the theory that poverty is a contagious, defective behavior
attribute of the individual who brought it upon herself. See Lisa A. Crooms, The Mythical,
Magical "Underclass": Constructing Poverty in Race and Gender, Making the Public Pri-
vate and the Private Public, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 87, 89 & nn.12-16 (2001) (citing a
number of scholars who have critiqued the Moynihan Report's reification of the image of the
pathological black, poor, single mother). The most notable contemporary critics include
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY (1997) and PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 27 (1998).
244. See Crooms, supra note 243, at 107-128 nn.92-191 and accompanying text (citing
various critics of the culture of poverty); Cheryl D. Hicks, "In Danger of Becoming Morally
Depraved": Single Black Women, Working-Class Black Families, and New York States'
Wayward Minor Laws, 1917-1928, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 2077, 2079 n.l 1(2003) (citing crit-
ics). As an example of how Moynihan perpetuates this ideology, in Chapter 3 of the report,
Moynihan comments that "[u]nquestionably [the institution of Jim Crow laws] worked
against the emergence of a strong father figure. The very essence of the male animal, from the
bantam rooster to the four-star general, is to strut. Indeed, in 19th century America, a particu-
lar type of exaggerated male boastfulness became almost a national style. Not for the Negro
male. The 'sassy nigger' was lynched." Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family:
The Case for National Action, at 16, reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCY, THE
MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 38-124 (1967). In an almost unbe-
lievable rhetorical move, Moynihan subsequently aligns the female-headed family with a
dangerous influence and control of white supremacy. "The Negro community has been forced
into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of the American
society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden
on the Negro male." id. at 75. Jim Crow laws, which had barred employment, housing, and
educational opportunities to blacks, are problematic only to the extent of the hampered male
masculinity. The matriarchal structure-giving power to women-becomes the cause of black
poverty and the "tangle of pathology." Id. The legacy of segregation, according to Moynihan,
is not unequal opportunity, but the strong black woman who continues to dominate the black
men around her, preventing them from functioning like the normal, strutting white American
men.
245. Despite the extensive academic criticism of the Moynihan Report, its conclusions
and recommendations were, and still are, widely accepted by many policymakers. Conserva-
tive thinkers such as Lawrence Mead and Charles Murray, perpetuate the notion that a per-
son's illicit and immoral behavior causes her poverty. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD,
BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (reprint in paperback 2001)
(1986); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984).
In an updated spin on the Eugenics movement, other contemporary conservatives such as
Orlando Patterson state that blacks are more likely to be poor because the trauma of slavery
has left a near-irremediable biological defect predisposing them to poverty. (In fact, Patter-49
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that marriage will prevent it. However, contemporary studies show that ide-
ology, rather than evidence, supports the claim that marriage guarantees
wealth.'" Second, through the 1970s, white policy-makers relied on the same
culture of poverty ideology when justifying their mass removals of Indian
children from their biological families. 7 Indeed, the extent of alleged harm
to the Indian children was the vague charge that they were emotionally dam-
aged by being "subjected to living with their parents." '48 Third, all states
have minimum separate and independent income requirements for prospec-
tive adoptive parents. The teenagers who are the subject of the poverty stud-
ies are poor because their pregnancy disrupted their educational attainment
and career development. The divorced women are poor because of their sud-
den decline in income. The states' assertion that single women with profes-
sional careers and advanced degrees, based on their marital status alone, will
become poor thus is patently false. ' 9 The claim that states must guard
son's "cure" for this defect is for black women to marry white men.). See ORLANDO
PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES
(1998).
246. See Lynette Clemetson, Study Finds Welfare Initiatives Do Not Address Needs of
Immigrant Families, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at A20. At the national level, the George W.
Bush administration has undertaken a $300 million dollar investment in marriage promotion
programs and welfare reform emphasizing marriage rather than education, jobs, or income
support. Nina Bernstein, Strict Limits on Welfare Benefits Discourage Marriage, Studies Say,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 2002, at Al (reporting the Bush administration's proposal "to spend $300
million on demonstration projects like premarital counseling and pro-marriage education
campaigns"). The programs are being implemented by Wade F. Horn, who is the current As-
sistant Secretary for Children and Families, HHS, and a proponent of the Fatherlessness ide-
ology. See Wade F. Horn, Promoting Marriage as a Means for Promoting Fatherhood, in
REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN AGENDA
FOR STRENGTHENING MARRIAGE (Alan J. Hawkins, et al., 2002). Despite the studies demon-
strating that such programs are neither helping families out of poverty nor even resulting in
more marriage, the Bush administration is standing firm behind its policies and the House
passed a bill spending $2 billion to allow states to promote marriage among the poor. See,
e.g., id. (reporting that providing work to women increases their self-reliance and they "may
have become less willing to settle for the wrong man"); Clemetson, supra, at A20 ("Many
programs intended to lift people out of poverty by promoting marriage and mandating work
do not address the realities of poor immigrants, a study released today has found."); Michael
Tanner, Wedded to Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A23 (criticizing the welfare reau-
thorization bill that passed the House for spending "nearly $2 billion over the next six years to
encourage people to marry.... Single people on welfare who marry might even get cash bo-
nuses.").
247. See YOUNG ONCE, supra note 139, at 87 (criticizing the "[nion-Indian workers and
court personnel [who] have been exposed to a perspective of Indian life as it is viewed
through the premises developed out of the 'culture of poverty' theories"); see also supra notes
139-47 (discussing removals of Indian children and ICWA).
248. Id.
249. See Crooms, supra note 243, at 100-07 (criticizing contemporary policymakers who
attribute "female-headed households" as a problem leading to poverty); see also KATHRYN
NECKERMAN ET AL., Family Structure, Black Unemployment, and American Social Policy, in
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY 215 (Margaret Weir et. al. eds., 1988) (concluding that pov-
erty among black teenagers results from the birth of the child disrupting the teenager's educa-
tional attainment and employment track).
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against children being placed with otherwise qualified single parents lacks
logic and merit.
3. Violence
The states also assert that the problem with same-sex families, unmar-
ried heterosexuals, and single mothers is that their homes, rife with gender
confusion, are purported to be filled with violence, immorality, and unrest.
In its opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the State of Arkansas
defended its ban against gay individuals from becoming foster parents be-
cause "the Board believed that there was a higher degree of... violence
among homosexuals."'  The State of Utah argued that "[situdies repeatedly
documented higher rates of domestic violence including all forms of child
abuse when cohabiting, sexually involved adults are not married"" and that
"American and Canadian studies have repeatedly confirmed that compared
to marriage, nonmarital cohabitation is extremely unstable .... involves
more fighting, more abuse, and more severe forms of abuse.... During a
one year period, about 35% of cohabiting couples will physically abuse one
another, compared to 15% of married couples." '252 (The latter statistic was
submitted by the State of Utah and was "evidence" prepared by Joseph
Nicolosi of NARTH.)2 3
What is odd is that no mainstream domestic violence organization at-
tributes an abuser's violent tendencies to his or her marital status.2" David
Blankenhorn, whose Fatherless America book and another anthology are
both cited in Utah's briefs, explains why people believe violence in unmar-
ried homes is more prevalent.25 According to Blankenhorn, "married father-
250. See State of Arkansas Surreply, supra note 217, at 1.
251. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 19 (citing in support for this proposition
Lynn Wardle, law professor at Brigham Young University).
252. Id. at 20 (citing Zheng Wu & T.R. Balakrishnan, Dissolution of Premarital Cohabi-
tation in Canada, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 521, 526, 529 (1995) and materials submitted by Joseph
Nicolosi of NARTH).
253. See supra notes 229-32 for discussion of NARTH.
254. See, e.g., American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, Who Is
Most Likely to Be Affected by Domestic Violence ("Unlike victims, perpetrators do have at
least two common traits---the majority of perpetrators (1) witnessed domestic violence in
their family of origin and (2) are male."), at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/whois.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2003); National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Why Do Men Batter
Women? ("Many theories have been developed to explain why some men use violence against
their partners. These theories include: family dysfunction, inadequate communication skills,
provocation by women, stress, chemical dependency, lack of spirituality and economic hard-
ship. These issues may be associated with battering of women, but they are not the causes.
Removing these associated factors will not end men's violence against women. The batterer
begins and continues his behavior because violence is an effective method for gaining and
keeping control over another person and he usually does not suffer adverse consequences as a
result of his behavior.") at http://www.ncadv.org/problem/why.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2003).
255. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 18 (separately citing FATHERLESS AMERICA,51
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hood emerges as the primary inhibitor of male domestic violence" because
men are naturally aggressive and violent and that only when these impulses
are channeled toward caring for a child or wife can the violent nature be
tamed.256 According to Blankenhom, there is no domestic violence in a
proper marriage; therefore the problem of domestic violence is solved if all
parents remain married and all children are raised by one traditionally mas-
culine father and one traditionally feminine mother.' Blankenhom dis-
misses statistics of domestic violence by married men against their wives
and biological children as "disconfirming evidence" but fails to explain why
these men are abusive, beyond saying the civilizing influences of marriage
failed in those instances. 8 Despite the acknowledgment that no mainstream
social scientist agrees with him, Blankenhorn persists in his assertions. 9
Blankenhom submits textual readings of Hollywood movies as evidence of
social trends and gives apocalyptic warnings that men will degenerate into
violent beasts unless society sanctions marriage for all."w This is the "scien-
tific support" of the states' defense of the contemporary adoption bans. The
states' claim that a categorical presumption against unmarried couples will
protect a child from domestic violence is devoid of any rational support and
is akin to the Reverend Brace's claims that a Catholic home is a depraved
environment in which to raise a child. 6 '
supra note 14 and an essay by Urie Bronfenbrenner, Discovering What Families Can Do, in
REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (David Blankenhorn
et al. eds., 1990)).
256. BLANKENHORN, supra note 14, at 35 ("By reducing the likelihood of sexual jealousy
and paternal uncertainty, and by directing the male's aggression toward the support of his
child and the mother of his child, married fatherhood dramatically reduces the tendency
among men toward violent behavior.").
257. Id. at 116 ("Historically and currently, the breadwinner role matches quite well with
core aspects of masculine identity. Especially compared to other parental activities, bread-
winning is objective, rule-oriented, and easily measurable. It is an instrumental, goal-driven
activity in which success derives, at least in part, from aggression. Most important, the pro-
vider role permits men to serve their families through competition with other men. In this
sense, the ideal of paternal breadwinning encultures male aggression by directing it toward a
prosocial purpose."); id. at 121-22 ("[S]exual division of labor within the family... is inte-
gral to the survival and reproduction of the society.").
258. Id. at 37 (stating that "marriage has clearly failed to inhibit male violence" when
describing married fathers who abuse their own wives and biological children).
259. Id. at 67-75.
260. See, e.g., id. at 141 (the movie FALLING DOWN (Warner Studios 1993) is proof that
men become violent when faced with a divorce); id. at 163 (the movie MRs. DOUBTFHRE
(Twentieth Century Fox 1993) is proof that genderless parenting is an attempt to rid the world
of men); id. at 31 ("The rapid growth of crime in our society over the past three decades does
not derive from traditional male norms but from the decline of certain traditional male
norms.... Put simply, we have too many boys with guns primarily because we have too few
fathers.").
261. See supra notes 63-65, 73 and accompanying text.
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C. State Interest in Protecting Children from Perceived
Immorality of their Parents
In the court filings, the parties focus on the influence that a gay, lesbian,
and single parent will have on his child. The plaintiffs typically offer studies
that they claim show children raised by gay parents are as well if not better
adjusted than children raised by straight parents.262 The states typically con-
tend that these studies are faulty, and submit evidence or make assertions (1)
that children raised by gay parents will lack heterosexual role-modeling, ex-
perience improper gender role socialization, and suffer from stigmatization;
and (2) that children raised by single parents will be more violent, promiscu-
ous, and immoral, than children raised by married parents.263 Under such cir-
cumstances, no court has found that the plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, and all courts that have considered
the question, have found the states' evidence sufficient to withstand the scru-
tiny of rational review.
However, it should be noted that any success that the state had in meet-
ing various legal standards, which are designed to balance separation of
powers and evidentiary concerns, 265 the state has not submitted any study that
has been published in a peer-reviewed medical or psychological journal that
establishes the superiority of a two-parent married family's ability to raise
children or that the alleged harms are in fact experienced by children raised
262. See, e.g., AcLu LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, Too HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE
AGAINST RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 52-96 (2002) (summarizing 22 studies performed on
children raised by gay parents between 1981 and 1998 measuring factors such as a child's
psychological well-being, self-esteem, social adjustment with peers, quality of parent/child
relationship, child's gender behavior, child's sexuality, and parent's preference for child's
gender/sexuality). The ACLU has assisted in the representation of plaintiffs in the Arkansas
and Florida cases. See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LESBIAN & GAY
PARENTING BIBLIOGRAPHY 12-14 (1st ed. 1994) (listing twenty-seven legal and academic
publications). The NCLR was co-counsel on the Utah case.
263. See, e.g., State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 22-25 (alleging that the studies
demonstrating children of gay parents are well-adjusted are flawed).
264. See Lofton v. Keamey, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380, 1394 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (survives
rational review on summary judgment); Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24-26 (N.H.
1987) (rational review); see also Cox v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656
So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (upholding denial of state right of privacy and federal due process
challenges to gay adoption ban and remanding for further development with respect to federal
equal protection claim).
265. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (commenting
that the materiality element evaluated on a summary judgment motion "is only a criterion for
categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim and not a crite-
rion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes"); Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d
at 1385 ("'In areas of social... policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification."') (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993)). 53
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in alternative families." Indeed, all mainstream child welfare organizations
reject the states' assertions that a child must be raised by two married het-
erosexual individuals. For instance, in 2002, the American Academy of Pe-
diatrics released a report in which it stated that after reviewing all available
research, "No data have pointed to any risk to children as a result of growing
up in a family with 1 or more gay parents."267 Nonetheless, an examination of
the proffered harms claimed by the states that are experienced by children
raised by gay and single parents is instructive. The states' arguments are
supported only by speculation and conjecture and are revealed to be assert-
ing moral panic and condemnation, which was once the favored persuasion
method of the Eugenic reformers of the past.
1. Heightened Criminal Activity and Promiscuity
The State of Utah claims that children in single-parent households ex-
perience "psychiatric problems," and "behavioral and educations [sic] prob-
lems, including... smoking, drinking, early and frequent sexual experience,
and in extreme cases, drugs, suicide, vandalism, violence, criminal behav-
ior."" In addition, the state emphasizes that "the likelihood that a young
male 'will engage in criminal activity doubles if he is raised without a father,
and triples if he lives in a neighborhood with a high concentration of single
parent families."' 2 The state further claims: "Most criminals are from single
parent homes or without either parent. A survey of 14,000 prisoners in state
correctional facilities found 43% were from single parent homes and another
14% grew up without either parent." 7' In support of its claim, the State of
Utah fails to use any data that has been published in a peer-review medical
or scientific journal, relying instead on assertions set forth by David
Blankenhorn and NARTH.
It is notable that criminologists do not claim any correlation between the
likelihood of criminal activity and a child being raised by single mothers. 7 '
Likewise, mainstream child welfare experts addressing violence and preg-
nancy among youth do not cite the marital status of the child's parent as a
266. Pietrzyk, supra note 228, at 10.
267. Ellen C. Perrin & American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Psychological
Aspects of Child and Family Health, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption
by Same-Sex Parents, 109:2 PEDIATRICS 341-344 (Feb. 2002). Based on this study, the Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics declared its "support [for] legislative and legal efforts to provide
the possibility of adoption of the child by the second parent or coparent..." See American
Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement, 109:3 PEDIATRICS 339-40 (Feb. 2002). See also
supra notes 12, 262.
268. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 18 (citing Bronfenbrenner, supra note 255).
269. Id. at 18 (citing FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 14, at 30).
270. Id. (citing material submitted by NARTH, see supra notes 229-32).
271. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein & William Glaberson, The Well-Marked Roads to
Homicidal Rage, N.Y. TnMEs, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al (observing that criminologists do not
know the reasons why people commit crimes).
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cause or correlation of those behaviors. 2 The distortion of data by the con-
temporary adoption bans to the contrary is revealed as an attempt to lend
scientific authority to the Utah statute's revival of the Eugenic Era myth that
an immoral single mother pollutes her children by passing on bad behavior
to them."3 Her lack of ability to discipline, a task that purportedly only a fa-
ther can perform, causes her son to commit crime; and her flagrant sexual
promiscuity, a violation of her traditional femininity, encourages her daugh-
ter to sleep around. Despite the evidence disputing these findings, the trope
is established that single mothers are the problem to be stopped.274
The Reverend Brace justified the Orphan Trains as a means by which he
"rescued" children from their biological families, most of whom were single
mothers. Reverend Brace believed that the removal of the children from the
urban vices and placement in the homes of the good rural Christian families
was in the children's best interest. Reverend Brace believed that this process
would transform the children, whom he referred to as "street Arabs," "little
vagabonds" and "homeless creatures," into "decent, orderly industrious chil-
dren."'275 In the Eugenic Era, the children of single mothers were considered
to be more violent and sexually promiscuous because "[s]tudies like Henry
272. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
UNION: A 2002 ACTION GUIDE To LEAVE No CHILD BEHIND (2002). Although the CDF docu-
ments the number of youth who are killed by gunfire and teenage pregnancy, id. at 46, 59, 66-
67, the CDF does not attribute the marital status of the youth's parents to this happening.
Instead, the CDF correlates these statistics to high school drop-out rates and unemployment
rates. Marian Wright Edelman, the president of CDF, proposes solutions to child poverty and
at risk youth to include investments in health care, Head Start programs, tax reform, and
increase in minimum wage. MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR
SOCIAL CHANGE 44-46 (1987). Notably absent are all calls for the promotion of marriage.
273. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
274. The proponents of the Fatherlessness ideology strongly advocate that the non-
marital status of a child's parent will lead to crime and promiscuity. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN,
supra note 14, at 45 ("For boys, the most socially acute manifestation of paternal divestment
is juvenile violence. For girls, it is juvenile and out-of-wedlock childbearing. One primary
result of growing Fatherlessness is more boys with guns. Another is more girls with babies.");
Horn, supra note 246, at 101 ("Moreover violent criminals are overwhelmingly males who
grew up without fathers, including up to 60 percent of rapists, 75 percent of adolescents
charged with murder, and 70 percent of juveniles in state reform institutions."). The Father-
lessness proponents do not rely on statistics to support these claims or even their own experi-
ence demonstrating otherwise. For instance, in January 1995, William Bennett, former Secre-
tary of Education, testified before the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources
in defense of the bill and the underlying Fatherlessness ideology. Acknowledging that his
mother, a single mother, did a "fine job" raising him and his brother alone, Mr. Bennett none-
theless calls the rise in single motherhood "a ruinous social slide." His evidence for his
proposition mirrors the circular logic and conclusory justification of the contemporary adop-
tion bans. Mr. Bennett explains that "we know that the chances of successfully raising chil-
dren in a single-parent home are not nearly as good as raising children in a two-parent home.
Every civilized society has understood the importance of keeping families together." Written
Testimony, William J. Bennett, January 1995, reprinted at www.empower.org/html/policy/
welfare/testimony.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
275. See supra note 57 (citing to CARP, supra note 7, at 9-10 (quoting Reverend Brace)).
See also supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text for discussion of the Orphan Trains.
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H. Goddard's The Kallikak Family (1912) claimed to demonstrate the ten-
dency of generations of children to inherit the social pathology of their par-
ents, particularly criminality and feeblemindedness." '76 Likewise, today, Ar-
kansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah offer the adoption bans as a means by
which children can be rescued from the corrupt influences of single mothers.
Contemporary adoption bans thus revive the misguided impulses that were
behind the Progressive Era's improper removals of children and the Eugenic
Era's warnings of what will happen to the children of single mothers.
2. Heterosexuality and Gender Role Socialization
The states also claim an interest in promoting proper gender role so-
cialization and heterosexuality in children. In its 2003 brief filed with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the State of Florida
claimed a state interest in having children raised by heterosexual couples
"due to the vital role dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gen-
der identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling,2 77 which the State
of Florida argues is related to a claimed state interest in "discourag[ing]
promoting homosexuality to children.""2 8 In its 1999 filing, Utah contends
that "nearly one-fourth of the children raised by gay or lesbian parents ex-
pressed homosexual interests,"7 9 and that because, "homosexual behavior
entails tremendous risks, it would be irresponsible for the state to ignore the
risk of children mimicking the risky behavior of their adoptive parents." 8' In
1987, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reached the same conclusions
with respect to this issue on speculation alone: "Although... a number of
studies... find no correlation between a homosexual orientation of parents
and the sexual orientation of their children, ... [gliven the reasonable pos-
sibility of environmental influences, we believe that the legislature can ra-
tionally act on the theory that a role model can influence the child's develop-
ing sexual identity."2 ''
As an initial matter, these assertions are contrary to the conclusions
reached by mainstream psychologists and psychiatrists.282 As observed by the
276. CARP, supra note 7, at 18.
277. State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 16.
278. Id. at 44.
279. State of Utah Brief, supra note 195, at 24.
280. Id. at 25.
281. Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) (emphasis added). It should be
noted that although the state supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the gay adoption
prohibition, (and the majority included Justice Souter when he sat as a state judge), the New
Hampshire statute differs fundamentally from the contemporary statutes. The state supreme
court premised its holding of constitutionality based on the fact that there was no statutory
presumption of unfitness. Id. at 26 (observing "that the bill does not speak of a presumption,
although the request for opinion does employ the term. We answer that the classification so
created is not one of the sort struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v.
Illinois... or in Vlandis v. Kline.. .").
282. See supra notes 262, 267 and accompanying text; see also Jane E. Brody, Gay
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dissent in New Hampshire's advisory opinion, in 1987, "apparently the over-
whelming weight of professional study on the subject concludes that no
difference in psychological and psychosexual development can be discerned
between children raised by heterosexual parents and children raised by ho-
mosexual parents." '83 When ascertaining the state interest in Hawaii's restric-
tion of same-sex couples from marriage, the Hawaii court concluded that the
"evidence presented by Plaintiffs and Defendant establishes that the single
most important factor in the development of a happy, healthy, and well-
adjusted child is the nurturing relationship between parent and child. ' "s
Moreover, the claim that a parent transmits her sexual orientation to her
child defies common sense. The fact that most gay and lesbian individuals
were raised by heterosexual parents, often who remained married and some
who are even prominent Republicans, demonstrates the fallacy behind the
asserted syllogism that heterosexual parents raise children who develop into
heterosexual adults.2 ' The claim that heterosexual parents raise children who
possess traditional gender roles is further unsubstantiated by the extensive
and long-standing research in the area of Gender Identity Disorder
("GID"). 8 6
Families Flourish as Acceptance Grows, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at F7 (reporting that ac-
cording to DR. SUZANNE M. JOHNSON & DR. ELIZABETH O'CONNOR, TiE GAY BABYBOOM:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GAY PARENTHOOD (2002) "as many as 14 million children in the United
States are being raised by at least one parent who is a gay man or lesbian" and "our study and
many other studies that have been done on gay- and lesbian-headed families show that gay
men and lesbians make very effective parents").
283. Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 28 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
284. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
285. For instance, Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians & Gays ("PFLAG") is an
organization founded in 1972 by two married heterosexual parents of a gay man for the pur-
pose of providing education to other parents with gay children. Today, the organization has
over 200,000 members in 500 communities across the United States. The members self-
identify as "parents, families and friends of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered per-
sons." Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians & Gays, at http://www.pflag.org/
about/mission.html & http://www. pflag.org/about/history.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
Mary Cheney, daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney is a lesbian, and John Schlafly, son of
conservative spokeswoman Phyllis Schlafly, is gay. See, e.g., A Legacy of Names at
http://www.queertheory.com/lhistories/c/cheneymary.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (listing
two articles identifying Mary Cheney as a lesbian woman who had worked for Coors Brewing
Co. "as its liaison to the gay community" and openly lives with her girlfriend); The Out List,
at http://www.gay.alb.de/infos/outlis2.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (listing "John
Schlafly, son of anti-gay conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly and lawyer for her organiza-
tion, the Eagle Forum").
286. For an excellent overview of the medical profession's development, application,
and later renunciation of treating children for gender identity disorder, see Shannon Minter,
Diagnosis and Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in Children in SISSIES AND TOMBOYS:
GENDER NONCONFORMrrY AND HOMOsExUAL CHILDHOOD (Matthew Rottnek ed. 1999). Al-
though the international and national medical profession considers GID a legitimate diagnosis
for transsexual adults who seek medical treatment, including sex-reassignment surgery and
hormone treatment, the treatment of children with purported gender identity is a criticized
practice. See Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal Responses to Health
Care Discrimination against Transsexuals, 81 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88, 104-07 (2001)57
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Further, the debate over whether a parent in fact transmits these values
and whether in fact a child follows them presents a more troubling dimen-
sion. The debate masks the state's claimed interest in preventing its citizens
from developing into gay and lesbian adults. The only "harm" identified by
the states is the production of more adults who are like the gay parents,
whom the states find morally reprehensible. Similar arguments were made
by a Protestant social worker at the turn of the century who advised a foster
family against returning the biological child to his parent because "we dread
Catholic influence more than the bite of the rattle-snake, for that only de-
stroys the body while the other destroys the immortal soul. .,", In the
1950s, Judge Harry A. Woodward, a judge who colluded with a social
worker to place for adoption the babies of single mothers without their con-
sent, justified his practices by stating that "the children now are in the homes
of decent people and honest people of Christianity.... I will not let a person
who wants to live a life of immorality inflict upon her children, regrettable
as it may be, her ways. If she has decided to live that life, I will not allow the
children to also do so in her path." '8 And as already mentioned, the desire to
annihilate a culture was the reason why white policy makers removed Native
American children from their own homes.8 9 By enacting the contemporary
(discussing controversy of GID diagnosis in adults and children). Although usually pre-teens
are treated, a GID diagnosis in children begins as early as two to four years old. Id. As de-
scribed in the DSM-IV, boys with GID "have a marked preoccupation with traditionally
feminine activities," "dress[] in girls' or women's clothes," "draw[] pictures of beautiful girls
and princesses," play with "[s]tereotypical female-type dolls, such as Barbie," play[] a
"mother-role" while playing house, and do not play "rough-and-tumble play and competitive
sports" or having "little interest in cars and trucks." DSM-IV, supra note 232, at 533. Girls
who purportedly suffer from GID suffer from symptoms such as eschewing playing with
"dolls or any form of feminine dress up or role-play activity," identify with "intense negative
reactions to parental expectations or attempts to have them wear dresses or other feminine
attire," prefer to wear "boy's clothing and short hair," admire "powerful male figures, such as
Batman or Superman," prefer to play with boys "with whom they share interests in contact
sports, rough-and-tumble play, and traditional boyhood games." Id. The treatment of children
with GID includes behavior modification techniques that reward the child for playing with her
gender's toys and punish her for playing with her opposite gender's toys. See Minter, supra,
at 15-16. The diagnosis and treatment of childhood GID was devised specifically with the
intent to prevent adult homosexuality and transsexuality. Id. at 15-19 (reporting that therapists
tell children things such as: "as [you] grow up, and if [you] continue to do sissy things, [you]
won't have many friends, and people will not like you." In extreme cases, kids with gender
identity disorder are sent to mental institutions where they are subjected to abuse and prod-
ding to conform into proper gender socialization. See DAPHNE SCHOLINSKI, THE LAST TIME I
WoRE A DRESS (1997). In addition to being ineffective treatment, most children are trauma-
tized from growing up in a mental hospital inhabited by insane adults. As parents have com-
plete legal authority over their children, children are forced into these institutions until age
eighteen, when they are no longer legally obliged to stay there and most insurance companies
end their medical coverage of the condition. Id.
287. See supra note 65 (citing CARP, supra note 7, at 103); see also supra notes 54-82
(discussing Orphan Trains).
288. SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 165 (quoting Judge Woodward); see also supra notes
121-29 and accompanying text for discussion of Baby Selling scandals.
289. See supra notes 136-47 (discussing ICWA and parallels to gay adoption bans).
[Vol. 40
58
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss1/2
2003] PARENS PATRI[ARCHYI: ADOPTION, EUGENICS, AND SAME-SEX COUPLES 59
adoption bans, the states are marshaling state resources to prevent single
mothers, unmarried couples, and gay people from transmitting their non-
traditional view of gender onto adopted and foster children. The pink trian-
gle is a poignant reminder of the last time that a state-sponsored social ex-
periment attempted to achieve the same end."l
3. Stigmatization
All states also rely upon claims that children will be stigmatized if
raised by single parents or gay or lesbian ones. The State of Florida claims
that its policy is rationally related to "minimiz[ing] social stigmatization of
the child,"'" Arkansas asserts that its policy is premised on "the stigmatiza-
tion that gays may face,"" and the New Hampshire Supreme Court specu-
lated that a child raised by gay parents would experience stigmatization
based on its own inferences drawn from Bowers v. Hardwick."3
Nearly twenty years ago, the courts were presented with a similar situa-
tion. In Palmore v. Sidoti,294 the father of a child brought suit to deny the
child's mother custody of her after the mother, who is white, married a black
man." ' The Florida state court granted the father's request, concluding that
the child "will, if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains
school age and thus more vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social
stigmatization that is sure to come." '
On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the state court's assumption
that a child raised by an interracial couple will be subject to more "pressures
and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same ra-
290. The German Nazi party did not exclusively persecute Jews during the Holocaust.
Gay men also were sent to and killed in concentration camps. Whereas the Nazis made Jewish
individuals wear yellow stars, gay men wore pink triangles on their prison uniforms. See GAD
BECK, AN UNDERGROUND LIFE: MEMOIRS OF A GAY JEW IN NAZI BERLIN (1st ed. 2000); HEINZ
HEGER, MEN WITH THE PINK TRIANGLE: THE TRUE, LIFE-AND-DEATH STORY OF
HOMOSEXUALS IN THE NAZI DEATH CAMPS (Alyson Publications, rev. ed. 1994); RICHARD
PLANT, THE PINK TRIANGLE: THE NAZi WAR AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS (1988); see also Rob
Epstein & Jeffrey Friedman, PARAGRAPH 175 (1999) (a documentary that "moves and in-
spires, revealing the tragic, untold stories of gay men living under the Nazi regime. Friedman
and Epstein use a masterful blend of interviews, archival material, and new footage to weave
the stories of lesbian and gay survivors of Nazism into a nightmare-like tapestry of German
gay life before, during, and after World War II.").
291. State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 21.
292. State of Arkansas Brief, supra note 206, at 3.
293. Opinion of the Justices, 520 A.2d at 23 ("Additionally, the general court finds that
being a child in such programs is difficult enough without the added social and psychological
complexities that a homosexual lifestyle could produce. The general court makes this state-
ment in a deliberative and balanced manner both recognizing the rights of consenting adults,
as limited by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bowers v. Hardwick").
294. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
295. ld. at 430.
296. ld. 59
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cial or ethnic origin."2" Nonetheless, removing a child for this reason was
inimical to the Constitution because "the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give [private biases] effect."" 8 Because the mother was found a fit parent,
the Supreme Court rejected the claim that stigma arising from a parent's in-
terracial marriage should terminate the mother's custody.2
In the one instance in which Palmore v. Sidoti has been presented to
state courts in opposition to the adoption bans, the State of Florida has dis-
avowed any similarity between the cases, claiming that Palmore v. Sidoti
was limited to a race-based claim.' This argument is erroneous. Palmore v.
Sidoti makes clear that "private biases" may not be given effect in removing
a child from the care of an otherwise fit parent. In light of the urgency of
finding qualified parents for foster and adoptive kids, the wisdom of that
policy appears even more compelling in the adoption and foster care context.
The act of parenting is a means by which an individual influences and
shapes the values that another will hold in the next generation. This right to
"affect the culture and embrace, act upon, and advocate privately chosen
values" is a means by which a parent chooses and propagates values, which
in essence becomes an individual's salient contribution to the democratic
order."' It is this contribution that the states are attempting to eliminate by
denying gay people and single parents the ability to parent children. History
establishes that the contemporary adoption bans thus fit squarely in the leg-
acy of the Orphan Trains, Tennessee Baby Snatching Scandal, and the
conditions that lead to the passage of the ICWA. These policies were
misguided then and, in light of Lawrence v. Texas, an impermissible exercise
of state power today.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BANS:
LAWRENCE v. TEXAS, STANLEY v. ILLINOIS
The removal of children from intact families that are deemed "morally
inferior" is not just a theoretical danger, but is a real component of how the
contemporary adoption bans operate. In Lofton v. Kearney,"2 plaintiffs chal-
lenged Florida's statute due to actual and prospective removals of children
from their existing families? 3 The most well-known plaintiff, Steve Lofton,
297. Id. at 433.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 432, 434.
300. See, e.g., State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 21 (citing Bottoms v. Bottoms,
457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (affirming trial court's removal of biological child from custody of
mother who is a lesbian)). Bottoms involved a custody case in which allegations of child
abuse were present. Bottoms does not cite to Palmore v. Sidoti in reaching its conclusions.
301. See Davis, supra note 45, at 1371 (discussing how the history of slavery informs the
notion of family liberty).
302. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
303. Id. at 1375. Plaintiff Douglas E. Houghton, Jr. is "a clinical nurse specialist and
legal guardian" who has been the caretaker for a child since age four when the biological
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has served as a foster parent to his ten-year-old son, Bert, since he was an
infant."° In 1988, Lofton worked as a pediatric nurse for infants infected
with the HIV virus and lived with his partner of five years, Roger Croteau? °'
The State of Florida asked Steve and Roger to take care of an infant foster
child with HIV, and within the next couple of years, Steve and Roger be-
came foster parents to five more babies, all of whom were HIV positive."
The State of Florida asked Steve to quit his job to provide the necessary care
for the infants, and Steve "did without hesitation."' The care Steve and
Roger provided was remarkable and did not go unnoticed. The Children's
Home Society, which was "a child placement agency licensed by Florida's
predecessor agency to the Florida Department of Children and Families,"
presented Steve and Roger an "Outstanding Foster Parenting Award," which
they named the "Lofton-Croteau Award" in their honor."°
In an unexpected turn of events, the medication administered to Bert re-
sulted in the successful sero-conversion of the HIV virus, a medical phe-
nomenon that occurs in a small number of infants who receive AZT and
other such medication at an early age.3" In 1994, the State of Florida learned
of Bert's HIV negative status and subsequently released him for adoption
because he no longer had a medical condition that made him a hard to place
child. t° Steve immediately applied to adopt Bert, but the State of Florida
denied his application pursuant to its statutory ban categorically prohibiting
all gay men and lesbian women from adopting children.3"' Steve then
brought suit in federal district court challenging Florida's law. From the date
of Bert's release for adoption, through the present day, the State of Florida
father voluntarily left the child with Houghton. Id. Plaintiffs Brenda and Gregory Bradley,
who are a married heterosexual couple, "intended to designate a homosexual relative to be the
guardian and eventual adoptive parent of their children in the event of their deaths," but are
denied the option based on the adoption ban. Id. at 1376. See also Zubeck, supra note 12 (ac-
cording to the Colorado DHS, if a similar ban had been implemented in El Paso County, the
policy would present the likelihood of disrupting a larger number of existing families).
304. Lofton,157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
305. See Lofion-Croteau Family: Steve and Roger, at http://www.lethimstay.com
loftonssteveroger.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Steve and Roger].
306. Id. Frank and Tracy were placed with Steve and Roger in 1988, and Bert in 1991 by
the State of Florida. Another child, Ginger, also was placed with Steve and Roger and died of
AIDS complications in 1995. The family moved to Oregon in 1999 to be closer to Steve's
elderly parents. The family's new pediatrician told an Oregon caseworker of Steve and Roger
and the State of Oregon subsequently asked Steve and Roger to take in Wayne and Ernie who
were five and two years old at the time and also HIV positive. Technically, only Steve regis-
tered as a foster parent with the State of Florida. Florida's marriage laws did not allow Steve
and Roger to marry or serve as joint foster parents. Id.; see also Loflon-Croteau Family: Gin-
ger's Story, at http://www.lethimstay.com/loftons-ginger.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
307. Steve and Roger, supra note 305.
308. Id.; see also Lofion, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
309. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
310. See id.; Steve and Roger, supra note 305. For a definition of a "hard to place" child,
see supra note 9.
311. Lofion, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
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sends Steve a letter every "few weeks" that provides an update on the status
of finding another family to adopt Bert. 2
The Florida district court found that there was no doubt that "a deeply
loving and interdependent relationship between Lofton and [Bert] ... ex-
ists," 3 and that "the emotional tie[] between Lofton and [Bert] ... is quite
close-as close as those between biological parents [and their children]. ' '314
Nonetheless, the State of Florida defended its decision to remove Bert be-
cause the adoption bans serves the state interest of "reflect[ing] the State's
moral disapproval of homosexuality" and that the "provision serves the best
interest of Florida's children... [by] rais[ing] [them] in a home stabilized
by marriage, in a family consisting of both a mother and a father.
315
The district court soundly rejected moral opprobrium as a legitimate
state interest, but it agreed that, in light of the fact that there was no funda-
mental right to adoption, the removal of Bert from his home, two fathers,
and four siblings serves the best interest of the child and is a permissible and
rational act.3t6 The decision is on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peal, where a decision is pending.3 7 Lofton v. Kearney demonstrates that
Florida's statute, and others like it, fit squarely in the legacy of now-
disavowed practices in the history of adoption placements that have removed
children from immigrant families, poor single mothers, Mexican-Americans,
and Native Americans for the proffered reasons that the children will be
raised by parents who are perceived to be morally inferior based on their
marital or caste status."' An important lesson from history is that when these
practices were stopped, there was no universal consensus with respect to
their impropriety. Rather, social reformers used legal mechanisms to end
practices that defenders continued to assert were in the interest of children.3 9
312. See The Lofton-Croteau Family: Bert's Story, at http://www.lethimstay.
com/loftonsbert.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (reporting that Florida rejected stipulation
to stop placement efforts during pendency of the lawsuit).
313. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
314. Id. at 1379.
315. Id. at 1382-83.
316. Id. at 1383-85.
317. The decision is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh
Circuit, No. 01-16723-DD. After oral argument was held, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
318. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text (Orphan Train); notes 94-115 and
accompanying text (Eugenic Era); notes 121-129 and accompanying text (Baby Selling scan-
dals); notes 136-48 and accompanying text (ICWA); notes 150-66 and accompanying text
(Arizona Orphan Abduction).
319. For instance, legal procedures necessary to secure a birth mother's consent and
government licensing of adoption agencies arose from the Orphan Trains and Baby Selling
scandals. See, e.g., Cole & Donley, supra note 8, at 277 (observing that the black market and
rigidity of eligibility requirements "gave rise to cries for reform in the field of adoption (and
foster care). These cries led in 1955 to a National Conference on Adoption sponsored by the
Child Welfare League of America.... Many of these changes took place in the 1960s and
1970s and were due to massive political, social and moral changes of that period."). The
ICWA introduced a system under which tribes receive jurisdiction to determine the placement
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Challenges to the contemporary adoption bans have been brought in
four states over the past twenty years. No court has yet struck the bans
down. 2 Indeed, the courts upheld the bans in both Lofton v. Kearny and
Opinion of the Justices,32' which was an advisory opinion on New Hamp-
shire's adoption ban, a statute later repealed by the state legislature.322 How-
ever, both of these decisions were issued before Lawrence v. Texas, and con-
sequently they both failed to recognize the liberty interests that adoptive and
foster parents have in the relationships with their children.
A. Liberty Interest Implicated by Adoption: Substantive Due Process
Arkansas, Florida, Utah, and New Hampshire assert that because there
is no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted, their respective statutory
and regulatory schemes are shielded from judicial inquiry.323 The Supreme
Court has defined a fundamental right as one that is "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,"32' and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,""32 without which neither liberty nor justice would exist.326 Accordingly,
any judicial declaration of a new right must proceed with caution and assur-
ance that the right at issue is as fundamental as claimed.327
It is true that no case has held expressly that there is a fundamental right
to adopt. However, neither is there a case explicitly holding that there is a
fundamental right to use contraceptives, a fundamental right to solicit legal
business, a fundamental right to vote in state elections without paying a fee,
or a fundamental right not to disclose a membership list to the state. None-
theless, the Supreme Court has held that a general right to privacy,32 access
to the courts, 329 voting," and association exist, and that the above de-
scribed activities fall within these general rights.
of foster and adoptive children. See KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 485-86.
320. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) and Cox v. Florida Dep't
of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) both upheld the Florida statute.
Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987) upheld New Hampshire's. A challenge to
Utah's administrative regulations was rendered moot once the statute was passed. As of Sep-
tember 2003, no decision has been issued with respect to Arkansas's statute.
321. 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
322. See supra note 171.
323. See, e.g., Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1380 (holding that "[ilt is undisputed that there
is no fundamental right to adopt, nor is there a fundamental right to be adopted. Instead, adop-
tion is a privilege created by statute and not by common law.") (internal citations omitted);
Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 24 (upholding New Hampshire's adoption ban in part
because "[tlhere is, further, no such right to adopt, to be a foster parent, or to be a child care
agency operator, as these relationships are legal creations governed by statute.").
324. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
325. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
326. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326.
327. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
328. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
329. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
330. Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 63
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In Lawrence v. Texas,332 the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of properly framing a right asserted to be a fundamental one. The Court ob-
served that Bowers v. Hardwick's.. rejection of what it characterized as the
right of "homosexuals to engage in sodomy" "discloses the Court's own
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake."' Indeed, "[t]o say
that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would de-
mean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right
to have sexual intercourse.""33
Likewise, defenders of the adoption bans cannot obviate the liberty in-
terest implicated by adoption through a particular spin. The Supreme Court
recently explained that substantive due process rights are not determined by
express language contained in the Constitution.336 Because the nation's foun-
ders recognized the limitations of an attempt to anticipate "the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities," the Constitution functions as a living
document, allowing "persons in every generation [to] invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.""33 In light of the fact that "times can
blind us to certain truths," the Supreme Court explained that "later genera-
tions" are the ones uniquely able to realize that "laws once thought necessary
and proper in fact serve only to oppress." '338 Indeed, the history of adoption
placement practices repeatedly exemplifies this phenomenon. The Orphan
Trains, baby selling, and removal of Native American children were policies
once thought rational and in the best interest of the children, but now are
considered misguided and a shameful exercise of power.339
The starting point in understanding the liberty interest implicated by an
individual's decision to adopt a child begins with the Supreme Court's right
of privacy cases. Griswold v. Connecticut' was the first case to strike down
a state law that forbade the use of contraceptives" The Supreme Court de-
termined that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,"
that some of those penumbras "create zones of privacy," and that therefore, a
state may not interfere with certain "sancit[ies] of [the] home and the priva-
cies of life" absent a compelling state interest to do so.2 Because the statute
at issue achieved its end by authorizing "marital bedrooms" to be subject to
331. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
332. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
333. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
334. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2484.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text (Orphan Train); notes 122-130 and
accompanying text (Baby Selling Scandals); notes 139-147 and accompanying text (ICWA).
340. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
341. Id. at 485.
342. Id. at 484-85.
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government control and scrutiny, the Court struck it down.34 3 In particular,
the Court held that because the law "seeks to achieve its goal by means hav-
ing the maximum destructive impact upon [the marriage] relationship," the
State of Connecticut was employing a form of government control that "is
repulsive to [] notions of privacy. '
Although the Griswold's announced liberty interest in the right of pri-
vacy was subject to much controversy and criticism,3' the Supreme Court
has relied upon such interest over the past thirty years to invalidate state
regulations that impermissibly regulated an unmarried individual's access to
contraception,' marriage to someone of a different race,3'7 access to abor-
tion,"8 and most recently, intimate sexual activity with someone of the same
gender? 9 As the contours of the right to privacy evolved, the Supreme Court
observed that "the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been
marked by the Court."3 '
When a child is placed in a home, adoption legally provides that the
child will be integrated fully into the adoptive family, receiving all legal
rights and obligations of a naturally born child."' The adoption of a child
thus is an act to create or expand a family, which is protected fully by the
liberty interest implicated in an individual's decision to form a family. Such
a liberty interest is not diminished by the lack of a biological connection be-
343. 16t at 485.
344. Id. at 486.
345. Justice Black's scathing dissent is the most notable criticism of the majority's estab-
lishment of right of privacy and its reliance on the Constitutional zones of privacy. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
346. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.").
347. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the freedom to marry "as
one of the vital personal rights" protected under the due process clause).
348. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
349. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003) ("When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homo-
sexual persons the right to make this choice.").
350. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
351. See HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-12 to 1-13 (observing that a "characteristic of
adoptive relationships is that once they are created,. . . [t]he adoptive family is said to repli-
cate and displace the child's original family 'in all respects.' Adoptive parents have exclusive
responsibility for the child.... [and] acquire the same rights to parental autonomy and family
privacy that the biological parents previously had.... This complete absorption of the child
into the legal and economic web of the adoptive family presumably encourages the emer-
gence of a lasting personal and psychological bond between the child and adoptive parents.")
(internal footnotes omitted).
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tween the parent and child, or by the fact that the parent child relationship is
created by the state. As explained in Smith v. OFFER,352 "biological relation-
ships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family," and
the existence of the marriage contract is evidence that the state is in fact in-
volved in the formation of all family relationships.353 Because the Supreme
Court has recognized that "the importance of the familial relationship...
stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association,"3 a decision to adopt a child must receive the same protection
as the decision to beget or bear one. As observed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, "a couple deciding to adopt must make decisions that are
not essentially different from the decision to beget a child biologically. Un-
der the Supreme Court's constitutional approach to... a family rights claim,
we should not belittle the similarities between adoption and natural child
birth. 355 Adoption is therefore a decision that is protected by the fundamen-
tal liberty interest an individual has in forming his or her family.
Turning to the permissibility of the adoption bans, the states have au-
thority over the parentless children in their care and a statutory duty to place
them in homes that advance child welfare and social concerns.356 The adop-
tion bans limit which individuals or couples can expand their families, based
on the parents' marital status or sexual orientation. The adoption bans in-
clude provisions requiring an individual to sign an affidavit stating he or she
is celibate or that he or she is heterosexual, and some states allow for the
state to investigate whether a prospective parent is having consensual sexual
intimacy with an adult in her home or is living with a gay or lesbian per-
son.357 Although all prospective parents who wish to adopt are subject to a
rigorous and highly intrusive investigation of their home environment, this
criterion differs substantially in its character and nature.
Unlike criteria such as financial status, emotional stability, past criminal
history, or views on child discipline, no state in the union or mainstream
child welfare organization designates sexual orientation, marital status, or
private adult intimacy as legally cognizable grounds to remove a child from
her biological parents.35 Likewise, unlike criteria such as religious beliefs,
352. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
353. Id. at 843-844 ("The basic foundation of the family in our society, the marriage
relationship, is of course not a matter of blood relation."); id. at 846 n.53 ("The legal status of
families has never been regarded as controlling: 'Nor has the Constitution refused to recog-
nize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."') (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (internal modifications omitted)).
354. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844.
355. Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989).
356. See supra notes 37-38, 49 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 2-5.
358. No state considers a parent's sexual orientation, marital status, or adult consensual
intimacy as a ground that may per se terminate parental rights. See, e.g., ADAMEC & PIERCE,
supra note 9, at 287-90 (listing grounds for terminating parental rights, which include neglect,
abandonment, or abuse. In addition, most states provide that if a birth parent suffers from
particular mental illness or physical incapacities (usually lengthy incarceration) that "mak[e]
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spending practices, career choice, and existing disabilities, no state or main-
stream child welfare organization has deemed sexual orientation, marital
status, or intimate associations as dispositive to the question of a biological
parent's fitness to raise a particular child.359 Because the states fail to provide
evidence of demonstrable harm or even relevance to parenting skills, the
criteria of sexual orientation, intimate associations, and marital status solely
involve a parent's status and lack any correlation to his or her conduct that
may affect a child.3" The means employed by the contemporary adoption
bans do nothing more than seek to police the prospective parent's constitu-
tionally protected decisions to enter into or refrain from entering into a mar-
riage, decide to create a family, associate with particular adults based on
their status, or engage in consensual adult intimacy.36' The contemporary
adoption bans therefore are similar to the regulation at issue in Griswold,
which "seeks to achieve its goal by means having [the] maximum destruc-
tive impact upon [a protected] relationship," between the prospective parent
and her intimate associations. 2
The interest implicated by the adoption bans is not an asserted entitle-
ment to adopt one particular child, a right to adopt all children, or a right to
receive all benefits to which a naturally born child is entitled. Rather, the
discrete issue implicated by the adoption bans is whether the state can deny
it impossible for them to provide normal parental care," parental rights may be terminated.
The level of harm to a child required to be demonstrated before a court will termination pa-
rental rights is an exceedingly high threshold. See id. at 290 (quoting attorney Richard Ducote
who observes that, "We adopt a higher standard of proof in parental-termination cases than in
criminal cases. With the same evidence that would enable a D.A. to send a parent away for 15
to 20 years for what he did to his kids, some juvenile- and family-court judges are still reluc-
tant to terminate rights.").
359. Although a handful of states take sexual orientation into account as an adverse fac-
tor in making custody or visitation determinations, no state considers a parent's sexual orien-
tation as a basis for terminating parental rights. See, e.g., LIrTLE, supra note 210, at 1-171 to
1-174. See also supra note 358.
360. Indeed, the majority of private adoption agencies routinely place children with gay
and lesbian parents seeking to adopt. See Crary, supra note 13, at A5.
361. The right to enter into a marriage and right to be protected from unconstitutional
distribution of benefits based on marital status are protected by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("Nor has the [Constitu-
tion] refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage cere-
mony."); and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating regulation that
barred unmarried individuals access to family planning). When the Supreme Court struck
down the sterilization statute in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942), it relied
upon the principle that an individual has a fundamental right to procreate and the state may
not administer a regulation that would permanently deprive one class of individuals this right
over another. Arguably the adoption bans prohibition on family formation achieves the same
end, the elimination of a class of individuals from having children over another. In addition,
the right to associate with others in non-criminal activities is protected under NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and the right to protection from government interference in con-
sensual adult intimacy is established in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003). The
contemporary adoption bans infringe upon each of these protections by denying children to
individuals based on their marital status or sexual orientation.
362. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 67
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an individual the right to parent and raise a child-based not on her ability as
a parent, but on her status as an unmarried, gay, or cohabiting individual.
Until the 1960s and 1970s, the states exercised control over which indi-
viduals or couples were entitled to receive contraception and information
about birth control. In holding such regulation unconstitutional, Griswold
and Eisenstadt established that an individual's decision to start a family,
rather than the biological act of procreation, is the fundamental right pro-
tected by the Constitution. As explained in Carey v. Population Services In-
ternational,
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of
this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.... This is understand-
able, for in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate of human
activities and relationships .... "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 36
The state regulation over contraception at issue in Griswold and Eisen-
stadt, and regulation of abortion at issue in Carey and Roe, control the
means by which children are brought into families. The contemporary adop-
tion bans regulate the placement of already born children into families. Both
types of regulations therefore are analogous attempts by a state to control a
person's ability to form a family by preventing a particular individual-
either gay, lesbian, unmarried, or cohabiting with another adult-from par-
enting the children over which the state has control. Because the adoption
bans baldly interfere with a liberty interest without any compelling state in-
terest, they too are constitutionally infirm and must go the way of the regula-
tions in Griswold and Roe.
Other federal authority that has held that there is no fundamental right to
adopt does not interfere with this conclusion. For instance, in Mullins v.
Oregon,'" the Ninth Circuit held that there is no "constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the adoption of [a] grandchild.""36 However, the case ad-
dressed the discrete issue of whether a grandmother who had maintained
minimal contact with her grandchild was entitled to adopt her.3" In contrast
to individuals affected by the adoption bans, the grandmother was able to
apply to adopt the child, the state considered the application and evaluated
the merits of her parenting skills, and the basis for denying the application
was not a categorical exclusion or irrebuttable presumption regarding her
fitness.367 Likewise, Lindley v. Sullivan3" rejected an equal protection chal-
363. 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972))
(emphasis omitted in Carey).
364. 57 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1995).
365. Id. at 791.
366. Id. ("[T]he Mullinses never have had more than minimal contact with their grand-
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lenge to a government program that provided insurance to disabled parents
for children born to them but not for adopted children.3" The classification at
issue was one that conferred a government benefit to a child based on her
status as a naturally born or adoptive child, and it was not a provision that
categorically precluded any individual from adopting based on his or her
status.7 Neither case addressed a type of government regulation that sought
to prevent an individual from becoming a parent to every child. Moreover,
the cases do not alter the conclusion that adoption implicates one of the most
precious of liberty interests, the right to form a family, and that therefore the
adoption bans impermissibly abridge substantive due process guarantees.
B. Liberty Interest Implicated by Foster Care: Procedural Due Process
Foster care indisputably involves a different type of familial relationship
than other situations. This difference is that the foster parents enter into a
binding contract with the state concerning various conditions under which
they will surrender the child. The foster care system operates with the under-
lying premise that a biological parent who gives up her child to the state will
have the child returned when she once again is able to care, emotionally and
physically, for her child.37" ' Indeed, "the natural parent initially gave up his
child to the State only on the express understanding that the child would be
returned in those circumstances."372 Due to these unique circumstances, any
substantive due process right that exists between a foster parent and her child
may be abridged when the biological parent seeks the return of his child pur-
suant to the terms of the foster care agreement.373
Florida and Arkansas have relied upon this aspect of foster care to argue
that the adoptions bans are permissible as applied to foster parents in light of
the fact that "foster parents do not have a justifiable expectation of an endur-
ing companionship because the emotional ties originate under state law. '374
The Florida district court agreed, claiming that Smith v. OFFER37 stands for
the proposition that "unlike natural families, foster parents do not have a jus-
tifiable expectation[] of an enduring companionship because the emotional
ties originate under state law. '376 However, the Supreme Court's holding in
368. 889 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989).
369. Id. at 126.
370. Id. at 131-32.
371. See Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977).
372. Id. at 846.
373. Id. at 846-47 ("Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family
as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal
from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.").
374. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2001); see also State of
Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 50-54; State of Arkansas Brief, supra note 206, at 9.
375. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
376. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1379; see also id. at 1380 ("Plaintiffs Lofton and Hough-
ton entered into relationships to be a foster parent and legal guardian, respectively, with an69
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OFFER was more narrow. OFFER recognized that in particular circum-
stances, the emotional bond between a child and her parent, independent of
any underlying biological relationship or the level of state involvement in
formalizing that relationship, forms a cognizable liberty interest with which
the state must not interfere. 77 The contractual aspect of foster families be-
comes relevant in the limited circumstance in which a natural parent in fact
seeks the return of her child. 78 Notably, the OFFER court expressly declined
to comment further on the contours of the substantive due process rights af-
forded to a foster parent and her child in situations other than when the bio-
logical parent seeks the child's return."7 Because adoption bans barring par-
ticular classes of individuals from serving as foster parents do not involve a
natural parent exercising her contractual rights for the return of her child, the
Florida district court erred in concluding that Supreme Court precedent pre-
cludes the recognition of substantive due process rights for foster parents.
As demonstrated above, the adoption bans implicate a substantive due
process right in family formation, and thus the states' regulations over foster
care are subject to constitutional scrutiny."8 "Procedural due process im-
poses constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment."38' As relevant to prospective
and existing foster parents, a state thus may not deprive an individual of the
ability to form a family by imposing an irrebuttable presumption of unfit-
ness.
inherent understanding that the relationships they forged would not be immune from DCF and
State oversight but permitted only upon their approval. Thus, while this Court recognizes the
need, importance, and value of foster parent and legal guardian relationships, it cannot extend
to those relationships the liberty interest granted to biological parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children. Lofton, Doe, Houghton and Roe have no expectation of permanency
and, therefore, no right to exclude the State from their family lives.").
377. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("Thus the importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promo-
tion a way of life' through the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood rela-
tionship.") (internal citation omitted) (some internal modifications omitted).
378. See id. at 846-47 ("Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster
family as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed
removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.").
379. See id. at 847 ("As this discussion suggests, appellees' claim to a constitutionally
protected liberty interest raises complex and novel questions. It is unnecessary for us to re-
solve those questions definitively in this case, however, ... [because] we conclude that 'nar-
rower grounds exist to support' our reversal.").
380. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1975) (holding that general social
welfare legislation will not have impermissible irrebuttable presumptions unless the statute
implicates a constitutionally protected interest).
381. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
[Vol. 40
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1. As-Applied to Prospective Foster Parents
In Bell v. Burson,3" the State of Georgia passed the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, which provided that the vehicle registration and
driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident would be
suspended unless the motorist were to post a security covering the amount of
damages claimed by aggrieved parties.3" The plaintiff contended that the
statute violated due process because it failed to provide him with an oppor-
tunity to present evidence that he was not in fact liable for the accident.3"
Georgia contended that it can apply the statute without considering such evi-
dence because "fault and liability are irrelevant to the statutory scheme.
385
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that liability "plays a crucial role in
the Safety Responsibility Act," because suspension of a license is triggered
by a finding of liability.386 The State of Georgia therefore "must provide a
forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable
possibility of a judgment [of liability] being rendered against [the uninsured
motorist]."'"
The adoption bans present an analogous procedural due process defect,
imposing an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness on a class of prospective
foster parents based upon their marital status or sexual orientation. The states
contend that their presumptions of unfitness are proper and no different from
statutory prohibitions against placing a child with an individual who has
been convicted of child abuse, a violent felony, or a sex offense.3"' There is
no question that a state has the statutory authority to avoid placing a child
with a foster parent who is a demonstrated danger to the child.389 However,
unlike the criminal prohibitions, the adoption bans differ significantly by
prohibiting all gay or unmarried individuals from parenting despite the ab-
sence of evidence of harm to a child. The nature of the purported harm to
children raised by single parents or same-sex couples consists of improper
gender role socialization, disinclination towards heterosexuality, immoral
382. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
383. Id. at 535-36.
384. Id. at 537.
385. Id. at 541.
386. Id. In particular, the Act provides that a license will be not be suspended if a release
of liability is executed by the injured party or a judgment of non-liability is entered. Likewise,
if suspension has been imposed, these conditions will lift it. Id. at 537 n. 1.
387. Id. at 542.
388. See, e.g., State of Florida Brief, supra note 136, at 28 (defending its adoption ban
against charges of eliminating eligible prospective parents on the basis that "[tihere are any
number of restrictions-statutory, regulatory, practical, categorical, and non-categorical--on
who may adopt .... Each of these restrictions restricts the pool of prospective adoptive par-
ents available to adopt children out of foster care; that is what restrictions do.").
389. See, e.g., K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the state
removed a child from the custody of her parents; and having done so, it could no more place
her in a position of danger... without thereby violating her rights under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...").
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role modeling, and stigmatization.3 These behaviors, however morally rep-
rehensible to some people in this country, are not criminal offenses and are
not the type of conduct that any mainstream child welfare organization has
determined results in harm to a child.39' Congress recently has recognized
that many of the former criteria that states and agencies used to screen out
prospective parents with disabilities was based on a similar animus that had
no relevance to parenting." The adoption bans perpetuate a similar arbitrary
bias that has no place in child-placement considerations.
Florida, Arkansas, and all other states interview, investigate, and evalu-
ate prospective foster care or adoptive parents, individually determining pa-
rental fitness. 93 The evaluations take into account whether a particular parent
can provide for a particular child in light of potential unique concerns such
as a medical condition, specific religious belief or cultural background, or
need for continued contact with biological family members; a state will deny
placement with any prospective parent who is determined to present a likeli-
hood of harmful or even inadequate care.394 Because a showing of parental
fitness is the crucial determination of the child placement process, Bell es-
tablishes that a state may not deny any prospective foster or adoptive parent
the opportunity to present evidence of his or her fitness.
Indeed, a fatal flaw to the adoption bans is that they circumvent the pro-
vision to which every other prospective parent is subjected, an extensive
home study and evaluation to determine their fitness. Because an existing
mechanism exists to ensure that a parent's behavior, conduct, lifestyle, and
judgment will not harm a child, the presumption of unfitness accorded only
to individuals who reside outside of a heterosexual marriage is suspect. As
390. See supra notes 268-301 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text. In addition, the Child Welfare
League of America ("CWLA") supports the placement of children with gay individuals and
unmarried couples and adamantly opposes the adoption bans' categorical presumptions of
parental unfitness towards them. In listing its objections to an administrative rule that served
as a template to Utah's statute, the CWLA stated that every state should allow all prospective
parents to "have an equal opportunity to apply for the adoption of children, and receive fair
and equal treatment and consideration of their qualifications as adoptive parents, under appli-
cable law." See Ex. R00823, Submission of Statement by CWLA, Administrative Record,
Utah Children v. Utah State Bd. of Child & Family Servs., Civ. No. 990910881 (3d Dist. Ct.,
Salt Lake County, Utah 1999). Neither the CWLA nor any other such organization is making
a similar call to place children with child molesters and violent felons.
392. See Madelyn Freundlich, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What Adoption
Agencies Need to Know, available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/ada.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2003) (summarizing the "non-discrimination mandates of the ADA" as ap-
plied to adoption agencies).
393. HOLLINGER, supra note 6, at 1-12.
394. See generally Eligibility Guidelines for Adoption, supra note 9 (listing guidelines
prepared by a licensed agency of the State in its evaluation of prospective parents. Categories
include age of parents, marital status, number of divorces, insurance, existing children in the
home, when a parent can return to work, health of parents, criminal record, and infertility.);
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observed by the Supreme Court in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,39
when there is an existing provision that is "aimed specifically at the prob-
lems of fraud and of the voluntarily poor," and an additional measure justi-
fied by this basis affects only a small subset of the population, "considerable
doubt" arises with respect to whether the additional measure "could ration-
ally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses." '396 This legal
principle holds true here as well. Given that there is a highly developed, so-
phisticated mechanism to ensure that a child is placed with a fit parent in a
suitable home, the adoption bans are superfluous, and indeed, nothing more
than a thinly veiled pretext for impermissible discrimination. The adoption
bans run afoul of procedural due process by foreclosing to certain foster and
adoptive parents the opportunity to present evidence of fitness, which is pro-
vided to every other member of the population.3"
2. As-Applied to Existing Foster Parents
With respect to existing foster parent and child relationships, the adop-
tion bans present an even more egregious violation of procedural due proc-
ess. In Stanley v. Illinois,398 Joan and Peter Stanley had three children to-
gether.'" Although Joan and Peter never entered into a legal marriage, they
lived together "intermittently for 18 years," during which time Peter shared
in the parenting duties, financially supported all of the children, and lived
with the children for all of their lives.' Joan died while two of the children
were still minors, and at the time, under Illinois law, children of unwed fa-
thers became wards of the state.' Upon Joan's death, the State of Illinois
instituted dependency proceedings, removed the children from Peter's cus-
tody, declared them wards of the state, and placed them with court appointed
395. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
396. Id. at 536-37. Although Moreno addressed an equal protection claim, the principle
applies to a determination as to whether a statute presents an impermissible irrebuttable pre-
sumption. As observed by the Supreme Court, the "'irrebuttable presumption' cases must
ultimately be analyzed as calling into question not the adequacy of procedures but-like [the]
cases involving classifications framed in other terms ... the adequacy of the 'fit' between the
classification and the policy that the classification serves." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 121 (1991) (citing to Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965)).
397. There is no question that when allowed to present their qualifications, gay and les-
bian parents remain qualified to adopt and raise children. A recent survey showed that over 60
percent of private adoption agencies routinely place children with gay and lesbian parents and
the only agencies that regularly resist such placement are religious-based organizations,
which appear to resist based on moral, rather than child-welfare, considerations. See Crary,
supra note 13, at A5 (reporting findings of national survey).
398. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
399. Id. at 650 n.4.
400. Id. at 646. The record states that Peter lived with the two children who are involved
in the case and is silent with respect to whether Peter lived with the child whose legal status
was not at issue. Id. at 647 n.2.
401. Id at 646.
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guardians.' Peter challenged the action because the State of Illinois had
never demonstrated his unfitness as a parent. 3 The state supreme court re-
jected the challenge, holding that "Stanley could be properly separated from
his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not
been married."
Before the United States Supreme Court, the State of Illinois defended
its actions by asserting that "unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their
children and that [therefore] it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings
to determine whether particular fathers are in fact unfit parents ... ." The
State of Illinois' defense of its illegitimacy statutes in removing children
from Stanley is strikingly similar to Florida's defense of the adoption ban's
removal of Bert from Steve Lofton's care. Illinois asserted that unwed fa-
thers are "unnatural" and Florida claims that gay parents are "immoral."
Illinois claimed that based on "history or culture.., real differences [exist]
between the married father and the unmarried father, in terms of their inter-
ests in children and their legal responsibility for their children, [and] that the
statute here fulfills the compelling governmental objective of protecting
children. . .. "' Florida asserts that same-sex couples fail to provide stabil-
ity and legal protections to their children and that the best interest of a child
is to be raised by a married couple. 8 The Supreme Court found the follow-
ing three flaws with Illinois' justifications and action.
First, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the emotional rela-
tionship between Stanley and his children presented a "cognizable and sub-
stantial" interest that favored Stanley's retention of his children, despite the
fact that his familial relationship was "unlegitimized by a marriage cere-
mony."' There can be no question that the district court's findings with re-
spect to "a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between Lofton
and [Bert]," presents a comparable liberty interest, which the contemporary
adoption bans impermissibly infringe.""°
Second, the Supreme Court soundly rejected Illinois' "assumption that
placing [an illegitimate child] for adoption is inherently preferable to rearing
by his [biological] father, that uprooting him from the family which he knew
from birth until he was a year and a half old, secretly institutionalizing him
and later transferring him to strangers is so incontrovertibly better that no
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1972).
405. Id. at 647.
406. See Lofton v. Keamey, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that
Florida asserts that its adoption ban permissibly "reflect[s] the State's moral disapproval of
homosexuality ... ").
407. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 653 n.5.
408. See supra notes 211, 279-280 and accompanying text.
409. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
410. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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court has the power even to consider the matter.... Illinois' proffered studies
and theories of harm were thus rejected because:
We are not aware of any sociological data justifying the assumption that
an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to receive a
proper upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was at one
time married to his mother, or that the stigma of illegitimacy is so perva-
sive it requires adoption by strangers and Rermanent termination of a sub-
sisting relationship with the child's father.
Likewise, Florida's assertions that a child will benefit from being raised
by a married couple is rendered irrelevant in the consideration of whether
Florida may remove Bert from his home of ten years, two parents, and four
siblings.
Third, the Supreme Court then invalidated the state statute because even
if Illinois' assertion that "most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglect-
ful parents" were true, Illinois may not rely upon presumption instead of in-
dividualized determinations in light of the reality that not "all unmarried fa-
thers" are unfit parents."3 "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper...
[b]ut when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in defer-
ence to past formalities ... it cannot stand."4 4 Thus, whatever the apparent
advantages that a more traditional family may provide, the State of Florida
may not remove Bert without a proof that Steve Lofton in fact is an unfit
parent. If the State of Florida removes Bert without such a finding, "the State
registers no gain towards its declared goals... [If [Lofton] is a fit father,
the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates [a
child] from his family.'4"
All statutes that impose irrebuttable presumptions pose a potential pro-
cedural due process violation. However, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,4!6 the
Supreme Court set forth the limits of this principle. Michael H. upheld a
411. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 n.7 (1972) (quoting In re Mark T., 154
N.W.2d 27, 39 (Mich. 1967)).
412. Id. (quoting In re Mark T., 154 N.W.2d 27, 39 (Mich. 1967)).
413. Id. at 654.
414. Id. at 656-57.
415. Id. at 652-53, 658 ("Under the Due Process Clause [the offered] advantage [of chil-
dren being raised by married fathers] is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when
the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family."). Indeed, the irrebuttable presumption
of unfitness afforded to gay and lesbian individuals, single mothers, and unmarried couples is
as arbitrary and invidious as a state statute that would prohibit any child placement with a
heterosexual man based on the fact that "the vast majority of sexual acts committed upon
children are committed by adult heterosexual males." Matter of Appeal in Pima County, 727
P.2d 830, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (Howard, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). There is no
question that these studies are true. However, unless a fact is established that no straight man
could ever be a fit parent, a statute providing an irrebuttable presumption would run afoul of
due process. The subsequent efforts to deny gay individuals the right to a process that is suc-
cessful in determining parental fitness is similarly illogical and irrational discrimination.
416. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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California law that created a legal presumption that the husband of a child's
mother is the father of the child if the parents are living together at the time
of the child's birth.' Under the statutory scheme at issue, an individual-
who is either the husband or biological father-may contest this presumption
within two years of the child's birth, but after that time, the presumption be-
comes irrebuttable" 8 In the facts of the case, Gerald D. was the husband of
the child's mother. Michael H., however, produced blood tests demonstrat-
ing a ninety-eight percent probability that he was the child's biological fa-
ther. 9 Michael H. contended that the statutory presumption violated his
right to procedural due process, because it terminated his liberty interest in
his relationship with his biological child without affording him an eviden-
tiary hearing to demonstrate his paternity."
The Supreme Court nonetheless rejected his procedural due process
claim, finding that the presumption was a permissible one, in part because
Michael H. did not bring his paternity claim within the two-year window
afforded to him by the statute.2" The irrebuttable presumption in Michael H.
thus differs significantly from the one set forth in the adoption bans.
Whereas Michael H. was disadvantaged by a rebuttable presumption that
became irrebuttable after he had failed to contest within the window of op-
portunity provided under the statute, the adoption bans present a categorical
presumption that an individual may never challenge. The adoption bans thus
are a rare form of legislation that presents a legal presumption of unfitness
and denies an individual all opportunity to produce any countervailing evi-
dence. Like the irrebuttable presumptions at issue in Stanley and Bell, the
contemporary adoption bans violate a prospective and existing parent's right
to due process. Moreover, the state asserted opposition to gay and unmarried
parents fails to rely upon evidence of harm or concrete relevance of fitness
used in child placement contexts.422 The contemporary adoption bans are jus-
tified by moral opprobrium alone; and indeed become indistinguishable from
the past policies in which the State of Illinois presumed unwed fathers unfit
parents, Reverend Brace removed children from the "depraved" Catholic
families, corrupt judges terminated rights of the "immoral" single mothers in
the 1950s, armed vigilantes took away children from the "half-breed sav-
ages," and racist policymakers took children away from Native American
families.2 3
417. Id. at 113.
418. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EviD. CODE § 621).
419. Id. at 114.
420. Id. at 119.
421. Id. at 121.
422. See supra notes 211-301 and accompanying text.
423. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 n.5 (1972) (listing studies of unfitness of
unwed fathers); see supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text (Orphan Train); notes 122-30
and accompanying text (Baby Selling scandals); notes 137-49 and accompanying text
(ICWA); notes 151-67 and accompanying text (Arizona Orphan Abduction).
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CONCLUSION
The states defend their contemporary adoption bans as benign prefer-
ences for placing children in the homes of married heterosexual couples; a
family structure, it is contended, that is the ideal environment in which to
raise a child. The application of these statutes and regulations, however, has
the effect of disrupting and dismembering existing families. Moreover, the
claimed benefits that a child receives from being raised in a nuclear family
echo the claimed benefits that advocates once used to defend the Orphan
Trains, the Tennessee Baby Snatching Scandal, and the conditions that led to
the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act. History counsels that the
contemporary reservations of parenthood to heterosexuals are part of an ig-
noble legacy; the legal landscape now compels such a reservation of parent-
hood to fall.
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